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Preface
Geraldine Byrne Nason
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN

Welcome to the compendium of lectures of the ‘Ireland at Fordham
Humanitarian Lecture Series’. The Permanent Mission of Ireland has
been proud to collaborate with Fordham University’s Institute of
International Humanitarian Affairs, in a partnership that speaks to
Ireland’s profile as a leader in international development and humanitarian action, as well as Fordham’s commitment to distinguished
research and education.
Over the last 18 months, our collaboration has built upon our
shared commitment to exploring the challenges facing policy makers
and humanitarian actors working to get aid to the most vulnerable people on our planet, often in the most hard to reach places.
COVID-19 has made their job even more difficult. Throughout this
lecture series, we have had the honour to hear from a range of eminent speakers, who addressed both established and emerging issues
in the humanitarian field.
On this journey, we explored the challenges facing policy makers
and humanitarians as they deliver life-saving support and protection
to people in need. Addresses by H.E. Mary Robinson, Chair of The
Elders and the first woman elected President of Ireland; President
Michael D. Higgins; Dr. Jemilah Mahmood, at the time Under-Secretary General at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; Chief of the Defence Forces, Vice Admiral Mark Mellett;
United Nations Resident Coordinator, Jamie McGoldrick; Dr.
Caitriona Dowd; WFP’s Matthew Hollingworth; and Tánaiste and
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Simon Coveney, T.D., raised
issues including the intersection between humanitarian action and
climate justice, activism and the public intellectual, trust and localisation, peacekeeping, humanitarian access, and conflict and hunger.
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Since the inaugural lecture by President Mary Robinson at the United Nations in May 2019, we have witnessed the nature of humanitarian need rapidly changing. Conflicts have become more protracted and societies are faced with new and emerging threats such as
the devastating impact of COVID-19. As each of our eight lectures
demonstrate, we must adapt and improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance to help those in need without delay as humanitarian
crises become more and more complex. It is our collective responsibility to ensure the full respect for international humanitarian law
in all contexts. Moreover, as is argued with clear conviction in all
lectures, it is crucial that humanitarian workers are given the access
and support necessary to provide vital assistance to those who need
it most.
This series brings an Irish perspective to exploring some of these challenges and how they affect policy makers and humanitarians as they
seek to ensure aid reaches those in need, humanitarian principles are
upheld, and civilians are protected. Listening to the expert voices of
practitioners with first hand experience, the lecture series has helped
to inform Ireland’s understanding of how these humanitarian issues,
arising with ever greater frequency and urgency, interact with the
work of the United Nations Security Council, to which we hope to
be elected for the term 2021–2022.
Ireland has long been a leader in humanitarian response, from our
missionaries to our current steadfast support for the global humanitarian system with the UN at its centre.
I recall the words of President Mary Robinson in her lecture,
“If we all fail to act now; if we fail to act decisively; if we fail to act
together; future generations will never forgive us for the world that we
bequeath them.” Ireland is committed to a values-based foreign policy,
with principled humanitarian action at its very core. Our response
to crisis is underpinned by a strong commitment to international
humanitarian law and the provision of predictable, flexible, and
timely funding, based on the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, impartiality, and humanity. These principles ensure that humanitarian assistance is targeted, based on need, and
10

provided without discrimination.
The humanitarian system is an essential pillar of the effective multilateralism to which Ireland is committed. As humanitarian needs
increase we need to redouble our support to the current system while
looking at how we can prevent needs from arising in the first place,
through investments in prevention and development. Reducing humanitarian need is a cornerstone of Ireland’s development policy,
which was launched earlier this year.
I like to think that Ireland’s lived memory of vulnerability as a country that has endured conflict, migration, famine and colonialisation,
has helped shape our commitment to a profoundly ethical response
to these global challenges. In Ireland we believe in shared responsibility to address those challenges together. Sometimes that means
shining a light in dark places, to bring relief to those who needed it
most. It is my sincere hope that this Ireland at Fordham Humanitarian Lecture Series does just that, by shining a light on the realities and
challenges of the humanitarian space today, so that we may better
respond to it tomorrow.
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Introduction
Brendan Cahill
Executive Director, IIHA
The Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs was founded at
Fordham University to act as a bridge between the academic and
humanitarian sectors, which it achieves through training, research,
publications, exhibitions, conferences, and global partnerships. In
The Idea of a University, John Henry Newman wrote:  
“It is education which gives a man a clear, conscious view of their own
opinions and judgements, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in
expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to see things
as they are, to go right to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought to
detect what is sophistical and to discard what is irrelevant”.
Education and discourse break down the walls that narrow our
views, and, by sharing our thoughts and critiquing them, we
emerge to a better level of understanding and action. It is with
this philosophy that the Institute partnered with the Permanent
Mission of Ireland to the United Nations to organize these lectures
and to create this book.  
In 1841, John Hughes, an Irish migrant who had risen to the highest office in the Catholic Church in New York, founded Fordham
University. Hughes was an advocate and an innovator throughout
his life. He created the New York parochial school system when he
saw children were not being properly educated in the anti-immigrant
public schools, he founded the Emigrant Savings Bank when he realized migrants were being denied access to fair banking, and, in
Fordham University, he saw that it is education, especially higher
education, that allows for social mobility, justice and prosperity
for the most vulnerable. Hughes was also a diplomat, traveling to
Europe to prevent European powers from interfering in the US Civil
War. He lived in a time—as we do now—where the migrant was
13

demonized and victimized and denied their human rights. It was
his belief that those who had power also had an obligation to provide for those who had none. He identified protection, education
and human rights not as luxuries but as necessities, and, perhaps
most importantly, having identified those inequalities, he fought to
right them. That ethos informs the work of everything the Institute
has done.
Ireland, in its most recent policy paper, A Better World, has made
a strong and reasoned plan for foreign investment and support. In
his introduction to that document, Simon Coveney, T.D., Ireland’s
Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, stated clearly:
“During our public consultations, we heard that Irish people see development cooperation as an investment in a better future, as an important
projection of our values and as a statement of solidarity with others who
are less fortunate. It is also important to our safety and security, a protection against volatility in a time of change.
We believe that the focus in this new policy will help create that better
world which we want for ourselves and our children, a world where
Ireland shows effective leadership and good global citizenship as we move
into the second century of our independence.”
Complementing the values of Newman and Hughes, the paper looks
at foreign investment as an opportunity for all, to be a voice for those
who need one, a trading partner for those who ask for one, a friend
for those who seek one. To complement that clear vision, we chose
eminent speakers from the United Nations, academia, diplomacy,
security, and the Red Cross Movement who represented the very best
in their own fields. We worked closely with the Permanent Mission
of Ireland to the United Nations to highlight those sectors that represented Irish priorities—climate issues, protection, gender equality,
food security, etc. This book is the result.
The concerns raised by the oncoming effects of climate change require nothing less than the complete unity of all nations not just in
word but through concerted action. Communities across the world
already face drought, food-insecurity, and increasing environmental fragility based upon the human-caused fluctuation in the natural
14

climate. The time to act is now. The Permanent Mission of Ireland
and the Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs share a deep
bond and a profound commitment to these same values upheld and
promoted within the climate justice framework. The example set forward by the Irish determination for the promotion and protection
of human rights for all provides this storied institution with a wealth
of potential to further stand with our most vulnerable communities.
The Founding Charter of the United Nations begins, famously, with
We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war…
We must never forget—even in the face of xenophobia and
greed—that we are made stronger by dialogue and action, by what
Bertrand Russell called his three passions—the longing for love, the
search for knowledge, and the unbearable pity for the suffering of
mankind. We celebrate our organizations’ deep bonds and shared
commitments to human rights and climate justice, while also taking
the opportunity to pause and reflect on the difficult path towards a
brighter, more equitable future.
Increasingly, humanitarian efforts are recognized empirically,
and there has been a necessary move toward greater professionalization in humanitarian assistance. In professionalization, however, we can sometimes lose the overall purpose for the delivery,
and sideline the passion of the volunteer for the sake of processes. We need the passion of the volunteer just as importantly as
professionalization and accountability. Ireland has sent educators throughout the world for hundreds of years; it is a nation
that has been a proud supporter of U.N. Peacekeeping efforts for
many decades. It has embraced the multilateral approach to global security and harmony. In 1861, in his first inaugural address,
President Lincoln spoke to a country in crisis, appealing to the
“better angels of our nature”. Words matter, the academy matters,
critical thinking matters, inspiration matters. The contributors to
these lectures, and to this book, approached these themes in different but complementary ways. President Michael D. Higgins
eloquently examined the role of the public intellectual in times
15

of crisis. Admiral Mark Mellett wrote incisively about seeing “the
role of Ireland’s Defense Forces contributing to an effort to move institutions along the continuum from insecurity to security, from
an absence of peace to peace.” In her chapter on localization, Dr.
Jemilah Mahmood examined the movement toward consultation with, and not simply provision to, populations in need.
Mr. Jamie McGoldrick decried the increasing politicization
of humanitarian assistance and the erosion of humanitarian
neutrality.
We are pleased to collaborate with the Permanent Mission of Ireland in working towards a world which ensures the protection of human rights along with a renewed respect for the environment. These
shared values both strengthen the bond our organizations share
today and serve to guide us for the future. The vision of change laid
out by the U.N.’s Sustainable Development goals represent the type
of transformative change that The Permanent Mission of Ireland and
the Institute of International Humanitarian Affairs support. The
path towards these goals will of course face obstacles, as witnessed
by pandemics, wars, natural disasters, and sectarian violence that
confront us regularly. The way forward is not always clear but the
humanitarian values of the Irish state, and those who represent them,
serve to indicate how passionately Ireland would represent a multilateral world on the Security Council.
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How Climate, Gender and Insecurity
Are Driving Food Insecurity
and Humanitarian Need
H.E. Mary Robinson,
Chair of the Elders

It is always a pleasure and privilege to return to the United
Nations, and it is a particular pleasure to deliver the first “Ireland at
Fordham Humanitarian Lecture,” which will focus on the challenges
facing humanitarian action in the twenty-first century.
Fordham University has a long and venerable connection to
Ireland. Indeed, I was delighted, as President of Ireland, to speak
at Fordham’s Rose Hill campus in 1995 to mark that Institution’s
150th Annual Commencement. This new collaboration between Ireland and Fordham will build on their shared commitment to exploring the challenges facing policy-makers and humanitarians in the
twenty-first century.
Over the last century, we have made progress in addressing
humanitarian and development challenges. However, there are
significant risks to our continued progress. Our commitment to
strong, multilateral responses to major crises is challenged when
we need it most. At the same time, conflicts are increasing in
number, becoming more protracted and fragmented, and pushing
unprecedented numbers of people into humanitarian need.
I believe climate change—which poses an existential threat to all humanity—is playing an increasingly central and destructive role right
across the range of issues that the United Nations strives to address.
As Chair of The Elders, I am dismayed that we could reverse the development gains of the last 100 years, not because we cannot act, but
because we will not act. The need to act and act fast is the message
of marchers and school children that we have seen in recent months.
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We hear these voices not only in the West. While the links between
climate, poverty, fragility, and insecurity are only beginning to be
fully understood, there is little doubt that the links exist—mostly
for those who are living this reality every day. As Hindou Ibrahim,
an activist from Chad (and a good friend), told the Security Council
last year:
“My people are living climate change. Climate change has an impact
on their daily lives and gives them insecurity. When they sleep at night,
they dream that they will wake up the next day and be able to get food
or water for their children. They also dream that if someone gets to the
resources before they do, they will have to fight for them.”
Climate change is not just an issue of atmospheric science or plant
conservation; it is fundamentally about human rights and the protection of people. When we think about the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the core principles it promotes, it is abundantly
clear that the impacts of climate change are rapidly undermining the
full enjoyment and full range of human rights. It is quite often the
most vulnerable who are facing loss of their right to life, to food, to
safe water, to shelter, and to health.
Last year’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report clearly outlines that our basic human rights stand to be eroded
due to the climate crisis: risks to health, livelihoods, food security,
water supply, human security, and economic growth are all projected
to increase with global warming at 1.5°C and to increase further to a
dangerous level with 2°C.
In 2016, as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for El Niño and
Climate, I saw for myself, with Macharia Kamau, who was also a
Special Envoy for El Niño and Climate, how existing phenomena
such as El Niño and La Niña are compounded by climate change.
And, I saw the real humanitarian consequences for poor people—
particularly for women.
The evidence is now building; the number of people going to bed
and waking up hungry is on the rise. The 2019 Global Report on
Food Crises tells us that climate and natural disasters pushed 29 million people into situations of acute food insecurity in 2018, mostly
20

in Africa. Unpredictable seasons in rural areas are dramatically affecting rural people’s—especially women’s—livelihoods, undermining the ability of farmers to grow and provide food, and the ability
of communities to access health and education services. Likewise,
the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events as a
result of climate change is leading to an increase in displacement of
people and communities—23.5 million people in 2016 according to
the World Meteorological Organization.
I was very moved recently when my fellow Elder, Graça Machel,
described the devastation she saw after a recent visit to Beira in her
beloved country Mozambique. Mozambique has now been hit by
another cyclone, Kenneth. These people do not have a plan B, do
not have insurance, do not have reserves that they can look to. They
are just devastated…devastated and in poverty, not really knowing
where to turn. While estimates of the number of people likely to be
displaced as a result of climate change vary, the stark reality is that
they will be multiples of those we see today.
The challenge of climate change is not only about droughts and desertification displacing people in Africa. Sea level rise threatens whole
communities living in small island developing states. Island countries such as the Maldives and Kiribati are facing the loss of their sovereign islands with rising sea levels. As a result, they are championing
the issue of climate change as a human rights challenge, connected
to the displacement of people and the potential loss of life, as well
as the right to low-carbon development. We must remember that
the people and countries bearing the brunt of food insecurity, social
instability and forced displacement have not contributed to the main
cause of climate change. That is the injustice of climate change. This
fact embodies the injustice and the necessity to recapture global justice through more ambitious climate action.
As the President of the IFRC said recently, climate change is already
making emergency response efforts around the world more difficult,
more unpredictable and more complex. However, we cannot only
consider the direct effects of climate change. By undermining livelihoods, eroding food and water security, driving displacement, in21

creasing competition for scarce resources, and increasing economic
and gender inequalities, climate change acts as a threat multiplier,
pushing already vulnerable and fragile societies over the edge.
With few options available to individuals, particularly young men,
economic hardship and marginalization can open the door for the
predatory activities of violent extremists in search of recruits.
While no armed conflict has one single driver, there is an increasingly
strong body of evidence that suggests that climate change, interacting with other factors, such as political, economic, and social conditions, is a major contributing factor. Armed conflict is now the main
reason that nearly 140 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection this year—most in a small number of countries
like Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan.
The role that climate change plays in crises is context-specific. Climate and insecurity interact in already vulnerable contexts and create
a vicious cycle leading to increased humanitarian need. As a paper
from the Overseas Development Institute and the Red Cross Movement pointed out, “the most severe impacts of climate change are
not necessarily in areas exposed to the greatest changes in climate,
but in places where people’s capacities to cope with these changes
are lacking.”
Individuals and communities affected by conflict and fragility lack
access to social protection or necessary institutional supports. As a
result, their resilience is undermined and their ability to adapt reduced. Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, told the Security Council last year: “Fragile countries are in danger of becoming
stuck in a cycle of conflict and climate disaster.” The most frequently
cited example of this phenomenon is the situation in the Lake Chad
basin region, where an environmental catastrophe—the shrinking of
Lake Chad by 90%—has had profound economic and social implications. The shrinking of the lake was accompanied by a shrinking of
economic opportunities, an increase in vulnerability, and the rise of
instability and violent extremism—most notably, the Boko Haram
insurgency. Local leaders, such as Hindou Ibrahim, are in no doubt
about the link between these two events.
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Disasters are not the only climate change-related developments that
affect security. I believe that we must also broaden our perspectives
when we consider what we mean by insecurity and the potential for
a humanitarian crisis. So-called ‘conflict’ can manifest at all levels;
intra-national conflict, or conflict between major ethnic groups, is
worthy of consideration, especially as it leads to displacement, which
further exacerbates climate vulnerability and plays havoc with ecosystems. Moreover, lower-level conflict can often have a negative
impact, especially placing different kinds of strain on humanitarian
systems, including in zones or regions of the world not traditionally
associated with conflict.
This reality was acknowledged by the leaders of the Pacific Islands
Forum, where they declared, “Climate change remains the single
greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of the peoples of the Pacific.” The Pacific Small Island Developing States have
pushed hard for the appointment of a Special Envoy on Climate
and Security. Their aim is to put in place mechanisms that will allow them to forecast what future security threats might play out as a
result of climate impacts in their traditionally peaceful region. This
is an initiative I fully support, as it aims to prepare for the future
realities we know we will face. The response to date, in terms of how
we, as an international community, prepare for the growing humanitarian needs that stem from climate change, has been, I’m afraid,
sorely lacking.
The Security Council had its first discussion on climate and security
in seven years under the Swedish Presidency of the Security Council
last July. This was followed last January with an open debate under
the Dominican Republic’s Council Presidency. I am acutely aware of
the arguments against the Security Council dealing with this issue—
encroachment on the mandates of other UN entities, the risk of securitisation of climate change, as well as a denial of climate change
itself by some. However, we, The Elders, believe it is time that the
Security Council caught up with the reality on the ground—the reality for the communities that Hindou Ibrahim gave voice to when she
spoke to the Council.
23

Understanding climate risk should be an essential element of the
Security Council’s prevention agenda. By deepening its understanding of how climate change is interacting with other drivers in the
individual country contexts on its agenda—or with the potential to
reach its agenda—the Council can meet its responsibility under the
UN Charter. Doing so does not mean that the Council is encroaching on the mandates of other UN entities, only that it considers all
factors at play in a given context.
It is encouraging that the Council has begun to move in this direction, with its recognition of the need for adequate risk assessment
and management strategies relating to the adverse security effects
of climate and ecological factors in a number of geographical contexts, including the Lake Chad Basin, the Sahel, and the Horn of
Africa. However, in order for members of the Council to carry out
their work, there is a need for a better understanding of climate related security risks across all of the Council’s files. This requires better reporting from the field that includes climate risk assessments as
standard. Reporting needs to be integrated with an analysis of how
the different drivers of conflict are interacting with one another. The
inter-agency initiative established by the Secretary-General is a welcome move in this regard.
Outside of the Security Council, the humanitarian community
has recognised the challenges it faces in responding to the growing
humanitarian needs as a result of climate change and conflict. The
World Humanitarian Summit Chair’s summary recognised that humanitarian assistance alone will never adequately address nor sustainably reduce the needs of the world’s most vulnerable people; rather, a
new coherent approach is required, based on addressing root causes,
increasing political diplomacy for prevention and conflict resolution,
and bringing humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts
together.
In my view, there are three elements that are needed to form the basis
of this new approach. Firstly, and this won’t surprise you, climate justice. This is a concept that I have championed for some time. It links
human rights and development to achieve a human-centred—a peo24

ple centred—approach, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change
and its impacts equitably and fairly. Climate justice is informed by
science, responds to science and acknowledges the need for equitable
stewardship of the world’s resources.
Climate justice is a transformative concept. It insists on a shift from a
discourse on greenhouse gases and melting ice caps into a civil rights
movement with people and communities most vulnerable to climate
impacts at its heart. Humanitarian action must put this concept at
the centre of its efforts, particularly when engaging climate related
impacts.
Part of this climate justice approach is a recognition of how men
and women are affected by climate change in different ways. For
example, in many communities women are the primary food producers and providers of water and cooking fuel for their families, so
any changes in climate or disasters that affect these roles, not only
impact women’s ability to provide, but also on the community as a
whole. It is for this reason that women must be at the forefront of
the response. Women are best placed to identify the needs and vulnerabilities of their communities and should therefore be consulted
and involved in decision-making in climate adaptation, humanitarian preparedness, and response.
Climate justice does not just cut across countries and societies. It
cuts across generations—how we safeguard future generations. What
kind of world do we want to leave to our children and to our grandchildren? Can we proudly stand here today and say that their lives
will be more prosperous, more equal and fairer than our own? In
fact, tomorrow’s leaders may well be frustrated and angry by our
inaction today. We need to anticipate and integrate the needs and
concerns of future generations to better inform the decisions that we
make today.
Secondly, we can no longer afford to regard the 2030 Agenda and the
Paris Climate Agreement as voluntary, and a matter for each member
state to decide on its own. It is clear from the IPCC report that the
full implementation of both the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Climate
25

Agreement has become imperative in order to save future generations from an increasing level of humanitarian disaster and need. Delivering on the goals we have set ourselves in the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Agreement, as well
as the Sustaining Peace Agenda, will not eliminate the challenges
ahead, but it will significantly improve our ability to address them.
At the same time, without reaching the furthest behind, we will never
realise the 2030 Agenda.
The more just, equal, sustainable, and prosperous societies envisaged
in the 2030 Agenda would be better able to respond to the challenges of climate change. However, delivering on the promise of the
SDGs will mean accepting profound changes to the way we live our
lives. Are we ready for such a transformation? Making it happen will
require a change of mind-set at the global political level.
Limiting the increase in global average temperature to 1.5°C would
substantially reduce the risks and effects of climate change, particularly on those communities least able to respond. However, we must
ensure that the most vulnerable communities, who face the worst
impacts, have access to international support and financing for adaptation to impacts that will happen irrespective of limiting global
temperature increases. Likewise, those working in fossil fuel industries cannot be left out. We need more funding for just transition, for
adaptation solutions and for technology. The financing is there—I
have absolutely no doubt of that. But, we need to work harder and
more collectively to make it work for those on the frontlines of climate change.
Rebalancing our approach to peace and security in line with the Sustaining Peace Agenda means investing in early warning and prevention as well as tackling the root causes of conflict, including human
rights violations. The Security Council needs to act before the first
shots are fired. A ‘whole of organisation’ approach is needed from the
UN, and it must be aligned with inclusive, nationally led processes
as well as the efforts of regional organisations. In post-conflict contexts, the Peacebuilding Commission has an important role to play
in bringing all of these pieces together.
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How do we get this political will? How do we get this sense of global
solidarity needed to make this a reality? I believe it is through the
emerging movement for climate justice, putting pressure on governments and on business, particularly the fossil fuel industry. It is heartening to see women leaders stepping forward—and they really are
stepping forward. Believe me, it’s amazing. I’m encouraged by this—
school children striking and young people making their voices heard.
Some, such as Extinction Rebellion, have taken to peaceful protest,
and there’s increasing business and investment leadership calling,
indeed pressing, for more ambition from governments. Businesses
pressing governments—because business does longer-term thinking
than government sometimes does. Governments are focused on the
next election—six months, a year, two years. The importance of this
growing climate justice movement is that it will call for a just transition to a world powered by clean energy, and climate actions that
fully respect human rights.
The third point is recognising that we know that climate change will
drive humanitarian need. We should, therefore, invest in measures
that reduce vulnerabilities and increase preparedness and resilience
to shocks, including climate shocks. The Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction provides a practical and tangible bridge between the development and humanitarian communities to prevent
new, and reduce existing, disaster risks. The framework underlines
the need for enhanced work to reduce exposure and vulnerability,
thus preventing the creation of new disaster risks, and accountability
at all levels for disaster risk creation. And most importantly, I believe,
it identifies that there has to be a broader and a more people-centred
preventive approach to disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction practices
need to be multi-hazard and multi-sectoral, inclusive and accessible
in order to be efficient and effective.
At the same time, the humanitarian community must continue to
explore new tools and innovations that allow it to act early, such
as anticipatory financing, cash transfer programming, and disaster
risk insurance. We know that early interventions can greatly lessen
the impact of climate related shocks—we need to become better at
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identifying opportunities to intervene before a looming risk transforms into a full blown humanitarian catastrophe. These initiatives should be seen as part of a much broader risk management
approach that includes humanitarian, development, security, and
climate actors.
The three pillars I have outlined point to the need for an integrated
approach, which puts the individual right at the centre of all our
actions—not as a subject but as an active participant in their own
destiny. This is very much the approach set out in Ireland’s new international development policy A Better World, in which reducing humanitarian needs sits alongside gender equality, strengthening governance, and climate action as Ireland’s policy priorities. These are
issues and above that actually, an approach that I expect Ireland to
highlight in its campaign for the Security Council in 2021—2022.
It’s also why I am very supportive of that campaign.
If we all fail to act now; if we fail to act decisively; if we fail to act
together, future generations will never forgive us for the world that
we bequeath them.
I think a lot about that world. I have six grandchildren; the eldest is
fifteen. They will be in their twenties, and their thirties and forties in
2050. They will share the world with nine billion people, and I think
a lot about that world and what they will think of us if we do not use
the window that we have.
I want to recall the haunting words of Hindou Ibrahim to the Security Council last July:
“For me, as one who comes from these communities, I see babies and
young people growing up in this area and think about them in the next
decade or the next twenty years. What will their futures be like? Are they
also going to jump in the sea? Are they going to join terrorist groups?
Or are they going to kill each other because, in order to survive, they
have to eat?”
I want to end with the words of the first Chair of The Elders, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who, when asked if he was an optimist, answered, “No, but I’m a prisoner of hope.” Because it is hope we need
to give us the energy to go forward resolutely and to accept the chal28

lenge of this window of time that we have to transform to a world
that will be safe for our children and grandchildren.
—United Nations, April 2019
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Humanitarianism and the Public
Intellectual in Times of Crisis
Michael D. Higgins
President of Ireland
A chairde,
To make a beginning to this lecture, what I’ve entitled “Humanitarianism and the Public Intellectual in Times of Crisis,” I very much
always enjoy returning to an academic environment. And this is perhaps understandable, having been a university teacher for so much of
my life. It was a world I found profoundly rewarding and enriching.
But there is no place quite like a university for reflection, the hallowed seat of learning, yes, but more importantly, a gathering place
of the young and curious who believe that the world need not be as
cruel as it is, but indeed, can be changed.
Universities can transform people’s lives through education and, of
course, through the wider impact of their research. Universities can
help students to develop their skills and knowledge, and now, perhaps this is the most important of all, I think now given our interacting crises—ecological, economic, social, and may I suggest ethical—we turn to universities in near desperation to provide a basis to
help us for a broader understanding of the interconnectedness of our
social-ecological system.
University research, it is claimed, correctly, is potentially of benefit
to everyone, with the capacity of intellectual space for enriching society, stimulating culture, and, of course, creating enterprise. However, now it must face its greatest challenge. A moment of truth has
arrived for all institutions, including third-level institutions—that of
facilitating an exit from a paradigm that has failed humanity and of
outlining how we can make our way to a new paradigm that will lead
to integrated, sustained eco-social policies of sufficiency and equity.
It will no longer be sufficient to train people to run after the bus of
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disaster, but rather to seek to understand why it is all happening. For
what we teach, after all, is the foundation of policy, and subverting
the taken for granted, the authoritarian and the socially dangerous
must be the core values of a university.
Indeed, I agree with Father McShane and John Hughes, Archbishop
of New York, who established this very university St. John’s College
in 1841, and understood instinctively that education is key to active
and enriching citizenship for immigrants and to human flourishing.
The story of John Hughes’s family is a quintessential Irish-American story: a family who departed Ireland’s shores two centuries ago,
families, some of whom were forced to leave as a result of hunger
or persecution, while others earlier in the 19th century had sought
to escape poverty and to build better lives for themselves and their
families. Throughout its history, Fordham itself, as an educational
institution, has had a commitment to the betterment of society and
social justice, both at home and abroad.
In relation to those two waves of migration, it is very important
as well to know that the first migration—from which, if you like,
John Hughes came—were from South Ulster, north Munster, the
many cases, and they paid their fare to come. After the revolution
of 1798 and the active union of 1800, there was a rumour that the
country was finished. Many people who had the means of anything
just simply moved. Any they came early, established themselves early,
and so, they would be completely different to the tsunami of the
desperate who would come in the 1850s.
In America, and elsewhere across the globe, the Irish found refuge and opportunity. They did not escape either the marginalisation or the exploited fear of the “other” that is the experience now
of too many migrants today. They overcame this and went on to
contribute to the economic, social, political and cultural development of their adoptive homes, as today’s migrants are doing all over
the world. Here in the United States, we saw a new Irish-American culture emerge as a result of the mingling of these different
strands, as it were, of two rich cultures interacting, creating something that is not reducible to either, but which in its transcendence
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combines the best of both heritages.
Today, 17% of Irish citizens are currently living abroad, joining
a continuous trend within the 70 million people of Irish descent
worldwide. The Irish were not easily to forget, and it is something
we must never forget. We too in fact were editorialised in the 1840s,
suggesting, for example, that the Irish Famine was an act of God,
that the Irish in fact were being punished, as well as that they were
backward, a hopeless case. And indeed a brilliant philosopher somewhere a hundred years earlier had said that they had never even been
occupied by the Romans, so how could they have the civilities that
other people had.
But I think, therefore, they did not convert to these editorials of the
1840s. A mere 12 years later in 1860 you will find, I think in The
Times of London, a different editorial appears, and it says:
“If this goes on as it is likely to go on… the United States will become very Irish… So an Ireland there will still be, but on a colossal
scale, and in a new world. We shall only have pushed the Celt Westwards. Then, no longer cooped between the Liffey and the Shannon,
he will spread from New York to San Francisco, and keep up the
ancient feud at an unforeseen advantage…We must gird our loins
to encounter the nemesis of seven centuries’ misgovernment. To the
end of time a hundred million spread over the largest habitable area
in the world, and, confronting us everywhere by sea and land, will
remember that their forefathers paid tithe to the Protestant clergy,
rent to the absentee landlords, and a forced obedience to the laws
which these had made.”
And thus it was to be in a way, but there is of course a great challenge in that, one with which I have been engaged as President
for the first period of my Presidency. That is, how do you make
an ethical commemoration? How do you use memory ethically?
Which is for a whole other day and anyway, it is all on my website, so
there it is.
I think that this question of actually putting the narrative of the
other into one’s consciousness, in such a way that one is able to read
and how one knows, as I said in one of my poems, who knows how
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to come to a point where forgiveness might be possible. Our nation’s
history contains many tragic reminders of the desperate plight of
those forced to flee their country—the most acute of which was the
Great Famine of the 1840s. One million people died from starvation, further 2.5 million emigrated, the majority to North America,
resulting in the halving of the population of the island of Ireland
between 1841 and the early 1900s.
It is important to remember that in the census of 1901, of all the
people born within the Island of Ireland, a majority of people were
living outside of Ireland. And I think that gives you an idea. So,
the collective memory of the Famine and of the people forced to
flee their homes is something that I think must always resonate profoundly in Irish Society.
As a country, we have known what it is to be hungry and to be
forced to flee our homes. And it isn’t only that because new research
is showing, particularly the excellent work at University College
Cork on the famine, that many people died on their way to the port.
And to actually pay the fare of £3.10 to go to Canada or £5 to go
to an American port required that you had something to sell, a cow
perhaps or the last implements or whatever. But many died and it
is the reason why there is a gap in the figures. Again, in relation to
others, we have details of where people die but not where they were
baptised because they died on the way and so forth.
I think that this memory of our past has shaped and has continued
to shape our values and our sensibilities today, instilling in us a moral
calling to help others in need.
I interject here to say that this is not easy, because there is often a
contradiction between the ethical implementation of that identification with human need and another kind of individualistic, in parts,
to want to be among the smartest very often and to be, if you like,
the most successful in a highly individual version of economy and
society—a point to which I’ll come. They are not necessarily contradictory, but they post a moral dilemma and they impose choices
at times.
I think today, millions of people around the world of course face the
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same fear, suffering and desperation as before in increasing numbers
and worse circumstances.
And I want to suggest that the current status being accorded to asylum-seekers in administrative systems and in the media discourse
urgently calls into question political philosophies, and tests the principles according to which our contemporary liberal democracies have
been drawing the line between, for example, the rights of citizens
and those of prospective citizens. After all, I’m in a university with
a distinguished law school. This is an argument I remember which
we’ve had in Ireland of course.
We have become accustomed to narratives of how men and women
throughout our world, as refugees, find themselves living for extended periods of time in unsuitable accommodation, confined to
forced idleness, without even control over their daily diet, so then—
as Eugene Quinn, Director of the Jesuit Refugee Service Ireland, remarked—children grow up “without the memory of their parents
cooking a family meal.” I know things are being attempted at improvement, but I read Eugene Quinn’s remarks with familiarity at
having seen it happen in too many places in the world.
The migratory experience is a journey of special vulnerability imposed on top of existing vulnerabilities. I am minded to recall the
reflections of Hannah Arendt in her 1943 essay, “We Refugees,” and
later expanded upon in her seminal book, The Origins of Totalitarianism. I think those reflections of Hannah Arendt have lost none of
their accuracy or potency.
If I had a word that I wanted to see as a major and minor success out
of the different papers that I have been giving recently, I think it is of
suggesting the difference that there is when people use words like internationalism or interdependency. The dominant time, people will
say this to you as people meet Presidents, including myself, that are
talking about trade. But really, wouldn’t it be a different place if people opened the conversation with people about the whole question
of interdependent vulnerabilities? We opened the conversation on
vulnerability on, as indeed that fine work of Ian Gough and others,
which in his book Heat, Greed and Human Need that opened on
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human need and then it went on to structures. But the notion about
it is in fact that it nearly always begins with trade, and I will come
later to suggest that—and I have no hesitation in saying it—this has
devalued everything really in relation to intellectual life, and it has
devalued diplomacy very seriously.
Arendt described the fate of refugees as that of human beings who,
unprotected by any specific political convention, suffer from the
plight of being unrecognised by the state. In a couple of weeks’ time,
I will visit and see this in action in places like Lebanon.
She identifies that deadlock that arises from the entanglement between the rights of humans and those of the citizen: in the nationstate, the so-called ‘inalienable’ rights of man cease to be protected as
soon as they are decoupled from the rights of the citizens of a state,
leading to this tragic paradox that the refugee, as the one most empirically the most vulnerable, who should have embodied the rights
of humans par excellence, represents instead the object that constitutes the radical crisis of this concept.
Arendt has intrigued me because I have used her work quite a lot in
recent years in relation to memory and forgiveness. But she, a refugee
herself from Germany who went through an internment camp in
France before seeking asylum in the United States, had a profound
understanding of how the loss of citizenship was akin to a loss of
human status. For not only do refugees lose their homes—that is,
“the entire social structure into which they were born and in which
they established for themselves a distinct place in the world”—they
also lose the political framework in which they had “the right to
have rights.”
Indeed, refugees and asylum-seekers in some instances have been allowed or sustained in terms of both life and liberty, but yet, they are
deprived of the context in which their actions, their opinions, their
ability to participate in speech (and, thus, in politics) have meaning.
For Arendt, therefore, to be stripped of citizenship is to be stripped
of words, to fall to a state of utter vulnerability with avenues of participation closed off, new futures disallowed.
It is for this reason, that I believe it is my responsibility, as President
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of Ireland, to encourage us Irish at home and abroad to be exemplary
in reaching out to those who find themselves seeking shelter and
succour on our shores. In June, Sabina and I had the opportunity of
welcoming refugees and asylum-seekers as well as those on the front
line of working with them to Áras an Uachtaráin.
The group who came to be with us that day included families who
had arrived in Ireland at different times over the past forty years from
Iran, Sudan, Syria and Vietnam. Each of them had made enormous
sacrifices, leaving family behind, taking risks to leave their homeland
in order to create new and better lives that have undoubtedly resulted
in making valuable contributions to our modern and inclusive society. They have brought to us a rich story and experience to add to
ours that should never be forgotten.
I suppose to ask you as often you read and hear about it; why is that
all these migratory activity in a migratory planet is always described
as the problem of migration? The problem? What about the 10-12%
of GDP globally produced by migrants. Why do you use language
the “problem of ” and so?
Many of the families to which I made reference that Sabina and I
have had the opportunity to meet with and visit in recent times are
refugees and asylum-seekers moving through Ireland’s refugee and
asylum system, which is grounded, of course, in the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. It is worth recalling the background to this international legal framework.
If we consider the aftermath of World War II as having launched the
first truly global refugee crisis in contemporary times, so too did this
period and these events elicit an equally global response.
Recognising the urgent need to help millions of Europeans who had
fled or lost their homes, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950 with a
three-year mandate.
I think it is very well borne in mind what stood behind that decision. Today, the organisation continues to work hard to protect and
assist refugees around the world. Underpinning its work is the 1951
Refugee Convention, which defines the term ‘refugee’ and outlines
37

the rights of the displaced, as well as the legal obligations of States
to protect them. And Ireland is one of the 145 states to have ratified
the Convention, and several regional responses have since yielded
further Declarations regarding asylum.
Now, seventy years after the mass displacement of what was the Second World War, forced displacement and migration are again at record levels. In June of this year, the UN Refugee Agency produced
the shocking statistic that the number of people fleeing war, persecution and conflict had exceeded 70 million globally last year,—the
highest number in the UNHCR’s history with 2.3 million more than
the previous year—highlighting the growing scale of the challenge.
The vast majority are displaced within their own countries; however,
almost 26 million people crossed international borders in search of
international protection in 2018.
But, isn’t it important to just question the scholarship that refuses to
look at the structure of the sources of migratory movements? We can
have the academic thing to a point of what is voluntary/ involuntary
at most. Furthermore, looking at the current geopolitical landscape,
it is hard to imagine a situation in which the number of people in
need of international protection will decline in the short term. Conflict and instability is now the single biggest driver of refugee flows,
and conflict zones have produced the largest proportion of deep endemic global poverty.
The war in Syria alone has resulted in over 6.7 million refugees in the
region, while another 6.2 million people are displaced within Syria.
Bangladesh continues to host almost one million Rohingya refugees
from Myanmar. Over 300,000 people have fled insecurity and violence in Central America, while 4 million people have fled Venezuela
since 2014. And in the majority of cases, I say it slowly, neighbouring
countries have opened their borders to those fleeing, demonstrating
compassion and empathy to the new arrivals.
What is our obligation then to those who do that? It is a very serious
one. There are, however, new challenges that are forcing people from
their homes. Part of the growing challenge is linked to a changing
climate. Dangerous shifts in climate are placing stress on communi38

ties, where ecosystems can no longer support populations, leading to
a lack of resources and contributing to conflict and violence.
The anthropology of Africa will show you people moving, in many
cases creating huge new conflict in relation to pastures and in relation to access to water. And unless we collectively take action to
prevent catastrophic climate change, as well as assist communities to
prepare for, and adapt to, changing climates, these population flows
driven by climate shifts are only going to increase. They are increasing. A lack of development, failures of governance, and increasing
inequality within and between countries are also fuelling instability
and conflict. This is a deepening, if you like, of what I call the intersecting crisis of ecology, economy, and society. These points are made
very well, inter alia, in Pope Francis’s encyclical, Laudato Sí.
Worryingly, today, the welcome and support shown to European
refugees following the Second World War, that was manifested in
the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, is somewhat contradicted, to
put it most politely, and is under immense strain.
The international system of protection for refugees is coming under
pressure on a number of fronts. As I mentioned, the numbers are
shocking and challenging, in terms of human suffering of all, but they
are not necessarily unmanageable. Indeed, eighty percent of refugees
are hosted in countries neighbouring their countries of origin, often
without much fanfare or acknowledgement. Refugees, when asked,
actually always up near the top choices they would love to return home,
and, therefore, you have a whole series of strategies chosen in relation
to make as to what is transitional: what is transitional for return,
transitional for adaptation and transitional for movement.
However, what I believe is more worrying is the increasing lack of international solidarity, both with refugees themselves and with those
communities and countries that host them. This is most apparent in
the response to the relatively small numbers of refugees reaching our
borders, which has brought forth a type of narrative about the ‘other’
that we, in the humanitarian tradition, had hoped was assigned to
the chronicles of the past.
Countries whose citizens have often benefited from international
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asylum and migratory flows are reneging on their commitments
with the aim of discouraging or inhibiting refugees from seeking the
international protection to which they are entitled under the 1951
Convention and Protocol. Pope Francis’s injunction that to all this
we must not remain mute in what he called “a culture of indifference” is one that I so strongly support.
In his briefing to the UN Security Council last April, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, spoke of the growing
hostility towards people on the move. Reflecting on his over thirtyfive year career, he remarked,
“I have never seen such toxicity, such poison, in the language of politics,
in the media, in social media and even in everyday discussions and conversations around this issue. This toxicity often focuses, sadly, tragically,
on refugees, migrants and foreigners. That should be of concern to us all.”
And that is the great problem that we have, that we have sunk to this
level, or that we have tolerated the sinking of those in authority to
use language like this. I fully agree with Filippo Grandi’s comments.
Regrettably, we are losing, be it through a consciousness rendered
mute, broken, weary, alienated, anomic, and, at times, perhaps obsessed with the very struggle for survival in a world that uses one’s life
but does not respect it, that what is lost is one of the most fundamental tenets of our humanity: giving help to those in need.
It may be the case that refugees turn to their fellow global citizens
for protection and shelter, with the hope of a better future and increased opportunities for themselves and their families. There is a bit
of a gloss on this I feel, however. The truth is that many are seeking
to escape from circumstances where hope has been lost. It isn’t an
easy decision to leave that with which you have been intimate, the
place which you have called home. And many, like our ancestors in
their day, have undertaken arduous journeys and, on arrival, have to
grapple with a foreign language, a different climate, and a new set
of social and cultural customs. They desire nothing more than to
contribute fully in their adopted homes. Yet, for many, after reaching safety, they are subjected to prejudice and, above all, stereotyping
born of ignorance and fear with the new capacities for communi40

cation being used by carrying that ignorance and fear. When such
prejudice is driven by political populism and lazy opportunism, it is
all-the-more despicable and deplorable.
However, rising inequality is undoubtedly a factor in this increased
hostility.
Europe, for example, was a leader in championing the rights of refugees for many decades and, since 2008, it has processed over 6 million
asylum applications. Now confronted by the rise of populist political
ideologies, of what is not a nationalism but a Neo-nationalism, for it
does not speak now of any emancipatory tendency towards freedom, it
speaks of a calling up and exploiting of fear, division and exclusion—
with the excluded often being those who, by their marginalisation, have been abandoned to become the prey of xenophobes
and racists.
And while this presents a major threat to European solidarity, it also
is a challenge, an invitation, to all of us to stand our ground against
such tendencies. As High Commissioner Grandi said recently, only
if Europe is strong and united will Europeans be able to deal with
refugee and migration issues in a principled, practical, ethical, and
effective manner.
In Ireland, we may have, to date, been spared the worst of the populism and hatred seen elsewhere. But we are not immune from it.
With that attitude which targets and scapegoats minorities, including refugees and migrants. Political leaders have, in general in Ireland, behaved in a responsible and ethical way. Nonetheless, I believe
we must remain constantly vigilant to the threat of these menaces,
and the ease with which such toxicity can lodge itself through social
media, for example.
As President of Ireland, I have offered an apology on behalf of the
people of Ireland when there have been incidents of callous and unacceptable behaviour directed at refugees. I believe that we cannot
and must not remain silent in the face of such attacks on refugees
and migrants. And thus, Ireland will continue to stand with refugees both at home and abroad. We are all on our shared vulnerable
planet challenged to give authentic meaning too to what we mean by
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those concepts in all the religions of the world—hospitality and
solidarity.
In 1998, Ireland was one of the first countries in Europe to establish a resettlement programme. Between 2000 and 2016, almost two thousand refugees from thirty nationalities resettled
in Ireland. More recently, in response to the war in Syria, Ireland
has agreed to welcome four thousand refugees under its resettlement and relocation programmes. Ireland has developed a Community Sponsorship Programme, on which so much new work
has to be done, a model which allows communities to come together and offer to host refugees arriving to be resettled in Ireland.
And this is a model, as I said, which needs further work, that has
to be resourced and developed to be the receiving, hospitable migrant and community adapting institution it is called upon to be.
We need to continually review and improve on our process and
our policies.
On the international level, Ireland was proud to co-facilitate, with
Jordan, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted unanimously by all UN member states. It represented an
acknowledgement by the international community that there is a
pressing need for a comprehensive approach to human mobility, and
that protection of refugees is a shared international responsibility requiring enhanced global cooperation on migration.
The New York Declaration laid the groundwork for the development
of the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees subsequently
adopted by the international community. Ireland also will continue
to strongly support the work of UNHCR and will continue to offer
€16.5 million to the organisation in 2019.
The United Nations has the potential to play a transformative role in
tackling these issues. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
recognises, for the first time, the contribution of migration to sustainable development. Some 11 of the 17 Sustainable Development
Goals contain targets and indicators that are relevant to migration or
mobility. The Agenda’s core principle is to “leave no one behind,” including migrants. And let me now say as a sociologist, and someone
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who writes occasionally about economics, that this phrase to “leave
no one behind” needs very serious revision. I simply put it directly,
does this mean inviting those who are not yet participants in the
paradigm that is failing to become part of it? Or is an invitation to
them to become part of the new paradigm, leaving no one behind in
society that has made the planet to the edge of precipice with over
consumption and irresponsibility. It is a phrase that I use because it
is in the discourse, but to make it critical, leaving no one behind.
I spoke with New York University about how you can extract and
abuse metrics in relation to global poverty by saying that we are winning the war against global poverty. We are not, but we are abusing
metrics to suggest that we are.
This is a good transition to maybe the toughest point of what I have
to say: public intellectuals and academics have a crucial role to play, I
believe, in giving support and weight as we wrestle with humanitarian crises. They can play a critical role in altering the discourse on
humanitarian crises, a discourse that has far too frequently become
soured by a hateful, oppositional rhetoric. Public intellectuals are
uniquely placed to reveal the structural resources that contribute to
humanitarian crises. That, as we would say in the old literature on
migration, creates the push.
I have already stated that it is hard to overstate the importance of
universities as communities of learning, disputation and personal
and social development. However, the present day finds academics
and other intellectuals in the public space highly challenged, their
very raison d’être I suggest is contested.
Some public intellectuals have been seduced by the reliance on corporate power; other academics, I suggest, have drifted into a cosy
consensus that accepts the failed paradigm of society and economy
as the only model we have, or might have, of operating internationally. They continue working with curricula that fail to offer, or seek
to recover, the possibility of alternative futures, alternatives in the
social sciences, for example, culture and philosophy. Universities are
challenged in an urgent way by the questions that are now posed,
questions that are, after all, existential, that are of survival of the
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biosphere, of deepening inequality, of a resile to the language of hate,
war, fear, and the very use of said science and technology yet again
for warfare rather than serving humanity.
And one has to think about it as well. What is taught in economics
101 all over North America? How much of it is real political economy? Or how much moral content is in it? How much of it is game
theory in relation to learning riddles that will prepare you for speculation in a further life? These moral questions are beyond ones that
might be considered any narrow adjustment in the needs of a narrow
hegemonic utility. There is a real concern now that the emphasis on
funding from beyond the State has had a distorting effect on the career structure of young scholars in particular, so many of whom now
constitute what is really a precariat in institutions struggling under
the yoke of a Neo-utilitarianism that is bad for scholarship, bad for
society, that has not merely failed, but has contradicted the principles
of the UN Charter, and yet so many are drifting through indifference
to a human disaster unparalleled in its consequences.
I believe public intellectuals have an ethical obligation as an educated
elite to take a stand against the increasingly aggressive orthodoxies
and discourse of the marketplace that have permeated all aspects of
life, including within academia. Is it not as important to experience
the development of the self with others and one’s connection and
theirs to a shared citizenship and history as it is to become a useful,
individualised consuming unit in a consuming culture? Universities,
after all, function within a culture, and how they negotiate that relationship, these balances, defines their ethos and output, and it is how
they should be judged.
The role of academics, and particularly those involved in the public
sphere, it could be argued, is to seize moments and have the courage
to provide reaction, to be subversive of received thought assumptions
and fallacies. According to the late Edward Said, an intellectual’s mission in life is to advance human freedom and knowledge. This mission
often means standing outside of society and its institutions and actively disturbing the status quo. And isn’t it interesting how the cultural sphere does this so well in ways that sometimes academia does
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not? Yet, it also involves placing a strong emphasis on intellectual
rigour and, if you like, ideas, while ensuring that governing authorities and international intermediary organisations are well-resourced.
As Immanuel Kant put it, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”
As I say this, I realise again the precarity of those young (and notso-young) scholars who, without security, tenure or protection, are
struggling to live within a system that, far from realising their intellectual and moral potential, is a source of alienation, allowing a limited distorted resonance with the joy and agony of life as it is lived.
Academics all over the world should weep for the destruction of the
concept of the university that has occurred in so many places, which
has led to little less than the degradation of learning.
Issues relating to the role of the public intellectual have an acute
meaning in the context of the United Nations, where I have been last
week, and particularly for multilateralism, which is so much under
attack just now. The United Nations faces ongoing questions regarding its representation (who should hold power within the UN?), its
mandate (what should be the UN’s responsibilities?), and its effectiveness (how should the UN be organised and run?). Multilateralism is at a crossroads.
There are, I believe, at least three critical elements to the role of
public intellectualism both rational and intuitive: knowledge, ability, and moral courage. And that includes the willingness to awaken
society for a noble cause or purpose. In the words of Albert Einstein:
“The world is a dangerous place, not because of those who do evil, but
because of those who look on and do nothing.”
The fundamental purpose of the United Nations is, surely all must
agree, to ensure that the world does not “look on and do nothing”
in times of the threatening rhetoric of war, humanitarian crises, and
human rights violations, and to ensure that peace, so hard won, is
lasting and stable. And above all that, our words on climate change
are turned into action.
We are, however, I repeat, living in a time when the very purpose
of the UN is being questioned. As an institution, it is being under45

mined overtly and covertly.
The wider context in which the UN has to function is one of a tradedriven globalisation that eschews any ethical responsibility, that has
seriously narrowed the normative in diplomacy, and that sustains a
hegemonic single model of connection of economy and society, with
‘development’ in turn being used as a conduit for the disseminated
singularity of such connection, a notion that suggests that repeating
the mistakes of the North will be sufficient for the future of the more
populous South. Our need of a new ethically informed paradigm
is acute. Our survival, any meaningful response to our interacting
crises requires it.
I have been arguing for the exit from a failing paradigm, for a scholarship that facilitates a new paradigm for a connection of ecology,
economy, and society and indeed ethics. It is not simply a matter of
putting an ecological or social gloss on what we have. We have to
strive for a new symmetry between ecology, economy, society, one
that respects diversity in all its forms while sharing a consciousness
of what we must do together, cooperatively.
I remember those conversations in Central America forty years ago,
and Heidi Agorastia and I speaking about civilisation of sufficiency,
and of the distinction which you must all recognise in your own life,
of when does one make the transition from self-sufficiency to insatiability. It is insatiability that has been the motorcar that has driven
us to the point of the precipice.
I believe that quality of life cannot be measured simply in terms of
consumption of resources, accumulation and consumption. Instead,
we must consider our relationship to, or ‘resonance’ with, the world,
not as we would wish to use or indeed abuse it, but ask how we are
taken into that world, how it takes us in and with what joy or pain.
In her brilliant recent work, Professor Rosa Hartmut puts it like this:
“from the act of breathing to the adoption of culturally distinct worldviews. All the great crises of modern society—ecological, democratic, psychological—can be understood and analysed in terms of resonance and
our broken relationship to the world around us.” Loss of harmony.
Rosa’s book, Resonance, is an impressive contribution to contempo46

rary social theory, presenting as it does an alternative view of modernity as the history of a catastrophe of resonance. There is an increasing recognition too in cross-disciplinary work of the importance of
resonance, and there is a growing body of evidence that suggests its
importance for deep human fulfilment. Professor Hartmut’s book
is at once a reflection of loss and of efforts towards belonging, as I
would put it, having a resonance for and with the world. One can
also see how such an approach can reconcile cultural work and the
better insights of economic and social studies.
I have elaborated briefly on this concept because I believe this has relevance to humanitarianism and particularly as to the quality of our
collective response as peoples to migration. I believe this “catastrophe
of resonance” is helpful in seeking to understand the growing narcissism, aggressive individualism, emphasis on insatiable consumption
and wealth accumulation, and acceptance of yawning inequality.
Reading the popular press, one can see, too, how migration and its
consequences is perceived by some as an unwelcome interruption in
the lives of some passive consumers, busy about at, the late Zygmunt
Bauman put it, being “consumed on their consumption.”
As a young university teacher appointed at the end of the 1960s, I
had myself hopes of the emancipatory power of humanistic social
science. We all struggled against the colonisation of what was modernisation theory and we struggled against the Washington Consensus. What I could not have foreseen was the influence of the second
coming of the ideas of theorists such as Friedrich Von Hayek, or the
influence they would have, not only on theory, but on public policies
that would be privileged in the United Kingdom, the United States
and elsewhere in the eighties and nineties. And I saw those views from
the Graduate School of Chicago, moved from Chile to implement an
agenda of imposed market theory and austerity. These were offered
not as policies chosen among competing options—the outcome of
any inclusive, contested, democratic public discourse—but as a single hegemonic version of the connection between markets, economy
and society itself sold to a public as a kind of individualistic natural law as it were, and delivered with an authoritarianism to match
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as basic needs were adjusted to macro-fiscal abstraction and fiction.
Decades of Keynesianism have given way to decades influenced by
the theories of those such as Friedrich Von Hayek and Milton Friedman, given way to unrestrained, unregulated market dominance and
a communications order with a discourse that ‘privileges’ aggressive
individualism.
All language too could be stolen. I think for example of that wonderful Canadian author who wrote Man’s Search for Authenticity. And
authenticity became distorted into being constructed like narcissism,
when you care for nothing. When authenticity, when it was used by
Taylor originally, was one which was achieving fulfilment through
others of the self. A prevailing, largely uncontested paradigm has
emerged and gained hegemony. That paradigm has had consequences for all institutions including universities and indeed the
United Nations.
It is a paradigm that makes assumptions and demands regarding the
connection between scholarship, politics, economy, and society—indeed the inter-relationship of societies. In the sense of Foucault, I see
it as a kind of colonisation, imprisonment taken into oneself, mind
and sensibility.
It has gained strength and encouraged an individualism without social responsibility, within and beyond borders. It not only asserts
a rationality for markets but, in policy terms, has delivered laissezfaire markets without regulation. Its colonisation of language itself,
distortion of concepts, even emancipatory ones, has assisted in the
concept of ‘freedom,’ for example, being re-defined in a reductionist
manner to ‘market freedom.’
Consequently, the public world must now become, as it was before
in human history, a space of contestation, a space that sets that which
is democratic in tension with that which is unaccountable.
As we live through this period of seeking an exit from extreme individualism, a period where the concept of society itself has been
questioned and redefined narrowly and pejoratively, when the public space in so many Western countries, the human body itself, has
been commodified—and it is when as calculating rational choice
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maximisers, rather than as citizens, that we have been invited to view
our neighbours—we must come together, merging consciousness of
ecology, human need, dignity, respect for sources of truth and consolation, reasoned and revealed sources.
We must combine co-operation for that recovery of the public world,
informed by the music of the heart as much as by the partial suggestions of ratio. That is what ancient systems from distant places are
inviting us to do.
Our existence, in the paradigm from which we must seek exit, is assumed to be, is defined as, competing individual actors, at times neurotic in our insatiable anxieties for consumption. Bauman, whom I
have spoken of already, puts it in his book, Consuming Life, “consumers become the promoters of the commodities they consume.” In essence, therefore, consumers become a commodified entity in their
presentation of themselves. The value of humans is debased thus and
reduced to their economic worth.
I make this point because behind these transitions lies an intellectual collusion that unfortunately masks a rationalisation. Standing in
support of under-regulated markets, of unaccountable, often speculative capital flows, are scholars who frequently invoke the legitimation provided by a university which itself, at times, is put under pressure to demonstrate its utility as the seat of the single hegemonic
model of political economy that prevails.
I make this point, because behind these transitions, lies an intellectual collusion, that unfortunately masks a rationalisation. Standing
in support of under-regulated markets, of unaccounted, often speculated, capital flows, are scholars that frequently invoke the legitimation fuelled by university. Which itself at times is put under pressure
to demonstrate its utility as the seat of the single hegemonic model
of political economy that prevails. All of this, as I come to a conclusion, can change.
Universities can lead a new paradigm of engagement with the world,
contribute meaningfully to the discourse on the pressing challenges
of the day, be it the crisis of democracy, the ecological crisis or the
humanitarian crisis.
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This paradigm, to come to lodge as alternative in the different forms,
necessitates a dialogue that can move out from specialist and esoteric jargon to a broad, vibrant public space that thus retains for the
university a capacity to be different, to be relevant once more, to be
the source of critical ideas, languages and tropes which can resist the
diktats of the marketplace that demand a narrow utility.
And it requires, too, a process of healing, with creative, cultural expression being made possible in public places, and having access to
the creativity of the self in interaction with others. All of these issues
are about how we look at each other and either avert our gaze or
celebrate our vulnerabilities, joys and anxieties in interdependency.
We need a new vibrant economic-social, economic literacy, one that
can carry merged consciousness from ecological, social, economic,
gender activists.
Will universities be allowed to do this? Will they seek the space, the
capacity, the community of scholarship necessary to challenge such
paradigms of the connection between economy, ecology, society,
ethics, democratic discourse and authoritarian imposition as have
failed? Or alternatively, will they, drawing on their rich university
tradition, at its best, recover moments of disputation and discourse,
seek to offer alternatives that propose a democratic, liberating and
sustainable future?
I believe that a university response, which is critically open to originality in theory and research, committed to humanistic values in
teaching, has a great opportunity to make a global contribution of
substance to the great challenges and crises we face; that such a university can be and will be celebrated by future generations as the
hub of original, critical thought, and a promoter of its application
through new models of interconnection between science, technology, administration and society.
And this will facilitate a better connection between the sciences, humanities and culture, representing a paradigm shift away from the
strict divisions that have sometimes impeded academics to realise
their best work, and which has perhaps fuelled the decline in interest
in the public intellectual.
50

As subjects are re-cast, unities can be restored, and we should consider Edward Said’s suggestion that it is in the interstices between
subjects that the most exciting ideas emerge. The change I advocate
is about recovering the right to pose important questions such as
Immanuel Kant did through the development of his form of transcendental realism in his time: “What might we know? What should we
do? What may we hope?”
I think these are so important. There is a moral basis to those who
are protesting, to those who would like a communitarian new beginning, but, I believe that while fully recognising the insufficient
criticism historically by the left of the abuses of statism in relation
to personal freedoms, to walk away from the state—which itself has
already been deeply ravaged by neoliberalism—would be a tragic error on the part of those who seek an emancipatory transformation
in our societies. Of course, to rely entirely on advocacy directed at
the state, and to neglect the possibilities and promise of alternatives
within civil society, would also be a disastrous choice. But neither
is necessary.
As an academic and a writer, I believe in the ‘performative’ potential of language: words and yes ideas matter—for bonding, bridgebuilding, mapping out a common space of equal and democratic
participation for both sides in conflict. Words are a great gift. They
are all the power that some people, and often entire peoples and
classes, have.
For some who live and struggle in an unequal world, in areas ravaged
by war, natural disasters and political extremism, ideas and words are
all they have at their disposal to express their common humanity,
their aspirations for what is different, fair, equitable and, above all,
emancipatory. They constitute what is for them the realm of hope, as
discovered and celebrated in co-operative community.
In combining the tasks of conscientisation with a commitment to
original thought and compassionate, emancipatory scholarship and
teaching, good intellectual ideas can help bridge the space to that
utopia and its praxis that we all, as vulnerable inhabitants of our
fragile planet, need.
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I think that certainly, may I suggest, the performative, as historically
represented in the march, the banners, the meetings, had a transformative capacity that is missing in isolated contexts of individuals,
sharing information in front of screens but not collectively experiencing anything. Sharing is so important. I often think about this in
one of my unfinished poems about it: “the night is long and I awake
and struggling to recall, the beat of beats behind banners made unholy
on Saturdays campaigning” and so on.
Edward Said, speaking to an audience at the University of Cape
Town, involving the example of John Henry Newman, as an argument against specialisation, suggested that the model of academic
freedom should be the migrant or the traveller and I’d like to finish
with this. We should, Said feels, be free, “to discover and travel among
other selves, other identities, other varieties of the human adventure. But,
most essentially, in this joint discovery of self and Other, it is the role of
the academy to transform what might be conflict, or contest, or assertion,
into reconciliation, mutuality, recognition and creative interaction.”
This spirited defence of the idea of scholar as searcher in pursuit of
knowledge and freedom allows for a contrasting of the sort of academic model of the professional who seeks to be “king and potentate,” as opposed to the traveller who is dependent not on power but
motion. Willing to enter different worlds, to “use different idioms,
and understand a variety of disguises, masks, and rhetorics.” Above
all, the migrant embraces novelty, and eschews predetermined paths,
crossing over to the space of the ‘other.’ This paradigm is the cultural
idiom of academic freedom, but it is also the truly liberationist spirit
of a genuine republic.
And if, as democratic republics, our nations are truly interested in
protecting the republican ideals on which their constitutions are
founded, incorporating the founding principles which surely include
solidarity, including solidarity beyond borders, then the ability to
reach out to others in times of crisis is a key expression of a healthy,
genuine republic that is abiding by its founding principles.
I finish by humanitarianism itself. Humanitarianism is an active
belief in the intrinsic value of human life. Through the actions of
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humans undertaking acts of benevolence and providing assistance to
other humans, we achieve a form of human welfare betterment.
It is, in its origins, a philosophical belief, but humanitarianism today
is often used to describe the thinking and doctrines behind the emergency response to crises such as war, famine and natural disasters. A
core tenet of humanitarianism is that people have equal dignity by
virtue of their being human based solely on need, without discrimination among recipients.
How much better it would be if the essential elements of what constitutes humanitarianism formed the basis of the discourse that prevails
on the streets of the world and within the highest political echelons,
rather than those subjects of humanitarian crises being abandoned or
indeed targeted as the prey of xenophobes and racists.
And words do matter. I suggest again that public intellectuals have
a crucial role to play in their contribution to the humanitarian discourse broadly and, in particular, the language and commentary relating to migration. We have seen in recent times, the souring of
language used by elected officials of governments, often those with
natives and populist tendencies with regard to the humanitarian crisis, using stereotypes that debase discourse, grounded as it is in irrational but contrived fear and ignorance, provides fertile ground for
political extremism and an ideological extremism of individualism at
best. And I think it has to be opposed with courage.
I think that in the end, in many cases, we must realise—there is just
one other last point I want to make—the necessary requirements of
intellectuals I spoke of earlier would sometimes, people suggest, say
we are actually working on the problem. And I think, frankly, this alleged suggestion of the exclusive demands of time and effort, of clarity, will in fact be used as a mask. You have in the end to go out to the
public world and take on tasks and the challenge of communicating
that which you have in fact been the subject of your moral wrestling.
I want to just thank you all, very, very much.
May I suggest that universities have a key role as institutional citizens in fostering a more enlightened and multi-faceted debate about
migration. And I congratulate you in providing a ‘haven’ to inter53

national students in addition to persecuted scholars who have been
forced to flee. And I do wish to say, I wish to conclude with a message of hope. It would be so easy to fall into the trap of pessimism
and become disheartened when faced with the grand scale of what
we face, especially in the current geopolitical trajectory.
The concept of utopia is being recovered in intellectual work in so
many places—work such as that of Ruth Levitas. But let me only say
that which is very important. Ernst Bloch suggested that utopianism
not only involves a rejection of what is and what isn’t useless, and a
hope for an alternative, but also a strategy for its implementation,
is central. And I think that is what we must all do in our combined
consciousness. Take the power, and the transformative potential
of that which is driving the response to ecological crises, deepening inequality, economic crises, loss of cohesion, and as well as that,
the grave, grave need to remake the constitutions so that they are
enabled to response to the heart of the world, rather than being
trapped in producing what are, if you like, hopeless riddles of what
is failing.
So I wish you all, what you imagined for the future, may it be blessed
in its inclusivity.
Beir Beannacht agus go raibh míle maith agaibh go léir.
And I so wish you success in everything that you do. And I urge you
to activism. No matter what you can do, there is nothing that cannot
be understood, nothing that cannot be communicated, and there is
nothing that cannot be replaced. And it is all there to be gained. And
there is great joy in all of that in communal celebration.
Beir Beannacht, many thanks.
—Fordham University Lincoln Center, September 2019
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I am standing on the shoulders of giants, since this series has previously brought two of the globe’s most important humanitarian diplomats to this stage.
Last April, former President Mary Robinson spoke with passion and
urgency about climate justice, an issue to which she has contributed so much, and in October, current President Michael Higgins
brought you an equally strong call for action, on the role public intellectuals have to play in defending some of our most life-saving
ideas, from humanitarianism itself to refugee protection. I can assure
you, like my predecessors, I was partially educated by the Irish and
my headmistress, a feisty 90-year-old Sr. Enda Ryan, deserves much
credit for my achievements, and is surely very proud of me today.
It is hardly likely that I may ever have the chance to take my turn
as President of Ireland, but, like the former esteemed speakers, I am
also here with a call to action for you. In other words, no one is walking out of here free of your share of responsibility to help us solve one
of the biggest threats currently facing humanitarian action.
The threat I want to talk about is not as obvious as the international
community’s terrifying failure to take the steps so obviously needed
to halt global warming, nor the crazy way that our debates are turning vulnerable migrants and refugees—people who need and deserve
our protection—into scapegoats. But it may be just as damaging.
“They never listen, so I don’t trust them,” a young migrant woman who
had spent some time in a transit center in Italy told us.
“You make promises without delivering anything,” a community member told us in Beni, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
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epicenter of the current Ebola epidemic.
We have a trust problem or deficit in the humanitarian sector, and
we all need to fix it.
We in the Red Cross and Red Crescent, are so concerned about this
that we devoted a major part of our recent quadrennial International
Conference with the States to it. As you can see from the title of my
speech, I have an idea about what we can do, and it involves paying
the right attention to “going local.”
To begin with, I need you to keep these three things in mind:
• First, trust is often seen as something warm and fuzzy. Trust makes
us feel safe. It makes us feel comfortable. But the truth is, trust is
about taking some risks. It is a leap of faith. This is why it can be lost
so quickly. Trust in long-standing institutions is not necessarily eternal. It is also often hard to come by when it is time for fundamental
change.
• Second, trust is a matter of life and death. If the right people do not
trust humanitarians, we can very literally die, and so can they. On
the other hand, if the humanitarian sector (including our donors)
cannot find a way to start trusting the right people, then humanitarianism itself may die. Who are those people? Those we hope to
help—and also those who want to help in their own communities.
This is what I mean by going local.
• Finally, trust is like water. Too little and we die, too much and
we drown. We absolutely need trust in the humanitarian sector. But it is not a stand-alone. Prophet Muhammad (peace be
upon him) reminded his companions: “Trust in God, but first tie
up your camel.” Former US president, Ronald Reagan, used to say,
“trust, but verify.”
So, trust is about ensuring adequate risk assessment, being accountable, and finding a way to balance and measure both.
This begs the question, how much should we trust?
Setting the Scene
Let me start by setting the scene. Why do I claim that trust is so
important to humanitarian action? As President Higgins already told
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us, humanitarianism is basically an idea—a story we tell ourselves—
and stories only work if we “suspend our disbelief.”
The historian Yuval Harari has explained that the shift of human
beings from small family social units to nations and ideologies gathering millions owes a great deal to our ability to invent and then
believe in stories. In other words, having common “imagined realities” that allow us to believe in invisible constructs, such as limited
liability companies and nations, as a way of organising ourselves.
Our economy is based on these kinds of helpful fictions. It is only
because we all believe in the worth of currency and in the stability of
markets that these things continue to function. Over many decades,
we have also built up a shared concept of reality for humanitarian action, with a notion that there is such a thing as global solidarity, rules
in war, and principles to which humanitarians will abide.
This is closely linked to the history of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, which I have had the honour and
privilege to be a part of over the last four years. Born more than
150 years ago in an Italian battlefield, and now represented through
14 million volunteers in 192 countries around the world, both our
individual National Societies and their international components
(the IFRC and the ICRC) are among the most trusted “brands”
in the world.
But trust doesn’t necessarily last forever. We can fall out of love with
even the oldest and most traditional imagined realities. Certainly,
we have seen many market crashes where that mutual belief, as well
as huge amounts of “imagined” money, suddenly went up in a puff
of smoke.
Along the same lines, we are currently about ten years (perhaps
starting with the Arab Spring) into a febrile period where public
belief in many core aspects of “the system” is disappearing around
the world. We see unprecedented doubt in government, in multilateral institutions, in the media, in globalisation and trade, and even
in science.
About two weeks ago, UN Secretary-General António Guterres
called this global wave of mistrust one of the “four horsemen” that
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“endanger twenty-first-century progress and imperil twenty-first-century
possibilities.”
As many of you know, the Edelman Company has been running
annual public surveys in several dozen countries on trust issues for
the last twenty years, finding a major falloff in public confidence in
institutions such as government, large corporations, the media, and
even NGOs (though there has been a modest uptick for the latter
in the last few years). This year’s report shows a continued “trust
inequity” gap, with the most highly educated segments of society
showing much higher confidence in NGOs, the media, and other
institutions than the public at large.
Last year’s report specified that only one in five people (educated or
not) believed that “the system” was working for them and over seventy
percent were ready for change. In the West in particular, the politics
of many countries have embraced change of unprecedented scope,
with large swathes of voters essentially endorsing Mark Zuckerberg’s
motto of “moving fast and breaking things,” of which we have seen the
consequences.
As people reject official sources of information, they are increasingly
turning to search engines and social media to inform themselves. In
the absence of accepted referees of truth, new imagined realities can
easily form in the algorithmic echo chambers, that fly in the face
of facts rather than building on them, sometimes based on who is
shouting loudest.
Pressure on the Principles
This environment is a new test for the traditional tools of the humanitarian sector. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent, and
many other humanitarian actors, have placed a great deal of faith in
our humanitarian principles as our central tool for maintaining trust.
This is particularly true for the fundamental principle of neutrality.
Our statutes describe neutrality as indispensable for “enjoying the
confidence at all.” For us, this means not only refusing to take sides
in war, but also avoiding “controversies of a political, racial, religious
or ideological nature.”
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In his commentary on our Fundamental Principles written over thirty years ago, ICRC legal guru Jean Pictet pointed out that, even then,
there was a rising tendency for many to see neutrality as a cop-out,
as essentially siding with the status quo, and insisting that everyone
must take a stand. He said, “The Red Cross must make it clear to those
concerned that it constitutes an exception, at a time when, throughout
the world, things are becoming more and more politicized…The Red
Cross cannot compromise itself in this wild turmoil. It has therefore confined itself to fields of action in which there are no such disputes, or at
least should not be, and aims at carrying out tasks which rally virtually
unanimous support.”
This has always been a hard balance—so hard, in fact, that some of
our peers, such as Oxfam, have formally signed off from neutrality.
Others interpret it so narrowly that their advocacy messaging stops
just short of what one could expect from a political party. But there
is a clear price for this. Governments in crisis-affected countries increasingly see humanitarians as the vanguard of political meddling
— using crisis situations (when controls are weak) as an opportunity
and excuse to push a partisan agenda. In many recent crises, from
Sudan to Myanmar, Syria to North Korea, the National Red Cross or
Red Crescent Society has found itself the only humanitarian actor allowed access to many of the people most in need. In other countries,
like here in the US, the National Society is the only non-governmental actor allowed regular access to major governmental committees
on emergency response.
Neutrality is an important reason why. Like trust itself, one does not
easily “get neutrality back” once it is set aside.
On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that our current (and potential future) young volunteers are now, more than ever, expecting
us to raise our voice, particularly on climate change, for the dignified
treatment of vulnerable migrants, for gender justice and inclusivity.
To a large extent, the aspects of these issues where we have the most
expertise, such as in the human impacts of climate disasters and the
humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants, fit well within Pictet’s
exception for issues about “which there are no… disputes, or at least
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should not be.” You are starting to hear a louder voice from us on
these issues where “there should not be” dispute.
For example, in September, the IFRC released a report on “The Cost
of Doing Nothing,” which shows that, if we do not change the ongoing rise in global warming, the number of people needing humanitarian aid due to weather-related events is likely to double to
200 million per year by 2050—and that even by 2030, the global
humanitarian spend on such events will have already skyrocketed to
USD 20 billion per year.
At our quadrennial International Conference in December, we confronted state parties to the Geneva Conventions with a series of
scenarios about the rising tolls of humanitarian crises driven by the
climate that our members are already struggling to address. We obtained their endorsement of calls to strengthen and modernize disaster laws and policies to account for climate change and to leave no
one behind.
Likewise, migration is among the most contested political issues in a
significant number of countries. Without taking a stance on whether
states should promote more or less migrants, we are speaking up for
their dignity and rights, and in particular for their safety and access
to essential services. We raised this consistently in the recent development of the Compacts on Migration and on Refugees. At our recent
statutory meetings in December, the entire Movement adopted a
“Statement on Migration and Our Common Humanity” presented
to the state parties to the Geneva Conventions at our International
Conference.
We are doing our best to thread the needle between neutrality and
standing up, but we know that we will continue to be challenged to
do more. Maintaining trust with an activist public (and volunteer)
base may come to be directly at odds with maintaining trust with
states, yet we need both to do our work.
Rise of the Compliance Culture
As challenging as that may be, solely staying true to our principles
will not be enough to maintain trust in the humanitarian sector.
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While they disagree on many things, both our individual and governmental donors are worried about value for money, and the possibility that money will be wasted, or even go awry. These concerns
are common sense and nothing new. They are absolutely right that
this money must be spent transparently, wisely and well.
But the ever-rising level of anxiety about these issues—and the way
we balance them against other kinds of risks—is a drag on our ability
to save lives.
Just a few years ago, on the occasion of the World Humanitarian
Summit, donors and agencies signed a far-reaching “Grand Bargain”
with the intention to finally correct some of the longest-standing and
most costly absurdities in the way the global system functions. The
flame of that moment’s courage is still alive, but it is still struggling
under heavy headwinds.
On the donor side, these commitments included reducing the “earmarking” of pledges to reduce the top-down rigidity in how we respond to needs, the provision of multi-year funding to allow us to
address the long-term issues, particularly in chronic situations, and
the reduction of donor reporting burdens.
As of last year, multi-year and unearmarked funding had grown overall in the sector, but only by a few percentage points, according to
Development Initiative’s Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. At
the IFRC, nearly seventy percent of pledges to our 2018 appeals were
still earmarked, and less than twenty percent of our pledges overall
were for more than one year. We were also required to produce over
1,700 separate donor reports. That is a lot of time that could have
been put to much better use.
Trust from the People We Seek to Help
We will do what we must to keep the trust of the individuals and
governments that fund us, otherwise money will stop flowing, and
people in need will suffer. But what about those people we hope to help?
It turns out that their trust is even more important.
Let’s take the case of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. First announced in August 2018, to date, over three thousand
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cases have been identified. This is an area suffering from over two decades of conflict, where basic services are already scarce, and people
have already been dying from many, less headline-catching diseases
from malaria to pneumonia. They do not trust the authorities and
they do not trust outsiders. As voiced to Marie-Rosaline Bélizaire,
a WHO doctor, people question, “They say, we are in a war zone.
We have been killed—so many people, so many times. So why are you
coming now?”.
Now overlay on this the extreme strangeness of Ebola, with its grisly
symptoms, the bizarre spaceman uniforms, the shocking separateness
we need from the bodies of loved ones, and the terrors of quarantine.
We had already learned many lessons about this from our experience
with Ebola in West Africa in 2014-16. Frightened, distrustful people
do not seek help when they are sick. They do not report deaths. Some
even attack their helpers.
When the virus first appeared in the city of Butembo in DRC, a 25year old carpenter was exposed to an identified case. Health workers
asked him to be tested, to which he responded: “I had heard many
rumours about how those who left for the Ebola treatment centre died...
So, I fled the centre and went back home.” When many feel like this,
you will never contain an epidemic.
Building on our experience in West Africa, the DRC Red Cross organised volunteers to undertake safe and dignified burials. Hundreds
of volunteers regularly collect information from the neighbours and
communities about rumours, attitudes, fears and complaints. With
help from the Centre for Disease Control (CDC), we analysed this
data to get a granular sense of what people were thinking.
In some communities, we heard that people thought that our burial
teams were replacing the bodies with rocks and then selling their
organs. They thought that people transported to Ebola treatment
centres were injected with poison and then died. With our community engagement and accountability programmes, we found ways
to address these fears (for instance, by ensuring that family members could see their loved ones being prepared at the time of burial).
Taking simple measures, like changing from an opaque to a trans64

lucent body bag, does much to dispel doubt and mistrust. Yes, we
listened, and more importantly, we acted.
In late October 2018, only 28% of reports of Ebola deaths were
coming to the DRC Red Cross from the communities themselves,
with the rest coming from the treatment centres. After extensive
community-based information and education work, by February
2019, 81% of our calls were coming from the communities. This
is an important success, and after twenty thousand burials, we feel
we are making a huge difference in containing this disease—a good
thing as coronavirus seizes global attention. But we can never be
complacent. There have been attacks against the DRC National Society volunteers as recently as last month when two were seriously
injured. We have to keep listening.
During my visit to Erbil, Iraq last year, I sat and listened to the lamentations of a group of women from local NGOs. They shared some
examples on the lack of ability of international donors and agencies
to engage, listen to, understand and trust the views of people. One
such example is hard for me to forget; if it wasn’t so sad, it would be
terribly funny.
A UN agency wanted to work in a community and decided, with
obviously little consultation, that rearing egg producing hens would
be an effective way to restore livelihoods. There were a few problems.
Many in the community had no experience with rearing hens and
were unclear what the hens were for. Still, beautiful, fluffy white hens
imported from Ukraine, costing probably five times more than the
local hens, finally arrived. Within a week, half were slaughtered for
meals, and another significant portion were sold off, leaving a suspicious community wondering if humanitarian workers were making
money on the side through a hen racketeering business.
Ground Truth Solutions, an NGO with whom we have been partnering, has been surveying aid recipients in crisis settings around the
world. In a survey of over seven thousand people in seven countries,
it found that many—over seventy percent—were willing to say that
they trusted humanitarians. But when they dug deeper, they found
them feeling mainly disappointed and disempowered. Seventy-five
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percent of them said that the aid they received did not meet their
needs. This shows that, even if we are saving lives, we are obviously
not listening well enough to what people want and need.
But will we trust them?
This brings me to the flip side of this issue: how can we expect the
people we serve to trust us, if we are not willing to trust them?
The Grand Bargain promised not only some change in this area, but
a “revolution” in community participation. We are nowhere near
there yet.
It isn’t that we do not talk to people affected by crises. We are constantly asking them questions; in big operations with multiple responders, affected communities sometimes get “assessed” over and
over again by different agencies. However, we are still not good
enough at actually listening. And even when we do listen, we often
do not act on what we hear, and worse still, we do not deliver what
we promise.
For example, among those who are currently living in Cox’s Bazar,
Bangladesh, after fleeing Myanmar, we found in 2018 that 43% sold
the aid they received on the market. The following year, this number
was up to 59%. This is in part an argument for providing cash rather
than our stock food and non-food items (another one of our commitments in the Grand Bargain). Giving cash—particularly unconditional cash—is our way of trusting that people are smart enough to
address their own most important needs. A great deal of research has
been done on this, and it fully supports the case for trust.
This is now widely agreed upon by donors and agencies alike, and the
volume of cash programming is rapidly increasing. As of 2018, it was
estimated at USD 4.7 billion, with an increasing proportion in the
form of cash rather than vouchers (rising from 55% in 2015 to 78% in
2018)—though still only representing 16% of the overall aid spend.
Within our own network, the Turkish Red Crescent is currently leading the world’s largest cash assistance programme in coordination
with the authorities and support from the IFRC and ECHO. The
IFRC, along with our network of national societies, delivers 25% of
the entire global cash program annually and this figure is rising.
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However, while donor agencies have mainly accepted the case for
cash, a distrustful electorate and press in some donor markets are
still making ominous noises, based on disproven assumptions that
recipients are likely to “waste” cash, or that cash is more likely to be
the object of fraud.
Still, cash is not a panacea. True community engagement and accountability is about more than just the type of aid we give. It is
about our readiness to adapt what we do more generally to the needs
of affected people as they themselves see them, and not just respond
to our own assumptions. We need to get beyond the suggestion box
to real transformation.
Let me give you another example from just across the border. Indigenous communities are the most affected by the many natural hazardrelated disasters affecting Canada every year. The Grand Chief of the
Prince Albert Grand Council in Saskatchewan, which represents 22
indigenous communities, said that for a long time the communities
he represents did not trust the Canadian Red Cross because they
perceived it as an arm of the government, with whom they had historical grievances.
However, all this changed when the Prince Albert area was affected
by severe flooding a few years ago. Many indigenous communities
disagreed with the evacuation plans proposed by the government
and, therefore, evacuated on their own to a different area than the
one designated by the government. The Canadian Red Cross still
provided those communities with cash assistance and other support,
even if they were not officially registered with the government. This
was a turning point for the Grand Chief, where he saw that the Canadian Red Cross was willing to meet them on their terms, even if
the government was not.
Since then, the Prince Albert Grand Council has signed a historical agreement with the Canadian Red Cross through which communities will be able to participate in and work in the planning of
evacuations. “We recognize that communities know their communities
best,” said Cindy Fuchs, Vice President of the Canadian Red Cross
in Saskatchewan.
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In major emergencies, however, we are still often on autopilot, copying and pasting from one plan to another, without taking the time
up front to engage. Like many of our partners, we are trying hard to
break out of this pattern. In December, we formally adopted a harmonized and ambitious approach to community and accountability
that will apply across our Red Cross Red Crescent Movement.
Donors need to help the humanitarian community to succeed with
this. This means finding ways to allow for more flexibility in midstream changes of plan. Aid organisations need to be able to go beyond rigid log frames but to be able to listen, adjust, deliver impact,
and learn. With all the best intentions, efforts to do this are often still
too difficult to be effective.
Building Trust with Local Civil Society and Governments
Finally, we need to address our trust gap between international and
local responders. When we were preparing the World Humanitarian
Summit (as I was leading the WHS Secretariat before joining the
Red Cross), we carried out what I believe is the largest and most
diverse consultation ever, about the global humanitarian system. We
connected with over 23,000 people, in 151 countries. Throughout
the consultations, we consistently heard the message that the international humanitarian community essentially needed to wake up to
the enormous capacity of governments and civil society in states impacted by crises—particularly in situations of non-conflict disasters,
where we expect all to be pulling in the same direction.
Around the same time, the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel
on Humanitarian Financing concluded that much greater investment
in local responders would be absolutely indispensable in a world
where humanitarian needs continue to far outpace international
funding (to the tune of over USD 15 billion) and where global appeals are constantly under-funded (usually persistently around 60%).
The rationale for investment in local actors was certainly related to
value for money, including over the long term, but touched on other
values as well. Local actors can work much more efficiently in response to emergencies, and investments in them build sustainability
68

by connecting today’s response with tomorrow’s preparedness capacity. Increasing focus on “localisation” was one of only a handful of
game-changing steps the Panel recommended to bridge the humanitarian financing gap over the long term.
Local actors also bring advantages when it comes to winning the
community’s trust. As pointed out in the Edelman Trust Barometer,
“people in my community” were among the most trusted categories
of persons in 2020 and “people like myself ” were considered among
the most credible sources of information. With this in mind, community-level volunteers, like those supporting National Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, have some of the best chances of winning the trust of affected persons in their communities, as we have
seen in the DRC Ebola virus example.
Many international NGOs and UN agencies have realised this and
look to directly hire as many local staff as possible. Unfortunately,
particularly in a major and protracted response operation, this can
have the reverse effect of undermining local capacity, because talented governmental and local civil society staffers are lured away by
better-paid positions, leaving their local institutions and organisations weaker. This is not the way to strengthen local capacity.
There are still major hurdles to overcome. Overall, direct funding to
local actors (the majority of it to governments and not civil society)
has barely budged—from 2.0% (USD 433 million) of overall humanitarian funding in 2016 to 3.1% (USD 648 million) in 2018,
while less direct funding was estimated that year at 8.74%. Most of
the funds they received were through intermediaries, such as UN
agencies or INGOs, with consequent added expense, as well as loss
of direct communication and understanding—between those carrying out the work at the last mile and those paying for it.
Local actors complained that they were often treated as sub-contractors, with little discretion to make use of their knowledge of local
needs and traditions, and very little opportunity to obtain support
for their long-term capacity.
This led to a commitment in the Grand Bargain to increase funding channelled to national and local responders “as directly as pos69

sible” (removing multiple layers) to 25% of the overall humanitarian
spend by 2020, as well as to increase investment in their institutional
capacity, support their voices in coordination mechanisms, and promote stronger partnerships between international and local responders. None of these goals could be met without significant levels of
trust between international and local partners.
Together with the Swiss Government, the IFRC has acted as a coconvener of the Grand Bargain’s Localisation Workstream, where
signatories are cooperating to support each other in carrying out
their commitments. Since 2016, we have seen important progress on
some of those commitments, but much less in others.
Many donors, UN agencies, and INGOs have been rethinking how
they work with local partners, changing policies that get in the way,
and piloting new approaches. For example, Italy revised procedures
in 2016 and moved to a direct funding relationship with its first
local NGO partners. The ACT Alliance changed the rules for its
Rapid Response Fund to make it available only to local actors. Mercy
Corps ran a capacity building program in Syria, through which local partners received remote coaching, mentoring, training, and ongoing support to strengthen their capacity in financial, operational,
and programmatic areas. UNHCR changed its policy on providing
overhead costs, which had provided INGOs an overhead amount
on contracts but not local civil society organisations. Germany and
many other donors significantly increased their support for the UN’s
Country-Based Pooled Funds, with the ambition that many of those
funds would increase the number of local actors receiving funding. While this has achieved progress in some contexts, it has not
across the board, and still has many challenges for local actors to gain
direct benefit.
Apart from IFRC, which is the largest global humanitarian network,
others, particularly faith-based network organisations, like Act Alliance and Caritas have long devoted themselves to supporting local
actors to respond in their own communities. But we also have many
things to improve. Last December, the IFRC general assembly adopted a new ten-year strategy committing themselves to a series of trans70

formations, including a major shift of leadership and decision-making, to the most local level—particularly to our 165,000 branches,
where most important services are delivered.
During our visits to several “demonstrator countries” and in regional
workshops in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East, we heard
from many local actors who struggled with repeated capacity assessments and heavy due diligence processes, after which they were still
often treated as sub-contractors. Women-led and women’s rights organisations report particular difficulties breaking into humanitarian
financing and coordination mechanisms.
Donors are leery of risk and worried about the capacity needed to
oversee a multitude of new partners. Not all local actors are prepared
to act according to humanitarian principles or humanitarian quality
standards. International actors worry about how this shift will affect
their funding and role in the future. There are still plenty of stumbling blocks on the way to major systemic change.
In the meantime, however, some steps are being taken toward
“localisation,” whether the international community wants them or
not. After the Sulawesi earthquake in Indonesia, the authorities limited the entry of international actors unless they could find a local
partner to sponsor them. With the tables turned, and as reported
by the Humanitarian Advisory Group, “some international organisations reported radical shifts in their partnership management. Fewer
international staff were employed into the partner organisations. Incountry partners took strategic and operational decisions… resulting
in greater local ownership of the response.” The majority of cluster
meetings were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia instead of English. International actors were still contributing—but in a different way. As
governments grow in capacity and confidence (particularly in Asia),
we can expect more to take their cue from Indonesia’s experience.
Of course, bans on international humanitarian action are not what
we are looking for. International responders will continue to have an
important role in a more localised humanitarian system, especially in
conflict settings where blocking humanitarian aid is often used as a
tool of war. But the turned tables in the Sulawesi case show a glimpse
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of a response that is much closer to the ideal of “as local as possible, as
international as necessary” than many internationals have managed
to achieve so far in their own incremental changes to partnerships
and coordination mechanisms.
In fact, just last week, my day turned a little brighter reading about
SOS Sahel, an international NGO working for more than 36 years
in Sudan and Ethiopia, that decided it was time to close down the
charity as enough local capacity had been developed to continue the
work. We need to learn how they arrived at this point and reflect on
the role of many organisations that have persisted for decades without significantly supporting leadership by local actors.
As someone who began her career in the global south, founding a
hybrid national–international NGO (or a southern-based INGO
as some called us) that somehow fit neither here nor there, but yet
seamlessly was able to blend in and learn from all sides, let me also
share my personal reflections and regrets.
Local and southern based NGOs have to be very careful not to strive
to be a mirror image of the more established northern NGOs. When
I founded MERCY Malaysia, I wanted to prove that we were as good
as, if not more effective and efficient than, these established organisations. My colleagues and I worked on quality assurance, obtaining
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership certification ahead of
many other large INGOs.
All this was very important for our internal learning, quality assurance and commitment to accountability—both to donors and people we serve. I always reminded myself and colleagues that we should
never lose what is precious about local southern organisations. As
an organisation born in a multi-racial and multi-ethnic country,
our humility, our deep knowledge of culture, our innate ability to
easily build relationships with diverse communities, our precious
asset and natural ability to listen, understand, and learn from the
people we aim to support, were crucial building blocks to enable us
to deliver the best possible assistance for people and with people.
There is no magic formula.
Sometimes, I felt like the token southern organisation representative,
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this rather unique Muslim woman from the global south, who was
a decent communicator, was opinionated and courageous enough
to speak out. I am glad there are many like me more visible now,
but the reality is we do NOT fully represent all the smaller community organisations, the grassroot organisations run by women, nor
the people affected by conflict and crises who can themselves selforganise and act.
So, both international and southern based organisations, especially the ones who are often represented in workshops and meetings
around the world, need to be humble and acknowledge that. We all
need to do more to build those bridges and relationships with people, and I daresay, to one day be able to allow them to lead us.
Personally, as a result of a more than 20-year persistent and patient
journey and stubborn advocacy, dialogues and commitments to localisation are common today. In my lifetime, I have seen the shift we
pushed for actually begin to happen.
Looking to the future, I know there will be another hopefully more
persistent group of individuals, who will push forward and continually transform the “system” and put trust and power into affected
people’s hands. And people affected by crises or caught in conflict
will raise their voices more frequently and louder. I urge you to read
the Guardian article published recently, and appropriately entitled
“Stop ignoring us: Rohingya refugees demand role in running camps.”
In order to achieve this much needed shift, we will require a completely different funding model and system from what we now widely use in the humanitarian sector. The fast-growing application of
FinTech, digital social networks, and the ability for people caught in
crises to connect directly with those who want to assist, will certainly
catalyse this.
It is also the action of individuals, like my friend Amierah who
crowdsources funding to get much needed warm blankets for migrants and refugees landing on remote Greek islands. The private
sector will increasingly play a role, we just need to know how to harness and guide the partnership, so that our humanitarian principles
are preserved. Most importantly, we need to ensure that everything
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we do will protect the safety and dignity of those we hope to serve.
But there are dark clouds looming above us today. A narrowing
humanitarian space imposed by governments may enable national
and local actors to strengthen preparedness, response, and recovery
from disasters arising from natural hazards. That gives us reason
to celebrate!
However, closing and limiting access to people caught in conflicts
is threatening our ability to reach those most in need and hardest
to reach. Added to this, current discourse and increasingly restrictive counter-terrorism legislation can cripple humanitarian action. I
would never argue that security is unimportant, but we may yet see
the negative repercussion of these regulations, when people feel they
are victimised and forgotten.
The Way Forward
So, how do we maintain trust in humanitarian action? Even in our
turbulent times, our principles are still a potent tool and certainly one we will want to protect from permanent damage. We hope
that this will be possible even as we stand up for humanitarian values when the political sphere becomes so extreme as to place them
in jeopardy.
To keep the trust of the public (and through them, our major donors), humanitarian organisations must maintain best-in-class safeguards against fraud and misuse of funds. We must be transparent
and conscientious in our use of resources that are entrusted to us on
behalf of those in need. And for aid to be effective, donors must also
allow us enough breathing space to make some of our own decisions
about how to use these funds without being buried in over-reporting
and paperwork. To turn around Reagan’s phrase—verify, yes, but with
some trust.
We need to rise to the challenge in trying to maintain trust in an
increasingly noisy world. Where confirmation bias of artificial intelligence creates algorithms that drive greater polarisation, where fake
news is paradoxically taken more seriously than mainstream news,
and where social media becomes the first point of news and informa74

tion. We need humanitarian actors to diversify skill sets to manage
this, to master these digital and media platforms, rather than reacting to them. We need to continually engage in ways that might seem
non-traditional today, but will be obsolete in just a few years’ time, as
the rapid speed of change in digital communication and increasingly
available technology to all.
We must work together to go local. This is where you come in. As
I hope you remember, this speech is ending with an assignment for
you. Going local requires its own leap of faith at a very distrustful
time. If we do not take it, we risk losing the confidence of the communities where we work, the people we seek to help, and the governments of affected countries. Losing that confidence can be just as
fatal as closing the spigot of humanitarian funding.
What is your role? Some of you, like me, are Grand Bargain signatories. I am sure among you here are international actors and you need
to adjust to current and future realities—to be bold, courageous, and
adaptable—to foresee what role you are best placed to contribute to,
and when you might eventually exit. Others of you are current, and
my hope is many of you are future thought leaders for our sector.
I need all of your help to overcome that most deadly of threats to
change—“humanitarian reform fatigue.”
We are moving, very slowly and painfully, toward a more localised
approach, where communities are supported to be their own heroes
and international support strengthens and enhances, rather than replacing and undermining, local capacity. This is just the moment
when many past reforms in our sector have begun to lose steam—
when the incremental improvements make the finish line look impossibly far and people begin thinking about the next catchphrase.
We need your voices (and your tweets and posts) to encourage all of
us to keep on going in this race to truly build a system fit for our
future—one that is empowering, and acknowledges that the people
we see as being on the receiving end are capable of being innovative,
effective, and accountable.
I met someone I admire, Sir Ellen Johnson Sirleaf at the UN General
Assembly last year. I lamented how it is sometimes so hard to push
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for reform, and she replied, “The size of your dreams must always
exceed your current capacity to achieve them. If your dreams do not
scare you, they are not big enough.”
So, to paraphrase John Lennon—you can say that I’m a dreamer, but
I’m not the only one. I know many of you share the same desire to see
not just a better humanitarian system, but, more importantly, better
outcomes for people who are caught in some of the worst circumstances merely because they were born in a different place, under
different circumstances—not by any choice of their own. We are no
better than them if not for that.
If improving our systems and approaches helps us achieve our goals,
then let’s start by investing in building trust, doing and delivering
what we say, with humility and perseverance, to the very people who
deserve that trust—the local populations.
—Fordham University Lincoln Center, February 2020
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The Sustainable Development Goals
and Common Values: A Vital Framework
for Humanitarian Action
Vice Admiral Mark Mellett DSM, PhD
Chief of Staff of the Irish Defence Forces

It is a privilege to contribute to the Ireland at Fordham Humanitarian Lecture Series on the theme “Sustainable Development Goals and
Common Values—A Vital Framework for Humanitarian Action.”
There are a number of themes that I would like to develop. These include the importance of collaboration, partnership, innovation, and
diversity. I will position these themes in the context of multilateralism, building to my key point which centres on the importance of
the Sustainable Development Goals and Common Values in providing
a Framework for Humanitarian Action.
The Irish Defence Forces are a key component of the security architecture of the Irish Stage, and when all is said and done, they are
part of the bedrock that underpins our State’s sovereignty, part of the
framework that provides for the institutions of our civilised society.
For me, a civilised society is built on values, providing a framework
for universal human rights.
The right to live in a civilised society is a human right of every man,
woman, and child. It is where people are free, where the institutions
of state function, and the vulnerable are protected.
I recently read Almost Human by Lee Berger. It traces the discovery of
the species Homo Naledi, a previously unknown, now extinct, hominin that existed over a quarter of a million years ago. The hominin
species predated Homo Sapiens from which we have all descended.
It made me think about the principles and values that evolve with
civilisation and how they influence how we know right from wrong.
More recently, I read The Jungle Grows Back by Robert Kagan, which
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further added to my thoughts on creating a paradigm, a continuum
if you like, between the uncivilised and the institutions of a civilised
society—between insecurity and security, between peace and the absence of peace.
As a fundamental principle, I see the role of Ireland’s Defence Forces
is to contribute to an effort to move institutions along the continuum from insecurity to security, from an absence of peace to peace.
Our military is not an end in itself. We are the guarantor of our
State’s sovereignty and sovereign rights. Sovereign rights that are not
upheld are more imaginary than real. Internationally, I see us as a
servant, working with others, politicians, diplomats, NGOs, entrepreneurs, lawyers, investors—and always within an appropriate
institutional framework, often involving the EU, but nearly always
underwritten by the UN.
Four hundred years ago, the English Poet John Donne in “For whom
the Bell Tolls” wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself. Each is a
piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by
the sea, Europe is the less.” His words are prophetic when we consider
what is happening today.
My sense of his key message is that we are interdependent. Today, in
a world of breakneck speed in terms of change and knowledge, when
we are physically experiencing the effects of climate breakdown and
biodiversity loss, we have never been more interdependent. We are in
the era of the Anthropocene—an era in which human activity is the
dominant influence on climate and the environment.
Earth’s history points to five mass extinction events. When we think
of the last two in particular, I think you will agree that the reptiles
and dinosaurs were not responsible for their demise; they didn’t
know they were about to become extinct, and even if they did, they
couldn’t do anything about it. Humans are different. In the context
of animals, we have extraordinary intelligence.
Aristotle marked out this difference reflecting that we are rational
animals pursuing knowledge for its own sake. “We live by art and reasoning,” he wrote, while Suddendorf suggests humans have radically
different possibilities of thinking. So, in my view, if we are to survive
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as a species, the principle of multilateralism has never been more
important. It must become a defining feature for the institutions of a
civilised society to flourish. It is essential for human security.
In Europe, notwithstanding the Balkan wars, we have enjoyed an extraordinary period of peace and security. This security has in no small
way been the result of the multilateral manner in which the values
and principles of the European Union have been institutionalized,
building on the philosophy of Robert Schuman.
But (and this is a point that Kagan makes) the institutions of the
EU were facilitated by initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, which,
at the time, provided over $15B to support a program for European
Recovery—a recovery that was complemented by US interest in Europe for decades to follow. But this is changing, and a new language
of unilateralism is emerging.
Ireland is in the top 7% of most peaceful countries, according to the
Global Peace Index. We are so fortunate to have civil society, market,
and government institutions that are well-grounded. There are many
countries, however, where this is not the case, and the gap continues
to grow between peace and the absence of peace, between security and
insecurity, and between civilised society and uncivilised actions.
For over 60 years, Irish soldiers have served in some of the most
challenging theatres in the world. Ireland’s approach in providing
assistance to victims of armed conflicts and other emergencies is to
stress the importance of coherent, complementary and coordinated
actions within a multilateral framework.
We emphasise the importance of systematically integrating protection of civilians and gender-based violence initiatives into policy and
practice to protect the most vulnerable, especially women and girls.
In our assistance programmes, we, in Ireland, also recognise the importance of enhancing resilience by strengthening the capacity of
countries, communities, institutions, and individuals to anticipate
and adapt to shocks and stresses.
Our women and men, soldiers, sailors, and aircrew have contributed to almost 70,000 individual tours of duty. Our women and
men have (and continue to) give leadership, such as that currently
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by General Maureen O’Brien in Syria and General Michael Beary in
Lebanon, previously. We have stood up to violent extremists, and we
have freed hostages.
It is in these missions that we come face to face, however, with the
simple reality that freedom is not free. While on this point, it is appropriate to remember the 87 members of the Defence Forces who
have died in the service of international peace, including our soldiers
who remain missing in action in Lebanon and the Congo.
In recent years, we have contributed to the rescue of over 23,000
women, men, and children in the Mediterranean, with Irish Naval
Service ships recovering over 18,000, many of whom were drowning
at the time of recovery. For many of these rescued people, the first
semblance of civil society experienced in months, if not years, was
that experience on the afterdeck of an Irish sovereign warship under
the Irish tricolour—our flag.
But there were many who were not so fortunate. One of our Naval
commanders reflected, “No one was unaffected by what they had to
do and what they saw on the mission...Crew members were faced with
hundreds of people struggling in front of them [in the water or on sinking
vessels] and with having to make a decision rescuing one person, knowing
that might mean another might not be pulled to safety.” We have seen
hundreds of people die and have recovered many bodies.
According to the Global Peace Index, over the last ten years there has
been a general deterioration of global peace and security, and I see
further challenges growing.
We currently have two wars on Europe’s borders. There is a full-scale
hybrid war in Ukraine, where over 10,000 people have died. In Syria, where Irish troops serve with UNDOF, multiple proxy wars are
still being prosecuted. It has been reported that over 500,000 people
have died, and over 6 million people have been displaced.
There is evidence, notwithstanding reports to the contrary, that remnants of ISIS in Iraq and Syria are consolidating, while others have
relocated elsewhere to countries like Libya. Some have linked up
with disparate violent extremist groups, influencing further south
across the Sahel. There are indications of ISIS consolidating in an arc
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from Mauritania to Nigeria, encompassing the Boko Haram foothold. This should worry us.
The situation in Mali, where Ireland contributes to both the UN
and EU missions, continues to deteriorate. Troops serving with the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Force
have been subjected to many attacks and significant loss of life. There
have been multiple atrocities involving civilian communities, about
which you are familiar.
Only last Tuesday, three of our soldiers were injured in what appears
to be a targeted, improvised, explosive strike. Thankfully, they are
well. I spoke to them last Wednesday; their attitude was stoic, wanting to get back to service and doing what they are there for—to facilitate safe and secure environments—just like the almost 600 other
Irish soldiers, sailors, and aircrew who serve in peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations in 13 countries on 14 missions as I speak.
The porous borders of the Sahel are a challenge in particular in places
such as the Tri Border area of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. There is
a sense that the insecurity is influencing westward towards the Gulf
of Guinea, where the illegal trade in weapons and people trafficking
is mixed with narcotics trafficking, fuelling criminality in the region,
which spills into Europe and beyond. This insecurity also drives irregular migration, and while we must treat symptoms in places like
the Mediterranean, the only hope for a cure is to treat the root causes.
There are other forces driving instability in and between states. For
example, state-sponsored cyber and espionage are becoming more
prevalent, undermining democratic institutions and threatening critical national infrastructure. The rise in the right is driving more nationalistic tendencies, which, in many cases, is triggered in response
to irregular migration, often fuelled by fake news and sometimes
reinforced by toxic social media narratives.
I have already mentioned the loss of biodiversity and the impact of
climate breakdown—both of which are being exacerbated by the effects of population increase. 200 years ago, there were one billion
people in the world. The UN estimates our population will pass ten
billion by around 2050. All of this is forcing on and expanding the
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continuum from where we should be getting more civilised toward
greater insecurity and an absence of peace.
There are positives, however, and they are linked to my earlier points
relating to human intelligence. Every day, we hear about and increasingly experience the positive impacts from the growth in automation,
the growth in robotics, and the acceleration in the growth of technology. These are driving the internet of things, enhancing artificial and
augmented intelligence, with the explosion of data presenting huge
opportunities. Data drives information, which fuels and feeds the
increase and creation of new knowledge and greater understanding.
But what does this mean for humanitarian action?
Three things are clear. Firstly, if we leverage the knowledge available—own, open source or partner—and recognise that in every
moment, new technologies and new ways of doing things are being
created, we reduce risk. Secondly, if we recognise that the rate of
increase in creation of new knowledge means that it has a decreasing
half-life and we are adaptive to this reality, we reduce risk. Thirdly,
the simple reality is that, with such an acceleration in the generation
of new technologies and knowledge, it is in our interest to collaborate and partner. That collaboration should take place in a framework of common values and common goals, such as the Sustainable
Development Goals. If we do this, we are to make a greater impact
in our humanitarian actions.
But there are a number of other features that should characterise or
inform the nature of our collaboration and partnerships. We must
innovate and create arrangements to support diversity, including diversity and inclusion. This will help ensure a greater impact in humanitarian operations.
Innovation is a systematic change in mindset that permeates entire
organisations. Increasingly, the answers to our challenging problems
lie outside our organisation boundaries. It is my view that we must be
open to ceding power to gain power. We must tame egos and accept
that we are increasingly interdependent. Einstein is credited with
saying ego equals 1/knowledge. Unfortunately, in my experience,
there are too many people who know just enough to have an ego.
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Egos often drive the maintenance of silos that undermine better collaboration, trust, efficiency, and effectiveness.
To enhance our capacity for service delivery, including performance
in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in the military, we recognise “opportunities come to pass, not to pause.” We need to enable
and empower our personnel to act with greater autonomy. We are
driving ‘Mission Command’ that is enabling greater freedom of action for subordinates within a framework of values and in keeping
with the commander’s intent.
We are increasing risk tolerance, recognising that, while creativity
and making mistakes are inseparable twins, mistakes are the portals
of discovery. In complex organisations, mistakes are inevitable; what
is important is that solid governance for risk mitigation be in place.
This requires a culture of learning where lessons are identified leading
to that learning, a culture we are endeavouring to make just—a just
culture, where there is balanced accountability.
In the context of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, innovation must also be cross-sectoral, and the potential dividend for
humanitarian action is clear. This requires greater alignment between
peacekeeping forces and humanitarian NGOs.
The messages articulated by Ramalingam et al. for innovation in international humanitarian action are applicable to every sector contributing to an integrated approach.
Innovation stimulates positive change, providing new ways of delivering assistance to those who need it most. Innovation demands new
ways of thinking that challenge the status quo. Instead of being satisfied with incremental improvements in delivery of aid, for example,
innovation requires a boldness that continuously asks the question: is
there a better way to do this? This may involve a different partnership
model, a new process for service delivery, leveraging a new technology, or all three.
Innovation does not happen by accident, it requires leadership, education, collaboration, and understanding. It needs to be raised to a
strategic priority. It is not necessarily just about inventing something
new, but, rather, it could be about applying something that is proven
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elsewhere in a new setting. For example, greater leveraging of the ‘4 Ps’
approach, the product or service, the price, the place, and the promotion—how it is communicated has relevance in the context of
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
Innovation is neither fixed nor linear, with the theory and practice
of innovation evolving continually. While it can happen by accident,
to be sustainable, it requires a deliberate and proactive shift in understanding, and a culture that leaves us ready to seize those fleeting
opportunities.
Open innovation should be supported by effective information sharing, within and between organisations, maintaining networks and
ready to codify partnerships with counterparts within and beyond
the sector.
States, regional bodies, and indeed the UN itself can encourage
sector-wide mechanisms to promote and facilitate innovation for
humanitarian action. Safe and appropriate spaces for experimenting
and innovating should be stimulated for the humanitarian sector.
Prevention is better than a cure, and treating symptoms alone will
not cure the root cause. A focus on innovations can help to support
a shift towards proactive work to prevent disasters, rather than only
reacting after the event, and towards increasing local ownership of
humanitarian activities, enabling a shift from ‘catastrophe-first’ innovation toward ‘vulnerability-first.’
Complementing innovation, we need to strive
1. for diversity in our networks and partnerships and
2. to enhance diversity internally.
Research has linked more diverse leadership with better governance
and risk management. It shows a correlation between gender-diverse boards and the increased likelihood of staff adhering to codes
of conduct with better communication as well as better financial
management.
Humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts are actioned in a comprehensive and integrated manner. In terms of external diversity, we
must strive to increase opportunities for external collaboration and
partnerships—for instance, seeking to mix state with enterprise and
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with higher education institutions and civil society actors. In my experience, the greater the diversity in terms of our external networks,
the greater the potential in terms of potential disruptive innovative
outcomes.
The World [Humanitarian] Summit has reaffirmed the value of
convening a diversity of stakeholders to develop solutions to shared
problems. Only by harnessing the skills and ideas of a diverse range
of stakeholders can we respond to the magnitude of the challenges
and implement changes on the scale required.
For many years, I have been on the forefront, advocating for open diverse networks to sense and explore answers to our challenging problems. In some cases, we have created diverse partnerships to seize and
exploit these ideas with a view to creating new technologies, with
end user solutions to end user identified problems, working
with academia, enterprise, and others.
It was such a partnership that enabled our Defence Force’s medical
teams responding to the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone to be equipped
with cutting edge technology, such as contactless thermometers, before such technology was available on the market. More recently, we
have worked with researchers to develop a cellulose-based material
for wipes and masks specifically designed to capture microbes such as
COVID-19 virus, trapping them inside the material, thereby reducing transmission of the pathogen.
This philosophy is why, in terms of our core profession, we require
more holistic perspectives in developing our personnel, not just in
traditional military skills, but also as scholars who understand the
language of others, and diplomats who can build the alliances necessary to underpin the integrated perspectives and partnerships required for humanitarian action working with others.
I have made the case for diversity in terms of the external partnership, and the same goes for an internal organizational perspective.
Spanning external and internal diversity is an appreciation of the importance of science, technology, engineering, and math, or so called
STEM. However, in addition to STEM, we must also leverage the
arts, encompassing social and political sciences. These define how
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relationships are formed and how alliances are built.
For us in Defence Forces, this has implications for how we develop
our personnel. Whereas, previously, we trained our personnel for scenarios we can predict, now, in a world of complexity, we also educate
our personnel for scenarios that we cannot predict. No longer is it
sufficient to be a competent soldier warrior; there are other perspectives that are also important. We require a seamless change from being a warrior to a scholar, understanding the perspective of others as
a diplomat.
Facilitating ‘cross-cutting’ structures within our military requires developed diplomatic skills in our personnel to nurture and build collaborative networks. Almost everywhere we operate, we work with
partners. Art, encompassing social and political sciences, enhances
the knowledge that builds and connects institutions.
In the context of our effectiveness for humanitarian action, we see
our drive to enable diversity internally. Developing a diversity and
inclusion strategy is critical. Someone once said, “Diversity is about
being invited to the party, inclusion is about being asked to dance.” It is
built around culture, creed, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and
even age.
Sutton et al. point out how high-performing teams have both visible and invisible diversity characteristics. Visible diversity can enable
access to knowledge and networks that are specific to a particular
group, whilst invisible diversity can support productivity and problem solving. The effects of diversity are additive for all diversity dimensions. Rather than focusing on one specific aspect of diversity,
the goal is to create teams that are diverse across multiple dimensions. “It is the mix that matters.”
Innovation and diversity are not exclusive. On my Twitter feed, you
will see a picture of a young man; his name is Charlie, and he is fifteen and a half. Charlie wrote me a lovely letter full of empathy and
caring. He wanted to go to Syria. Charlie wanted to help our soldiers
make safe and secure environments for people in dangerous places.
Charlie has special needs, and (in his own words) at times, he is hard
to understand. Charlie has helped our Defence Forces understand
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a broader perspective; he has attended with our troops before their
deployment to missions like Syria. Last year, when our values champions received their awards from the President of Ireland, Charlie
received a special award also.
Within every organisation—the military in particular—institutionalising a gender perspective, gender equality, and empowerment of
women are all capability drivers. Ireland and our Defence Forces
have been at the forefront in terms of Women Peace and Security.
I am well aware that gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and
abuse are features of many conflicts. They have been prosecuted as
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and, in certain instances, the
most grievous of all crimes: the crime of genocide.
One of the strongest indicators of intra and inter state violence is the
gender gap. The Global Gender Gap Index is an index designed to
measure gender equality. When compared to the Global Peace Index,
the results are stark, with a clear and unambiguous relationship between the size of the gender gap and the absence of peace.
I am proud of Ireland’s leadership in terms of Women Peace and
Security. Our Defence Forces contributed to the production of our
three National Action Plans. Within our Forces, we are working hard
to institutionalise a gender perspective amongst all our personnel. In
a male-dominated organisation, it is as much a male issue as it is a
female issue.
I acknowledge that I have much to do to progress our Defence Forces
in terms of improving gender balance. I am, however, acutely aware
that empowerment of women, gender equality, and closing the gender gap are societal issues which require multifaceted approaches.
The winner of a recent study in an Irish national science competition
for pre-university students found that gender stereotyping in 5—7
year-old girls was actually being reinforced by their 5—7 year-old boy
peers. This has significant implications, not just in terms of science,
technology, engineering, and maths, but also for achieving better
gender balance in our militaries.
Better gender balance in our militaries is not a matter of political
correctness; it is not just about access to a further 50% of the popu89

lation. It is not just about being a better reflection of the society we
defend, protect, and serve—it is a capability issue, which makes us
better at what we do. It enhances our capability in peacekeeping and
humanitarian action.
So, I come to the nexus between values, the Sustainable Development Goals and Humanitarian Action.
Progressing along the continuum from insecurity and absence of
peace towards sustainable institutions of a civilised society is about
striving for common values.
Values are a vital framework for everything we do, and yet, we can
take them for granted. Values provide the glue for common action.
Values are the bridge between the insecurity and the institutions
of civil society, and yet, too often, values are being undermined by
seemingly smart people.
Within our Defence Forces in recent years, we have dedicated significant efforts to institutionalising our values in action in everything we
do. In a world where power is inverted, where the advent of social
media has meant that rapid change and complexity are the norm,
it has never been more important that, as leaders, we seek to influence values at every level—international governmental, the regional
institutional level, and the state level, as well as organisational and
personal levels.
In our Defence Forces, our values include the moral courage to do
the right thing; the physical courage to persevere, despite danger
and adversity; a respect that treats others as they should be treated;
an integrity that encompasses honesty, sincerity, and reliability; a
loyalty to State and comrades; and a selflessness which puts duty
before ourselves.
From an organisational perspective, values have inward and outward
dimensions. Not only do they help make us stronger as organisations, but they also help define how we partner and how we will
engage with others. Values are enablers for better innovation and
richer diversity. However, values are also about how we adhere to the
law—International Humanitarian Law, Law of Armed Conflict, and
the Law of War. Values are about ethical practice.
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The Law of Armed Conflict, with its principles such as Distinction,
Humanity, Proportionality, and Precaution, has a close relationship
with and takes its foundation from an ethical basis.
Ethics and the law coalesce to form a necessary combination that is
demanded of the conduct of conflict today. Those who do not adhere
to legal and ethical standards may find themselves indicted before a
court, such as the International Criminal Court.
The Defence Forces incorporate ethics and the law as key enablers
to the conduct of our operations, particularly Peace Support Operations. Although Peace Support Operations are not war, it is in a postconflict atmosphere where the highest ethical and legal standards are
necessary. The Peace Support Force must maintain a disciplined and
professional approach in operations, all supported by an understanding of ethics. In our case, aligning with our Defence Force’s values
and with the legal requirements of the Geneva and Hague Conventions is ordinarily expected.
While I have articulated the case for values, my key point is that
institutionalising values at an organisational level is a critical component in the context of nested governance, where common values
linked to the Sustainable Development Goals drive a vital framework
for humanitarian action.
Thirty-one years ago, the Brundtland Commission, in “Our Common Future,” was one of the first seminal reflections to advocate for
a holistic approach to the key principle of sustainable development.
In the context of the norms and principles that underpin good governance and inform our values, sustainable development should
be what Axelrod describes as a ‘meta-norm,’ that is, something for
which self-penalisation should occur for non-compliance.
Brundtland also advocated for multilateralism, and corporate social responsibility. There is a clear congruence between Brundtland’s
findings and the Sustainable Development Goals. The codification
of the UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals was co-sponsored by
Ireland and Kenya. Attainment of these goals requires governance
that is comprehensive and integrated. They represent a universal call
to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all peo91

ple enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. They are fundamental to the
framework for humanitarian action.
They address the global challenges we face, including those related
to poverty, inequality, climate change, environmental degradation,
peace, and justice. The goals are integrated in that action in one area
will affect outcomes in others, and the development must balance
social, economic, and environmental sustainability. Accordingly,
they frame the integrated approach. Innovation, diversity, and values
shape how we will leverage these goals.
Ireland is an extraordinary country with a charisma that underpins
a reputation for doing good. A reputation that is inextricably linked
with values. A reputation that is a driver of multilateralism. A reputation that is a form of power, enabling a small state on the periphery
of Europe to play a leadership role on the international stage. A reputation for an empathy that has a resonance from Africa to Afghanistan and beyond to the Philippines and the small island states.
Ireland’s values are for a fairer world, a just world, a secure world,
and a sustainable world. Our values have been forged in a furnace
of famine and migration. Our foreign policy is deeply anchored in
the values set out in our constitution. These are also reflected in the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the principles which underpin the European
Union. This explains Ireland’s sustained, strong commitment to
multilateralism.
Common values involve a marriage of our strategic intent, as conveyed by the dictates of Irish civil society and our ethical approach to
the conduct of operations. They are of relevance in the context of the
benchmarks and goals set for us by our membership of the international community and our responsibility to protect, to lead, and to
assist our fellow citizens.
We live in an extraordinary time where the rate of change is as if we
are at war, and yet, we act as if we are at peace. We are seeing more
unknown unknowns—‘black swan’ events—and we now have ‘black
elephants’—known unknowns. I have recently spoken about black
rabbits, where our wicked problems collide in a perfect storm of cli92

mate change and biodiversity loss, breeding even greater unknowns.
There has seldom been a period in our history where values-based
leadership was so important. That is why I think the leadership being
shown by Ireland in competing for a seat on the Security Council is
so important.
Our bid is not about status or power; it is about values and multilateralism.
The American Philosopher Mary Parker Follett said, “Leadership is
not so much about the exercise of power, but about that capacity to create
that sense of power in those who are led. The real role of a leader is to
create more leaders.”
So, as leaders, we all must do our bit—top down and bottom up—
to ensure, for example, the Sustainable Development Goals are being properly codified at the State level and within our organisations.
We must ensure our values are codified, actioned, championed, and
recognised.
We should all push back where we see cynical populism. We must
double our efforts to embrace diversity and inclusion so that society
and organisations allow people to be whole and to belong. We must
champion gender equality and the empowerment of women, while
being alert to stereotyping and shifting the inertia in areas such as
science, technology, engineering, maths, and the military. In this, the
20th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1325, it is our duty to use all our power to close the gender gap. The
gender gap is a driver of violence and insecurity.
Leadership, like innovation, is also about risk-taking and mistakes.
Clausewitz said, in war, “everything is simple, but even the simplest
thing is difficult.” In a world of growing complexity, it is inevitable
that mistakes will happen, yet mistakes drive learning. I am comforted by the words of George Bernard Shaw, who said a life spent
making mistakes is not only more honourable, but more useful than
a life doing nothing.
In summary, in a world of complexity, we are increasingly interdependent, and sharing knowledge is critical. Increasing complexity,
characterized by wicked problems, growing insecurity, and challeng93

ing vectors on one hand, and the explosion in data, knowledge, and
understanding on the other, necessitates that we should be collaborating and partnering, rather than isolating. Our collaboration should
be characterized by innovation and diversity and be built on values
that help to ensure that our understanding is applied with wisdom.
Knowledge and understanding without values leads to populism,
unilateralism, and selfishness. Knowledge and understanding in a
framework of values leads to multilateralism that drives the potential
for wisdom. George Bernard Shaw said, “We are made wise, not by the
recollection of our past, but by our responsibility for our future.”
Progressing along the continuum from the insecurity and absence of
peace towards sustainable institutions of a civilised society requires
leadership, values-based leadership. Values are inextricably linked to
character, and, as leaders, we need to accentuate that character. If we
are to ensure the appropriate culture in our organizations, we need a
culture we proactively design, rather than one we react to by default.
While I have articulated the case for our values, my key point is that
institutionalising values at an organisational level is a critical component in the context of nested governance, where common values
linked to the Sustainable Development Goals drive a vital framework
for humanitarian action.
It has been said that the eyes of the future are looking back at us, and
they are praying that we see beyond our time.
The UN is a remarkable institution, and when all is said and done, it is
us. When I think of the UN, I think of John F.Kennedy, who, in a speech
to be conveyed in Dallas that tragically was never delivered, reflected:
“We, in this generation, are—by destiny rather than by choice—the
watchmen on the walls of world freedom. We ask, therefore, that we
may be worthy of our power and responsibility, that we may exercise
our strength with wisdom and restraint, and that we may achieve in
our time and for all time the ancient vision of ‘peace on earth, good will
toward men’ (and I add women). That must always be our goal, and the
righteousness of our cause must always underlie our strength.”
—The Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN, March 2020
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Humanitarian Access
Jamie McGoldrick
Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process,
United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator

I will present based on operational challenges and less on the legal
approaches to interacting with non-state actors and de facto authorities for the purpose of being able to deliver humanitarian assistance
to vulnerable people, often caught up in conflict, and in territory not
controlled by the legitimate or recognized government. I will focus
on Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen.
Today, all roads—political, social, economic, and humanitarian—
lead to COVID-19. COVID-19 is changing our world, the way we
operate, and part of the humanitarian access challenges we face where
we work. The COVID-19 pandemic has upended society, bringing
the economy to a halt in entire countries and threatening the lives of
tens of millions.
In my current position as UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordination on Palestine, COVID-19 has changed the long-standing
paralyzed political dynamics, perhaps temporarily or longer.
The non-political nature of the COVID pandemic created—maybe
for the first time ever—an imperative for broad cooperation between
all sides—Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas. In other
words, the self-interest of all concerned now drives the need to cooperate on containment and distribution of equipment and materials.
Even more than the destructive aftermath of the 2014 war, the COVID crisis has opened doors for Israeli facilitation of access to goods,
equipment, etc., previously thought unimaginable. So much so, that
Israel itself is contributing with in-kind assistance to Gaza.
There are many threats to humanitarian assistance worldwide. The
two main challenges are the increased political grip on humanitarian
funding and humanitarian access. Reductions in funding globally
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occur as humanitarian needs grow and are linked increasingly to humanitarian assistance choices based on political considerations and
impacted by a growing world disorder. The other biggest obstacle
facing humanitarians is access.
In many of the countries where we operate, we cannot deliver food
and other things because of political obstacles. For example, during
the height of the war, to deliver aid in Syria, agencies cooperated
with whatever limits President Assad wanted to impose—that included which agency we could deliver aid through, and where the
aid could go. Obviously, aid was not delivered easily into the areas
that opposed him. Therefore, it makes it very difficult to deliver aid
neutrally, impartially, and independently. We see the same situation
in many places where the opposition wants to stop humanitarian
agencies from delivering aid.
Humanitarian access is about finding ways to reach people who need
assistance. A simple idea, but complex, when control over territory
and armed conflict are in play. Non-state actors and governments all
try to exert control, influence over the access, the recipients, and the
aid itself. In this context, I will address access issues of the newest
crises of the Middle East: in Yemen, where I was based before my
current position, and in Palestine, which is the oldest humanitarian
and political crisis in the region. Both face similar geo-political challenges and similar root causes. Thus, we may find that similar lessons
can be drawn to address the challenges.
Engaging with non-state actors and de facto authorities for humanitarians is increasingly important for the majority of conflicts in which
humanitarian actors operate. Security incidents affecting aid workers
have more than tripled over the past decade, and there is a growing concern over the role non-state actors have in such insecurity.
Moreover, when non-state actors control territory, and therefore access to populations, humanitarians have to negotiate access in order
to deliver aid. Yet the vast majority of humanitarian agencies fail to
engage effectively with non-state actors, and it is the aid workers and
those in need of their help who suffer the detrimental consequences
of that lack of engagement.
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The growing counter terrorism legislation is a recently new emerging
threat that affects our work with non-state actors. Countering terrorism, or the “war on terror,” is a foreign policy imperative for the United States and most major donors to humanitarian organizations. The
onus tends to be on implementing agencies, whether from the U.N.
system or individual nongovernmental organizations, to fall in line.
The pressure to adhere to these governments’ foreign policy agendas
is immense. Humanitarians see that this unrecognized consequence
of the “war on terror” has its effects on the ability of humanitarian
organizations to reach people in need.
Most humanitarian organizations are highly dependent on government funding, which limits their operational independence. They
often choose to accept funding with restrictive counter-terror clauses
as part of the bargain. After years of global focus on the threat of
terrorism, the public and the media are understandably wary of any
risk that aid will be diverted from those in need to those affiliated
with armed groups. Fear of even the slightest diversion damaging the
reputation of the organization creates pressure to accept the premise
and the procedures of government-funded aid programs. Especially
in the case of Israel and Palestine, there are individuals and advocacy
groups prepared to attack the legitimacy of organizations based on
real or imagined violations of counter-terror regulations.
We have a clash of cultures—political agendas rubbing up uncomfortably against humanitarian principles. The premise of counter terrorism legislation is that humanitarian agencies do not distinguish
between armed actors, including designated terrorist groups, and
civilians. In fact, these agencies make every effort to do so to carry
out their mission in keeping with humanitarian principles. Far from
trying to evade or work around counter-terrorism regulations, humanitarian organizations devote an increasing amount of time and
resources to comply with a complex and ever-changing regulatory
regime in which they are forced to assume all the risk. Some humanitarian organizations have fallen afoul and been embroiled in costly
legal battles over allegations of allowing donor aid to end up in the
pockets of non-state actors.
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Humanitarian agencies that do engage with non-state actors are often hesitant to admit that they do so, particularly when such groups
are labeled as “terrorists”; they are often reluctant to share their experiences with other aid workers or publicly speak about them.
In 2016, the United Nations Secretary-General convened the World
Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul. The first-ever summit of this
scale, it was set up to identify solutions to today’s most pressing challenges in meeting the needs of people affected by conflicts and disasters, and to set an agenda for keeping humanitarian action fit for
the future. Over a thousand recommendations later, the Summit is
a distant memory, but the problems it set out to address continue
to fester.
One important group, however, was missing throughout the consultations leading up to the World Humanitarian Summit—the
non-state actors. In that regard, the Summit was a lost opportunity.
Clearly these actors couldn’t be present. But some more research
on the current state of affairs would have been helpful to enrich
the conversation around one the biggest challenges humanitarians
face today.
Perhaps one of its main successes was the fact that it took place at
all. More could have been made of the Summit. The purpose of the
Summit was to set an agenda for humanitarian action to collectively address today’s most pressing humanitarian challenges. However, non-state actors—which play an integral role in allowing or
hindering humanitarian operations in conflicts from Syria, Yemen,
and Somalia to Colombia and the Central African Republic—were
not part of the consultations in the lead up to the Summit. There
wasn’t enough work done on the potential impact of counter terrorism legislation and a better understanding of engagement with
non-state actors.
All of that said, excellent research and policy work is being carried
out by many parts of the humanitarian world including Geneva Call,
OCHA Peer to Peer initiative, NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, as well as the Humanitarian Policy Group of the ODI,
and Chatham House International Law Program, to name a few.
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In practice, as humanitarians, the range of crises and interventions
we are working on are no longer short-term ones. In many cases,
some of these current emergencies are long standing and seemingly
infinite. Obviously, we face a polarized new world disorder. We face
it in Palestine and Yemen—places where I have worked most recently. Humanitarian work is often driven by Member States’ political
considerations. Our own struggle is politics over humanity, and I
think increasingly humanity loses out more often than not.
Palestine
If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most intractable of our
time, the humanitarian situation it has produced over many years is
certainly one of the most complex, protracted, and entrenched. In
such a polarised and visceral environment, the line between addressing the long-term humanitarian consequences of conflict—in this
case, the cumulative effect of almost half a century of occupation—
and being seen to stand in judgment over its causes, can quickly
become blurred.
Humanitarian organisations cannot, however, afford to stray across
the line into the domain of politicians and peacemakers—at least
not if they want to be accepted across the board, with an approach
that is credible and relevant. One false step in this minefield—be
it an action or words—can set off charges of bias or prejudice, and
ultimately stymie humanitarian access to people in urgent need of
protection and assistance, whatever side of the frontline they may
be on. This is true in armed conflicts around the world, although in
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, where perspectives of
national identity, history, politics, and human suffering have become
so intertwined, the path of neutrality has been as delicate as it has
been crucial.
Yet, “neutrality, independence and impartiality” risks becoming an
empty mantra unless the humanitarian response is also seen to be
effective.
In Palestine, the humanitarian community tries to prevent any backlash. It’s interesting to assess the amount of time we spend as UN
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agencies and NGOs on fact-checking, devoting equal amounts of
time to the Israeli side or the Palestinian side (in reports), and trying
to address the complaints that come along all the time, which tie us
up in terms of what we do. This has led to self-censoring and a sort
of dangerous silence.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has been emboldened by the support
he’s received from Washington, and that’s pushed him very hard to
achieve as much as possible, evidenced by the US Embassy move to
Jerusalem, the annexation of the Golan, funding cuts to UNRWA,
the Palestinian Authority, etc. The recently released Trump plan was
wholeheartedly welcomed by the Government of Israel. On paper
it is designed to bring massive gains in terms of annexing land for
Israel, recognition of illegal settlements, etc., as laid out in the recently published maps of the suggested areas in the West Bank.
The stark, unspoken truth is that the receding prospect of a two-state
settlement, accelerated by any move to implement the Trump Plan,
will slowly erode the generosity of international donors. As that happens, what will likely remain is a set of programs meekly underwriting what is sometimes misleadingly called economic peace: programs
that involve funding for humanitarian purposes, security, and modest economic development, as well as an expectation of Palestinian
acquiescence to a continued Israeli occupation.
There are few places as surreal as the OPT when it comes to the issue
of humanitarian work and access. Whereas Yemen has diverse and
distinct theaters of operation—Sana’a, Aden, Hudaydah—the stark
differences between East Jerusalem, the rest of the West Bank, and
Gaza require almost entirely separate responses.
The peculiarities of Gaza make it all the more complicated. Gaza is
a territory that is controlled by Hamas—a faction that much of the
donor community regards as a terrorist organization. From a political perspective, the legitimate authorities are meant to be the Palestinian Authority, who were expelled in a violent takeover in 2007
and, of course, Israel—as occupying power—is legally responsible
for the enclave and its two million inhabitants. Some 80% of the
population relies on international assistance of some kind and unem102

ployment hovers above 50%. The UN in 2012 wrote a landmark report that Gaza would be unlivable by 2020. And COVID-19 aside,
we are here.
It is under a blockade from air and sea by Israel, with heavily controlled and regulated access by land. Energy and water supplies are
totally insufficient and the health system teeters on the verge of collapse. In order to get anything inside, you need to ensure the appropriate clearances from the Palestinian Authority, who, despite not
being present on the ground, still control the crossing points.
While there is a border with Egypt, humanitarian and international
assistance is only allowed through that border under very exceptional
circumstances. As a result, our operations require close coordination
with all three entities. Easy enough, except that many of the donors
also require assurances that their assistance will not benefit Hamas.
So with all of this, Gaza is the type of place where the clearances to
distribute humanitarian aid take far more time and effort than the
actual distribution.
In Gaza, we have Hamas as the de facto authority, the non-state
actor. We have a long standing “no contact policy” as Hamas is a
declared terrorist organization. Any dealing with Hamas is against
the counter-terrorism legislations, hence raising compliance issues.
Thus, mainly the UN’s political arm, Norway and Switzerland, talk
to them. UNRWA has a long-standing relationship in Gaza and the
West Bank. Other UN agencies and NGOs are not fully understood
by Hamas. This is an awkward work in progress.
The last war in Gaza was in 2014 and resulted in more than 2,000
deaths, some 10,000 injuries, and more than 11,000 destroyed
homes—many more damaged along with key infrastructure. The
cost of damages was estimated in the billions of dollars. Under established procedures, there was no way a relief effort could have taken
place given the massive need for cement and other heavily controlled,
or so called “dual-use,” materials by Israel.
After the 2014 war, together with the Palestinian Authority and
Israel, the UN created a mechanism that would give both governments—neither of them present on the ground by the way—an
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equal say in what entered and for what purpose. It was called the
Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism. It is one of the most intricate arrangements I have seen whereby all concerned goods are assigned to
a specific project and then monitored by a team on the ground, to
ensure their appropriate use.
At this point, Hamas had no choice but to engage. Most people
were not pleased with the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism. Human rights people said it reinforced the blockade. Private sector and
project managers used to dealing with the Israelis directly had to deal
with the Palestinian Authority—a government that was not present.
In the end, it worked for its intended purpose—reconstruction has
been largely completed and could not have happened without this
mechanism. Whether it has a purpose or not anymore is a question,
especially as the Palestinian Authority has now adopted a largely
negative approach to Gaza through a series of overt and more covert sanctions. But with regard to the humanitarian specifically, the
mechanism facilitated repairs and construction of water treatment,
sewage, and desalination networks, hospitals and health clinics,
as well as the entry of items like solar panels to power these
installations.
In Gaza, as a result of the tension and volatility we have seen over
the past two years since the Great March of Return demonstration,
we were never too far away from a repeat of the 2014 war. The UN
Special Coordinator for the Middle East has often stated this warning during the past two years in his monthly briefings to the Security
Council. Weekly demonstrations at the fence on a Friday have resulted in over 30,000 people injured and almost 8,000 shot, with over
200 dead. There are over 1,500 young people for the most part with
lower limb injuries as a result of being shot at the fence. Among the
young there is a great deal of despondency and despair over their future. They can see other people their same age on social media pages
living a normal life—they crave that. Over the past two years, there
have been many occasions where rockets were fired indiscriminately
into Israel from Gaza. And there were many incidents of retaliatory
airstrikes by Israel Military Forces inside Gaza.
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The recent history of Gaza offers a grim warning of the severe consequences that can follow when international assistance declines and
is divorced from politics. When Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, the
PA split between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Fatah-controlled
West Bank. As two-state diplomacy began to lose traction, international actors simply postponed efforts to address this problem. Some
international assistance continued to flow to Gaza, but it was seen as
humanitarian support. Politics and mediation are limited currency
in the Palestinian context. Direct Palestinian and Israeli talks are frozen. The intra-Palestinian schism is ever widening between Hamas in
Gaza and Fatah in Ramallah.
Most donors avoided supporting official institutions and politics
more broadly. Attention, diplomatic energy, and funds shifted elsewhere (primarily to the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority
there). After more than a decade, the results are clear: disastrous humanitarian conditions, radicalization, and periodic bouts of violence.
Rather than an actual peace process, the negotiations that take place
between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza alternate between containing violence and threatening it.
As humanitarians, we meet regularly with the Hamas liaison people,
as well as with military intelligence and politicians when there are
major issues to resolve. On a more technical and operational level,
we work with them on what the non-state actors’ obligations are as
an authority in a place like Gaza. To do that, the UN created a red
line document on what they need to do, and what we need to do. To
manage expectations, we have a technical conversation on the things
that matter to them, because they want recognition. Hamas wants
legitimacy, which we cannot offer, and wants to be treated almost
like a government. What we can offer is some sort of regular communication with them. If we do not build trust and enhance mutual
understanding, they will block our movements.
We have to listen to Hamas, and listen to their concerns. We also
have to seize the opportunity to remind them of their obligations
under humanitarian law. This is something on which we have to
work on a regular basis. Hamas as a political and military outfit is not
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fully aware of the humanitarian system, the different organizations,
how they operate, and the governance structures. Regardless of the
optics, we need to build trust, especially for UN agencies and NGOs
who have arrived in Gaza for humanitarian reasons since the early
2000s. UNRWA is a long-standing service provider in Gaza and the
West Bank, and has a different status and perception than the newer
organizations. It is important that Hamas better understand these
changes to improve trust and access.
The current ‘no contact policy’ of the international community with
Hamas hardly makes sense, especially when we see this in light of the
mediation and diplomatic outreach and inclusion with the Taliban
in Afghanistan. What marks Hamas as different?
With the Palestinian Authority based in Ramallah, recent history
has shown they could be more supportive to the needs in Gaza than
is the case at the moment, given the overwhelming humanitarian
and socio-economic needs there. International donor support for
Palestine has been diminishing since 2012. The Palestinian Authority often views the international community as competition given
diminishing donor funding, and especially in light of their budget
support being reduced as well. The Palestinian Authority has been
having difficult discussions with Israel for some time over tax revenue—collected by Israel for the Palestinian Authority—being held
back in the amount it deemed the Palestinian Authority distributed
as prisoner payments. A significant percentage of the Palestinian Authority’s budget is missing from that source as well. It has been a
regular occurrence that government salaries do not get paid in full,
and services delivery is limited. Recently, and especially in light of
the COVID-19 outbreak, the transfer of funds from Israel to the
Palestinian Authority has improved with relations being more collaborative.
In terms of the Israeli Government, it is operating via purposeful
fragmentation. They deal with us through liaison. They deal with us
through the civilian arm of the IDF. We do not see Shin Bet. We do
not see military intelligence and others who control everything in
terms of movements. This fragmented approach to contact is not op106

timal to achieve consistent and positive access and movement. This
fragmentation suits the Israelis and undermines the humanitarian
community’s own coherence. We all meet at different levels but our
messaging does not necessarily cohere.
We are supported and encouraged by the Government of Israel, because they recognize the importance of humanitarian assistance in
Gaza to maintain a modicum of peace. We have a pleasant interface
with the technical areas of the Government of Israel who are for the
most part willing to facilitate our work in Gaza and the West Bank.
We spend a lot of time pushing back on false allegations created by a
well-organized set of Israeli NGOs. Our operational space is reduced
by the severe scrutiny from very active Israeli Non-Governmental
organizations with links to the government who issue reports and allegations, causing humanitarian organizations to spend a lot of time
addressing often unfounded allegations, which is costly. As humanitarians we welcome any type of scrutiny if it leads to a more effective
and efficient response. Instead, we use up much needed staff capacity
and resources to push back on these allegations.
We’re also trying to create a unified humanitarian country team approach with NGOs and UN agencies on International Humanitarian Law violations and demolitions in the West Bank. In addition,
we issue regular statements and are available to take on any media
on any issue. We try to be consistent and balanced in the words and
advocacy we employ.
Again, we have witnessed a different kind of collaboration with the
COVID-19 response when the goal of addressing the outbreak, containment. and treatment is a common goal: to defeat “the virus [that]
knows no borders and no state can defeat alone,” Therefore, the fight
against Covid-19 is a global challenge that requires a multilateral
approach.
Yemen
Yemen’s war has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters; between 70 and 80 percent of the population is in need of
humanitarian assistance, and over half of its 26 million people face
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food insecurity. Localised fighting escalated into full-blown war in
March 2015 when a Saudi-led coalition intervened on behalf of the
internationally recognised government of President Abed Rabbo
Mansour Hadi against an alliance of the Houthi militias and fighters aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The conflict
has fragmented a weak state, destroyed the country’s meager infrastructure, and opened vast opportunities for many terrorist affiliated
groups to grow and seize territory.
The legitimate Government of Yemen is based outside the country
in Riyadh, and has an internal base in Aden, to the south. I was
regularly criticized for being silent on the Houthis, and being present in Sana’a, not having our UN Yemen office in Aden in the
south. The government was very critical of the way we worked with
the Houthis, noting that we “didn’t call them out” often enough.
The legitimate government was unable or unwilling to comprehend
the humanitarian dimension of the international community’s role
in Yemen.
We tried to meet the recognized Government of Yemen on a regular
basis in Aden and in Riyadh. We wrote letters to them, keeping them
informed, reminding them of their responsibilities, reinforcing neutrality and impartiality. A couple of times, a PNG threat was in the
air for me and some of my colleagues.
The Saudi-led coalition was made up of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, with support from the UK and the US—curious composites I
would say—and the interaction we had with them was not very unified. It was a compromise to take funds from all of these parties, but
we did it in a pragmatic way. It was important we took that, but it
also reminded them of the obligations they had under international
law, and that’s been done many times.
Access to Yemen via air, land, and sea was controlled by the Saudi-led
coalition. Access for donors and the media became very politicized.
Also, humanitarian access inside the country was always a challenge.
I would meet them on a regular basis, mostly late at night in the
south of Sana’a while they were chewing Qat. We aimed to get them
to understand what we were all about and listen respectively to what
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they were trying to ask us. We did not have to agree, but at least
listen with intent. Asking for compliance with the Security Council
Resolution meant the end of the Houthis’ reign in Sana’a, and was
thus a nonstarter. We had to change that whole framing there with
them. We also gave them praise for recognizing the security they
provided for us inside Sana’a but also inside the whole northern part
of the country. I think that was important as well.
I worked with the media regionally and internationally and had
monthly press briefings in Sana’a, because the media were blocked
from coming to the northern part of Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition. The Sana’a airport was closed to commercial flights, and we
were prevented from allowing the media to come in or the message
to get out.
I took part in TV panel discussions with the legitimate Yemen Government based in Riyadh to try to counter their complaints against
the UN and the space that we had here.
There were no donor representatives in Yemen, and trying to get
Member States into Yemen was not easy, but we had low level visits.
However, we had weekly virtual humanitarian plus meetings with
donors and member states, including those part of the Saudi-led coalition from Riyadh and Amman, including London.
I also visited the key capitals in Europe, the US, and the region to
raise humanitarian and protection concerns. Creating a political
change within Congress and Parliament in the US and the UK, respectively, was not easy when the crisis was not seen by all as a humanitarian crisis. In many cases, Yemen was closely interwoven in
the politics of the region.
As in any context, Yemen and the Houthis were no different in that
there had to be more consultation in the context we as humanitarians operate with non-state actors. Research has shown that despite
the diversity of non-state actors around, there is a high degree of uniformity in many of the views expressed on a range of issues related to
humanitarian action and access. Many of the non-state actors consulted see value in humanitarian action, in broad terms, as alleviating
suffering or providing relief to those affected by armed conflict or
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natural disaster. In the case of the Houthis and Hamas, a way to exert
control, to be part of the international effort, is to bring rewards to
populations under their control, by appearing to give permission for
access and movement of goods to affected areas.
With the Houthis, we established a couple of mechanisms to regulate our contact, maintain the technical nature of our engagement
as a humanitarian community, and to get better results. It gave the
impression to the Houthis that they had a bigger stake or role in the
work we were undertaking. Mechanisms included:
The Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF): a tool
for gathering information on the access constraints faced by the
UN agencies, INGOs, and NNGOs. It is a very simple online tool.
All partners, national and international, feed the information into
the AMRF as the only way we can build a comprehensive understanding of what type of issues we are facing, where, by whom, etc.,
and accordingly provide the foundation for evidence-based advocacy
and engagement with the authorities on access issues.
Humanitarian Access Working Group: comprises senior colleagues
from different humanitarian organizations. Based on the information from AMRF and the trends analysis, the HAWG is expected to
establish some sort of negotiation/engagement strategies at all levels.
Establishment of Field Hubs: critical for tackling the issue of movement restrictions at the local level as the best approach to ensure
that there is a system for exchanging information and best practices
among the organizations operating at the field level.
One of the outcomes of the meeting was a consensus on the need to
operationalize a “One Window” mechanism for the humanitarian
organizations to engage with the authorities on the different access
issues and to bring about more systematic dialogue with the authorities on all the issues raised in the Access Monitoring Framework,
which mentioned the paper covering assaults against staff, multiple
requests from different agencies, movement restrictions, visas, etc.
Very often, non-state actors only refer to assistance; the protection
of civilians, or related protection issues, are rarely discussed. In the
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Yemen context, each quarter I sent separate letters to the Houthis
and to the Legitimate Government outlining and listing protection
incidents, trends, etc. The letters were forwarded to all the relevant
Embassies, including those in the Saudi-led coalition. Each side only
saw the reports of the incidents attributed to them.
Available research has shown that non-state actors see a direct link
between the transparency, and confidence in the quality of assistance, on the one hand, and the humanitarian agency’s adherence
to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence on the
other. In the case of Houthis, the motivation was to prevent humanitarian actors from being independent and having free access
and movement, based on viewing humanitarian assistance as a purely
western endeavor, not in the charitable mode in Islamic culture. This
was based on a lack of trust and suspicion of our motives, given that
the majority of our funds came from member states that were part of
or supported the Saudi-led coalition. Hamas has much more experience in dealing with international actors than the Houthis and have
strong allies in the region. With Hamas, they are more assured of
their position and don’t feel threatened that they might lose control
of Gaza. This is not the case with the Houthis who are in an all out
struggle. As a result, the Houthis want more control over the work
and the movement of humanitarians, and viewed our work through
primarily a security threat lens.
Hamas are seeking a degree of respect, and even recognition, from
our dealings with them. They have created an outreach within the
region. Egypt, Qatar, and one of their leaders regularly meets with
leaders in Russia, as well as regional and other Muslim countries. The
COVID-19 pandemic might be another opportunity for Hamas to
gain even more traction. As humanitarians, we have to be smart and
avoid getting embroiled in the political attempts underway to create a division between the West Bank and Gaza. To this end, as the
international community, we work through and with the Palestinian
Authority in Ramallah when dealing with Gaza.
For the most part non-state actors are broadly familiar with the core
humanitarian principles. But on the independence of our assistance,
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non-state actors suspect that geopolitical concerns, funding, and
other factors challenge the ability of humanitarian actors to be independent in practice. With all of the principles, the focus is on observed behavior (rather than, for example, where an agency’s funding
comes from). Both Hamas and the Houthis know where funding
comes from and that it often is ideologically at odds with their situation. But, it is a pragmatic acceptance.
Without understanding why aid workers are or are not attacked,
they cannot adequately protect their staff; without understanding
why access is denied or facilitated by non-state actors, it is impossible
to resolve blockages. We need to better understand non-state actors’
views on humanitarian action, including humanitarian access and
principles. It would be quite a challenge, but could be immensely
beneficial to sit down with Hamas and the Houthis and have a discussion on these policy and legal issues, rather than on operations,
including access, movement and security concerns. We often substitute this conversation with training on international humanitarian
law and practice. We know that non-state actors, at times, conflate
some principles (notably, neutrality and impartiality) and seek to coopt humanitarian aid or otherwise undermine humanitarian principles for their own benefit — much as member states do from time
to time.
The widespread lack of knowledge about the rules of IHL governing humanitarian access is a more problematic issue and must be
addressed across contexts. It’s not enough that non-state actors can
rhyme off the core humanitarian principles. This requires sustained
dialogue, dissemination, and training to ensure that non-state actors’
leaderships and rank and file members understand their obligations
concerning access, and implement them in practice.
Hamas is a long established body with the conflict raging for decades, and their regular interaction through line Ministries at the
technical level understand how the international humanitarian work
functions, the role of the UN, especially UNRWA, donors, and
NGOs. It does not mean they agree; however, there are relationships
and exposure to the work of humanitarian principles. It does not
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always result in compliance and access facilitation; often it is disruption and blockages, with humanitarian work viewed as the arm of
foreign governments, and based on political considerations. It is hard
in Gaza to avoid this opinion, especially the recent cut of all funds to
UNRWA, and the politicization of the Palestinian Authority’s support to Gaza. But it does not mean that our work is stymied; rather,
it is highly regarded and appreciated as it helps the people of Gaza,
and that it legitimizes, in a certain, way Hamas’s control.
The Houthis have a very limited understanding of the way the international community functions. They have little experience in statecraft and diplomacy. This was the purview of the President Saleh
component of the Sana’a Alliance, as the balance of power swung in
the Houthis’ favor, after Saleh was killed. They were always suspicious of the UN and the international community. Our optics were
not helped when the UN returned in mid-2017, and we took over
the US Diplomatic Transit Facility, the old Sheraton hotel. In my
first encounter with the Houthis Military Intelligence, they stated
that I worked for the “United Nations of America.” One of the key
tasks was to move to a new residential compound for UN staff to
live, moving out of the US diplomatic facility. During the preparations for the move to the new compound, and once we left the US
compound, the trust between the UN and the Houthis improved.
In several cases, the non-state actors’ research has shown that they
feel that the humanitarian organizations have not engaged with
them in an appropriate, proactive, or impartial manner. In some
contexts, engagement is hindered by external political pressures, resulting in serious consequences for aid workers and civilians alike. As
in the case with Hamas, some states, including donors, have listed
the groups along with other movements as “terrorist groups,” which
has led some agencies to avoid direct engagement with them for fear
of falling afoul of counter-terrorism legislation.
Aid agencies elsewhere fear that engaging with non-state actors could
lead to expulsion from areas under government control. These are
dilemmas to which there are no easy fixes, and need to be negotiated on the ground. A more flexible and pragmatic, if not discreet,
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approach from the member states doing the “labeling” as terror organizations would be helpful. The bottom line, however, is that nonengagement or limited, ad hoc engagement with non-state actors
ultimately hinders their need for an agreement to comply with International Humanitarian Law. If we avoid contact or engagement,
it can be perceived by the non-state actors that humanitarian actors
are abandoning our own humanitarian principles and viewed as nonneutral and partisan.
Aid agencies must invest in relationship building with all the parties
to armed conflicts and develop strategic engagements with non-state
actors. This would be best served, where possible, by the Resident
and Humanitarian Coordinator. Under the new reformed Resident
Coordinator system, there is a direct reporting line within the UN
Secretariat making the position a much more political role. By taking on the responsibility to consult with non-state actors, they help
protect those agencies and organizations whose operations could be
jeopardized by criticism of meeting non-state actors. But this has
to be accepted by the management of the UN and NGOs at the
capital level.
There needs to be a level of certainty and commitment from HQs
that the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators will be supported
if negative voices and criticism of outreach with non-state actors is
brought to the world’s attention through criticism in both mainstream and social media. I believe that my attempts to reach out,
be it with the Houthis or Hamas, have resulted in more consistent
and sustained access. With trust building and conversations being
broader in range, we will be able to see more consistency of international humanitarian law in the policies and approaches of non-state
actors, and can help serve as a better basis for negotiating humanitarian access.
The non-state actors must witness that humanitarians should behave
in ways that demonstrate their neutrality, impartiality, and independence. This must be both obvious and transparent. Any perceptions
that humanitarians are not adhering to their principles can have
dangerous consequences, ranging from denial of access to attacks on
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aid workers and their property. This underscores the importance of
humanitarians not only behaving in accordance with humanitarian
principles, but also carefully monitoring and managing non-state actors’ perceptions of them in order to avoid misunderstandings.
This is key to building trust and acceptance between parties to conflicts and securing safe access. It might mean sometimes being proactive in informing the non-state actors before the fact—but not seeking their permission—rather for information. In some cases, it could
mean using their technical staff to participate in joint technical assessments to build trust and confidence, without any involvement in
deciding the types of interventions, locations, or beneficiaries.
The Houthis did not trust the UN. The UN support was part of the
pre-war national dialogue and after that, the Security Council Resolution 2016. Basically, this resolution was to deliver a 6-month quick
win to return to normal and reinstall the legitimate government in
Sana’a, it did not work. This added to the suspicion of the UN, and
it took some time to educate and convince the Houthis that the
Security Council was not overseeing our humanitarian work on the
ground. Otherwise, it would have basically locked the humanitarians
into a position we couldn’t move from, and we were then tainted in
the eyes of the Houthis. I had to work tirelessly to build trust with
them, negotiate access, create red lines in operations, and foster clear
understanding on what their obligations were under international
law. To do that, I was basically the interface for the country team so
their operations were not jeopardized.
Although they have obligations under IHL, non-state actors are
not part of legal frameworks and treaties. But, this must not prevent non-state actors from respecting the law, and demonstrating
adherence to it. It is important that orientation of leadership takes
place and training is offered to lower ranking field staff. It is best to
use actual local examples when there have been problems and have
discussions around what would be a better way forward to prevent
the restrictions of access, interference with aid delivery, etc. Each
incident should offer an opportunity to remind the parties of their
obligations, reinforce messages, and create inclusion.
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It is not an easy conversation to have with non-state actors or de
facto authorities. Criticism is not easy to deliver. They seek respect,
legitimacy, and even recognition for the way they interact, provide
security, safe passage, and engagement. But, one has to be careful to
venture into a conversation on non-state actors on their obligations
under international law. These can be tricky conversations and need
to be thought out tactically when the right time is to discuss. As was
the case with both the Houthis and Hamas, they wanted something in
writing to help confer acceptance and legitimacy. This could be a simple “red lines” document, or Standard Operating Procedures, with relevant contact points and numbers—without references or signatures.
Finally, the non-state actors consulted in this study often refer to
political issues when asked to make recommendations on how to improve humanitarian conditions. Many see humanitarian crises and
needs as rooted in conflicts that can ultimately only have a political
solution. This is beyond the scope of this survey, but indicative of a
shared understanding—across conflicts—of the roots of humanitarian crises and the very political nature of their resolution.
In conclusion, and bringing this back to where I started—with the
current COVID-19 outbreak—the international community should
explore the possibility of opening up a space for greater cooperation
between Gaza and Israel in order to achieve a more effective coordination in response to the COVID-19 crisis. In addition, we should
use the crisis as a means to reduce the current tensions between
Ramallah and Gaza to avert the risk of impeding rather than facilitating an effective response to the current crisis. In the past week, there
have been exchanges with all stakeholders at a technical level, but it
is acknowledged that there is a need to extend these discussions to
the political level to ensure the right level of response to the growing
humanitarian crisis and to provide a base for future development.
—Jerusalem, April 2020
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This series has seen no shortage of esteemed speakers issue calls to
action and for renewed attention on some of the most pressing challenges our world faces. Today, I want to speak to you about what I
consider a defining challenge of humanitarian action in the twentyfirst century: conflict-driven food crises.
This is, first and foremost, an urgent moral outrage. For food crises
to be on the rise again in an era of global food abundance is morally
unacceptable and must be politically unacceptable as well. This is a
challenge for which we have no lack of technical responses. Humanitarian organisations have long had the technical capacity to address
acute hunger—programme delivery has evolved and advanced over
decades to be more targeted, efficient and effective than ever before.
As a global community, we have made enormous strides in addressing hunger. What we have failed to address, however, is conflict and
its devastating impacts. We do not lack the technical capacity to get
to zero hunger, we lack the political will to prevent and resolve the
conflicts that drive it.
Conflict-driven food crises are also at the intersection of many other,
interconnected crises. Chief among these is the global climate crisis,
which evidence suggests will have complex and unpredictable impacts on cooperation and conflict across the world, while putting
pressure on sustainable food systems. Wider humanitarian crises,
too, that we might think of chiefly as displacement or health crises,
often entail the targeting of food systems. In 2018, for example, the
UN’s Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights concluded that
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tactics of “forced starvation” had been employed in the violent campaign against the Rohingya people in Myanmar, leading more than
800,000 to seek refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh. Lastly, conflictdriven food crises are linked to a subject I want to discuss in greater
detail today: the gendered nature of war and humanitarian emergency.
Overview
Today, both global conflict and acute hunger are increasing. By almost any metric, the world is more insecure in 2020 than it was a
decade ago. Violent conflict is becoming both more prevalent, and
more complex. Today’s conflicts are often of lower intensity in terms
of casualties, but are highly fragmented, multi-actor, and often protracted crises.
These crises are driving an increase in acute hunger. In recent years,
after decades of improvement in levels of world hunger, we are seeing a sustained increase in hunger globally. In an era some believed
might have heralded the end of famine, not only are we not making
progress on the Sustainable Development Goal of zero hunger but,
as Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed noted recently, we
are going in reverse.
And make no mistake, violent conflict is the cause. Conflict is the
largest single driver of severe food insecurity worldwide and the main
driver for over two-thirds of people in food crises. By the most recent count, there are 74 million acutely food-insecure people in 21
conflict-affected countries.
Beyond being the primary driver globally, violent conflict is the defining characteristic of the world’s worst food crises. In Yemen, for
example, the World Food Programme has launched its largest-ever
emergency response. On average, the proportion of under-nourished
people is almost three times as high in countries in conflict and protracted crisis than in other low-income contexts. Countries in Africa,
where historically, much of Ireland’s development cooperation has
been focused, remain disproportionately affected by food crises.
In other words, it is not just that conflict is hunger’s most significant
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driver and is therefore central to the ambition of getting to zero hunger. But, reaching the furthest behind first depends on addressing
hunger in conflict-affected contexts, where these crises are worst and
where people are most vulnerable.
In 2017, the UN warned of the imminent risk of famine in four
countries (South Sudan, Somalia, north-east Nigeria and Yemen),
all devastated by violent conflict. The announcement resulted in UN
Member States mobilising to draft, and ultimately unanimously pass,
UN Security Council Resolution 2417 on the protection of civilians
placing a central focus on the prohibition of food as a weapon of war.
UNSCR 2417 is a clear indication that the international community
is outraged by the tragedy of preventable famine in the twenty-first
century and galvanised into effective action when the prospect of
food crisis at this scale arises. The coordinated action and momentum in responding was extraordinary. On the ground, humanitarian
teams worked tirelessly to scale-up efforts, save lives and draw attention to deteriorating conditions.
Since that time, further progress has been made on the World Bank’s
Famine Action Mechanism seeking to tie early warning of future
food crises to the timely dispersal of funds. At the International
Criminal Court, the Assembly of States Parties endorsed an amendment to the Rome Statute recognising, for the first time, starvation as
a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. However, it should
not require the spectre of four famines to mobilise global action. Nor
should this scale of suffering be required to ensure vital momentum
is maintained in the aftermath.
Pathways
Before I speak about the way forward and future action, I want to
dedicate some time to discussing the pathways through which conflict produces hunger. This is important for three reasons.
First, from the perspective of a social scientist, I want to be accurate
in diagnosing the challenge we face. Without understanding the precise mechanisms through which conflict causes hunger, we cannot
hope to fully understand them. Second, from the perspective of a
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humanitarian, I want to expedite effective response. Without identifying clear mechanisms, we cannot meaningfully address root causes,
target prevention and support recovery. And third, from the perspective of an advocate to policymakers, I want to be clear that there is
nothing natural or inevitable about conflict causing hunger. Conflict
does not automatically lead to food crises: they can and must be
prevented and made both morally—and politically—unacceptable.
The first pathway—often the most extreme and visible—is the use of
food as a strategic weapon of war. This includes the deliberate targeting of food supplies, agricultural land and livestock, and food storage
infrastructure by parties to a conflict. It can also include preventing
or restricting the movement of food supplies, and wilfully impeding
humanitarian relief. The work of groups like Global Rights Compliance and the World Peace Foundation in documenting instances of
this point to the use of this tactic in high-intensity, large-scale and often regionalised conflicts, such as in Yemen, South Sudan and Syria.
The second pathway—which is not entirely independent from the
first—is through smaller-scale, often localised conflicts. We know
that conflicts are becoming more diffuse and characterised by greater
fragmentation. A more diverse constellation of state and non-state
actors pose a greater risk to civilians and create a more challenging
environment for humanitarian negotiation, coordination and access.
Conflicts between livelihood groups, centring on natural resources
or livestock, can fall into this category, as can relatively low-intensity
violence that disrupts food and market systems. Critically, we know
that national crises and local-level conflict systems often intersect
and fuel each other, with sometimes devastating effects. Even where
large-scale conflict is driven by wider, geopolitical factors, food and
food systems can become flashpoints of violence in local livelihood
systems. This means that this pathway is widespread across insecure
and fragile contexts.
The third—and often the least visible—pathway is through social
mechanisms. Here, I am indebted to Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s development cooperation funding, which
supported research conducted as part of Concern Worldwide’s work
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in South Sudan. That work highlighted the ways in which conflict
causes hunger far from the frontlines of fighting, and often in hidden ways. This research revealed ways that social solidarity mechanisms are transformed and disrupted by conflict. Where once, loans
of food, sharing of available supplies, or mutual support in times of
stress might have buoyed vulnerable households, collective support
systems—between community members, neighbours, and even family—can collapse in conflict. This can occur through a breakdown
of trust, the upheaval of displacement, and pressure on limited resources.
This has particular implications for those already at the margins of
social networks even before crises set in, such as the elderly, or people
living with disabilities or conditions that are stigmatised. As before,
this is a reminder of the sharp meeting points between the reality of
conflict and hunger, and our ambition of reaching the furthest behind
first. This also has starkly gendered dimensions, including through
the unequal distribution of food within the household—with men
and boys receiving more, better or earlier food than women and girls;
an increased risk of intimate partner violence and violence in the
household in a context of wider social strain; and gendered violence
through distress coping strategies like child marriage. In many rural
contexts, women also carry greater responsibility for household food
security and manual agricultural labour, while at the same time, enjoying disproportionately fewer land rights than men.
These mechanisms are no less important to the discussion of conflict
and hunger for being less direct, and sometimes less visible. They
are also a vital reminder of the different entry points available to the
international community in seeking to address this crisis.
The Way Forward
In 2008, in the wake of the global food price crisis, Ireland’s Hunger
Task Force produced a report aimed at identifying the specific contribution Ireland could make to tackling the root causes of hunger,
particularly in Africa. A decade later, the world faces another food
crisis, this time driven by violent conflict. Today, what does an ambi123

tious agenda to address conflict-driven hunger look like?
Against the backdrop of a mounting crisis, it is important that Ireland recognise its own experience of conflict and hunger and become
a powerful advocate for crisis-affected communities on the global
stage. In two short years, Ireland will commemorate the 175th anniversary of the Great Famine. An tUachtarán Higgins spoke in this
very lecture series of how “this memory of our past has shaped and
has continued to shape our values and our sensibilities today, instilling in us a moral calling to help others in need.”
In its report, the Hunger Task Force identified a failure of governance at national and international levels for ongoing global hunger,
specifically citing an apparent willingness to live with the current
extent of global hunger. Ten years later, little has changed globally
in this regard, and reversing this, first requires a shift in thinking.
Member states, and the international community as a whole, must
recognise severe food crises as the pressing security issue that they
are. Hunger is not incidental to contemporary violent conflict: it is
a tactic employed by warring parties, a product of localised conflict
systems, and a deep-rooted consequence of conflict’s social impacts.
In responding, Ireland and other member states should focus action
in three key areas:
• Supporting humanitarian response tailored to conflict contexts;
• Strengthening reporting and accountability at the UN Security
Council and beyond; and
• Leveraging policy synergies of existing agendas, particularly in relation to the gendered dimensions of conflict and hunger.
Tailored humanitarian programming
As a donor, and a key partner to communities in the midst of, and
emerging from, violent conflict, Ireland can support principled humanitarian response to food crises in several ways.
First, there is a clear need for greater investment in conflict-sensitive
livelihood and food security responses. Livelihood and food security
programming must be tailored to the conflict context in order to reduce pressure on natural resources and food systems, build and rein124

force often depleted social capital, and support the capacity of crisisaffected communities to better anticipate, adapt to, and recover from
conflict shocks and their impacts on their food security.
Conflict analysis needs to be undertaken, fully resourced and regularly updated and monitored as a central part of humanitarian response.
We cannot work in conflict, and ensure we are having a positive impact, if we do not understand conflict dynamics. But too often, humanitarian systems are overstretched and actors lack the space, time,
and resources needed for in-depth analysis and critical reflection. We
should not consider conflict analysis as outside the core functions of
humanitarian organisations: it must inform humanitarian response
so we know which livelihood systems make people more or less vulnerable to attack, which assets can generate more or less competition
in communities, and which systems of participation selection and
vulnerability analysis have greater or lesser legitimacy.
This is important at every level: during conflict, even far from armed
fighting, the potential for localised tensions to result in significant
humanitarian suffering should not be underestimated. And long after war is officially over, violence continues for many in their communities, families, and homes. Considering that most people in conflict-affected countries depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, it
is particularly important that transitions out of conflict take better
account of sustainable and conflict-sensitive livelihood strategies for
the reintegration of former combatants, their families and communities, and displacement-affected populations. Livelihood resilience
programmes especially adapted to conflict contexts—to anticipate,
adapt, and recover from conflict—are a vital part of this transition.
We know that national peacebuilding processes cannot consolidate
peace unless there is local buy-in and ground-up participation and
leadership. Without responses tailored to local peace and conflict
dynamics, we may continue to see localised devastation of livelihoods and nutrition outcomes even where national-level peace is
established.
More evidence and learning in this area would be valuable; and key
global platforms and fora, such as discussions surrounding the FAO
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Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted
Crises, Tokyo’s Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2020, and New
York’s Food Systems Summit in 2021, can all provide opportunities
to share expertise and deepen global action in this area.
Existing legal instruments, reporting, and accountability
At a global policy level, we have no shortage of laws and policy instruments in which the right to food is enshrined. This right is recognised in international humanitarian law, which explicitly prohibits
the starvation of civilians as a weapon of war, including the wilful
impediment of relief supplies. It is also codified in multiple provisions of international human rights law, including the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Individual UN Resolutions—both global in scope, such as UNSCR
2417, and country-focused, such as resolutions on Syria, Yemen,
Somalia, South Sudan, and DRC—have also served as important
mechanisms for drawing attention to the scale of conflict-driven
food crises and mandating action.
We do not lack provisions and instruments of international law.
What we lack is robust monitoring, effective reporting, and political commitment to conflict prevention and resolution. Member
states can make better use of existing monitoring and reporting systems to draw attention to the importance of food in these fora and
mechanisms. For example, member states can draw attention to the
right to food through the Human Rights Council’s Universal Period
Review; and through country-specific and thematic reviews by the
Peacebuilding Commission. Leveraging these existing mechanisms is
vital to reinforcing the norm that conflict-driven food crises are not
inevitable or natural, but avoidable and unacceptable.
Existing frameworks, and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda
Related to this, I want to draw your attention to a particular opportunity for the international community to make progress on addressing conflict-driven food crises: the Women, Peace and Security
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(WPS) agenda. This year, we are marking the twentieth anniversary
of UNSCR 1325. We know that there is still a long way to go before
we can claim to have arrived at a full understanding of the gendered
nature and impacts of insecurity, the most effective actions to prevent and reduce gendered violence in conflict in all its forms, and the
transformative potential of women’s leadership in conflict resolution
and peacebuilding. But, of those issues that have generated political
momentum and begun to translate into global, national, and local
action, UNSCR 1325 and associated resolutions have had extraordinary success.
And effective advocates find strong allies. I want each of you to ask
yourselves, where is hunger in the WPS agenda? I propose that meaningful progress in addressing conflict and hunger can come through a
greater attention to WPS in two ways:
Frist, as I have outlined above, and many studies have documented,
both conflict and hunger are profoundly gendered. It is vital that in
considering the gendered drivers of conflict, the gendered impacts
of humanitarian crises, and the potential for gender-transformative
peace, that we consider access to, control over, and utilisation of food.
For example, humanitarian and development programmes aimed at
advancing gender equality can do more to engage with food security
and livelihood obstacles that differentially affect women, men, girls,
and boys.
Further, reporting at national and global levels on initiatives, frameworks, and action plans to protect, support, and empower women in
conflict can consider in more detail how women’s right to food has
been affected by insecurity, and where conflict’s legacy produces and
maintains gendered gaps in the full enjoyment of this right. Ireland’s
Third National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security explicitly
recognises that,
Conflict and hunger are inextricably linked. Food can also be used
as a weapon of war. Women and girls are frequently responsible for
agricultural production and feeding families and are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.
But it is in the minority. In a review of a database of National Ac127

tion Plans on Women, Peace and Security compiled by Caitlin
Hamilton, Nyibeny Naam and Laura J. Shepherd, of the 59 NAPs
published in the last five years, just over one-third specifically mentioned food, hunger, or starvation. That means that in the five-year
period since the world made getting to zero hunger, and achieving
gender equality, global goals, only one-in-three NAPs have explicitly recognised the link between these two. Even among those that
do, the majority mention food only in passing. Far fewer reference
hunger, fewer still mention starvation, even though we know this is
a long-established, profoundly gendered, and devastating tactic in
contemporary warfare.
Second, as I have mentioned, the WPS agenda has been remarkably
successful in mobilising action and focusing political attention. So
even beyond the specific gendered dimensions of food security in conflict, we can learn from the lessons of WPS for any global initiative. It
seems to me that there are several key lessons to highlight that have
important parallels in how we address conflict and hunger.
The first is that while UNSCR 1325 was a watershed moment, it was
not an isolated one. It took incremental change over decades to build
up a body of resolutions and global policy that meant real progress
on this issue was launched and sustained. This should serve as an
important caution that if we want UNSCR 2417 to be impactful,
we must look ahead to the complementary and targeted instruments
required to consolidate and strengthen it in the years to come. And
we must identify the member state champions who will show the
political leadership and initiative to safeguard this progress.
The second lesson is that although the WPS agenda is localised
through National Action Plans, we still too often see a disconnect
between global rhetoric and national action. For too many women in
crisis, the aims of UNSCR 1325 remain too remote to make a meaningful difference in their lives, and their voices have been too marginal
in high-level discussions. This should be a lesson to us all that crisisaffected communities must be at the centre of any policy or response.
We must avoid the trap of thinking of populations whose right to
food has been violated merely as passive recipients of global policy,
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and as too vulnerable to claim ownership and lead in its development. Real progress will rest on centering crisis-affected communities
and supporting complementary food and conflict resolution systems
that are best-suited to their needs, aspirations and recovery.
The third lesson is that we must expand our understanding of the
dimensions of violent conflict. Although abhorrent, a narrow focus on the most direct elements of gendered violence can serve to
obscure the many complex social systems that prevent true gender
equality and wider social transformation. We must recognise that
even in conflict, for example, women are often more vulnerable to
violence in their own homes than outside of them. Similar patterns
are becoming clear in relation to food crises: the targeted use of
food as a weapon of war is legally prohibited, morally unacceptable,
and devastating in impact. Beyond this, the complex ways that local conflict systems and social power relations in crisis interact with
food availability, access, utilisation, and stability are too often overlooked and yet continue to undermine food security and recovery for
millions of people.
Lastly, the success of the WPS agenda can point us to responses that
should be explored in relation to conflict and hunger. This will be
valuable in building a more central gendered perspective into our
response to food crises, introducing the question of hunger and food
security more prominently in the WPS agenda, and better leveraging
synergies between the two.
At a global level, member states should consider specialised training
for peacekeeping troops on conflict-driven food crises, and the deployment of specialist hunger technical staff in missions, mirroring
the vital investment in gender capacity across UN forces. The creation
of a Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on conflict and
food crises would complement the vital work of the outgoing Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, and help to draw attention to the
issue globally. The open, annual debate on Women, Peace and Security at the UN has been vital in setting a global agenda, and may have
parallels in high-level discussions on food security that could provide
a focal point for diverse action and advocacy efforts in this area.
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In supporting peace processes bilaterally and multilaterally, member states should place greater emphasis on food security, hunger,
and starvation, which remain relatively neglected. WPS advocates
have monitored the inclusion and leadership of women in peace processes, in part by drawing attention to their exclusion in delegations,
and the silence of official peace agreements on gendered provisions
of disarmament, reconciliation, reintegration, and recovery. That silence is also found in relation to food security: in a database of over
1,800 peace agreements compiled by Christine Bell and others at the
University of Edinburgh, the term ‘food’ appears in the texts of only
160 agreements (fewer than 10% of all agreements coded). ‘Hunger’
appears in the texts of only 11 agreements, ‘famine’ in only seven,
and ‘starvation’ in only two. Many of these records concern multiple agreements in the same conflict, meaning the actual number
of member states that have explicitly recognised the right to food or
freedom from hunger, and mechanisms to prevent and recover from
famine or starvation in peace processes, is even fewer still.
Ultimately, much more must be done to bring together advocates of
women’s protection and equality, and those focused on bringing an
end to conflict-driven food crises, whose goals are so clearly aligned.
While formal, written inclusion in policies and frameworks such
as resolutions, peace agreements, and National Action Plans alone
is insufficient to ensure meaningful change; it is almost impossible
without it.
Conclusion
It may occur to you in reflecting on what I’ve shared, that Ireland is
already leading in many areas critical to progress on conflict-driven
food crises. Our role in the SDG development and commitment to
reach the furthest behind first means that we have an obligation to
not only address hunger, but focus our efforts in responding to the
greatest and gravest food crises—those driven by conflict.
Our technical leadership in global nutrition and hunger policy,
coupled with our own experience of conflict and famine, lend us
an authentic voice and national experience in this area, at a time
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when there is all too often a retreat from global multilateralism and
a perceived disconnect between domestic policy and international
development cooperation.
Lastly, our leadership in the Women, Peace and Security agenda demands that we ask—what are the gendered dimensions of conflict
and hunger? And beyond that, as a leading voice at the UN on this
topic, what are the lessons from the significant progress in the field
of Women, Peace and Security that might help us forge the path to
zero hunger?
Go raibh maith agaibh.
—Dublin, March 2020
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This paper brings a practitioner’s perspective on the relationship between hunger and conflict. What follows are reflections and a few
suggestions drawn from close to twenty years of field experience,
serving the World Food Programme as the representative in Syria,
Sudan and currently South Sudan.
We seek to highlight some of the challenges humanitarian practitioners face in addressing hunger in the context of conflict and suggest
how we might improve the international community’s approach.
Three potential avenues for action are identified:
• First, to consider how the international community might better
harness collective knowledge and analysis to inform a more effective
response;
• Second, to reflect how donors might reframe how their humanitarian and development assistance is premised and delivered; and
• Third, to consider how jurisprudence can give content to the political commitment of Security Council Resolution 2417 and the
subsequent amendment of Article 8 of the Rome Statute, elevating
starvation from a weapon of war to a war crime, including in situations of non-international armed conflict.
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Hunger and Conflict
The Narrative
The international community is accustomed to thinking of hunger
as a side effect of conflict. However, side effects are effects. The use of
“side” distracts from the reality. In simple numerical terms, hunger
is often more deadly than that inflicted by weapons, yet the drama
and clamor of war obscure the quieter tragedy of famine and starvation. Wars and explicit violence capture the headlines, and our attention, in a way that hunger sometimes fails to do. Some examples,
which are both familiar and yet unfamiliar: more Vietnamese died
in the Tonkin famine of 1943-44 than in the terrible—yet far better
known—conflicts that followed. During World War II, in Europe,
Asia, and Africa, conflict-related deaths—just shy of 20 million—
were equaled, and perhaps eclipsed, by a similar toll from hunger.
Alarming figures can also be found for contemporary or ongoing
conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria and Yemen. These
figures are startling, because for reasons that are unfathomable, deaths
from famine are less visible, less newsworthy—less memorable than
death by gun, bomb, or shell. The point, simply, is that war’s impact
on food security is as deadly as war itself.
Reference is made to World War II because this is in our living
memory and it brought together the international community to address its failures. It was in the wake of World War II that the United
Nations was established. The international community wanted to
ensure that the atrocities of that magnitude never happen again. Despite many shortcomings and failures, the UN system has alleviated
the toll of some appalling crises and conflicts. The international humanitarian community evolved, and today is structured and funded
on the premise of treating hunger largely as a side effect of conflict.
Conflict creates the need; humanitarians respond accordingly.
In this context, the World Food Programme was established within
the multilateral system as the food delivery operational arm of the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It has
always been perceived as the logistical engine that feeds the hungry.
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Yet, from the outset of its creation, despite initially being an experimental three-year programme, WFP was mandated with first, saving
lives; second, improving the nutrition and quality of life of the most
vulnerable people at critical times in their lives; and third, helping
build self-reliance of poor people and communities. WFP now describes its role as “saving lives, changing lives.” Nevertheless, already
in the 1960s, it was acknowledged that peoples’ needs can vary, and
thus, WFP assistance should adapt to those needs.
Increases in food prices do not affect all people equally. Thus, those
most negatively affected by a food crisis are the poorest of the poor,
as they are least able to purchase higher-priced food. When no other
poverty indicators are available, WFP considers that the world’s most
vulnerable, who spend 60 percent of their income on food, are inevitably priced out of the food market. To be able to assist these
people adequately, WFP needs to understand why these people are
poor and not limit the analysis to expenditure on a food basket. Yet,
the instruments and the definition of people in need have largely
been grounded in calorific adequacy. To change lives meaningfully, a deeper understanding of social dynamics and power struggles
is required.
The architecture of the humanitarian system is built on the premise
of identifying need and responding accordingly. Our understanding
of hunger must evolve and become multi-dimensional. In the case of
conflict and hunger, this is more apparent. It has become inescapable
that the relationship between hunger and conflict is far more complex and dynamic than the binary cause-and-effect schema outlined
above. This complexity has not yet been adequately reflected in the
humanitarian architecture, nor in the nature of the needs WFP is
mandated to address.
Hunger is a direct result of conflict. Conversely, food security is a
prerequisite for a state’s socio-economic security, and as such, food
insecurity can intensify and, at times, cause conflict. The corollary
for humanitarian actors, donors and practitioners, is that treating
hunger simply as a side effect of conflict is inadequate, and ill-suited,
to both the scale and the nature of the problem. It is therefore time
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for us, the international community, as academics, donors, and practitioners, to adapt our thinking, and our response, accordingly.
The Legal and Policy Framework
Hunger comes when the four elements of food security have disappeared—availability, stability, access and utilization, as defined in the
1996 World Food Summit. Or within a rights framework, when the
five elements of the right to food are missing, namely: availability,
stability, accessibility, sustainability and adequacy—acknowledged
in WFP’s 2012 Protection Policy and in the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee’s (IASC) Centrality of Protection Strategy. Inequalities,
with disparities in income and wealth and access to basic needs, such
as food, shelter and clothing, but also sanitation, education, healthcare, and justice are growing. The achievement of real, visible and
long-lasting development is severely constrained. To understand the
drivers of these inequalities, WFP strives to ensure that people of
concern are central to all decisions and delivery related to its food
security mandate, whether in humanitarian, development or protracted crisis settings.
The legal framework at the international community’s disposal gives
the multilateral system the scope to examine the complexities of food
insecurity in conflict. Some of the core components of hunger fall
beyond WFP’s remit or mandate—the organisational DNA—but as
the largest operational food security agency mainly responding in
conflict and protracted settings, WFP must consider all aspects of
hunger, mainly, why people are hungry.
By way of illustration: in Syria, it is now well established that the collapse of food systems was an underestimated and poorly understood
element of both the long and short-term unfolding of socio-political
and humanitarian crises. Before the war broke out, over the period
of 2010-2012, droughts had occurred across Syria displacing the rural poor to the urban areas. This rapid urbanization of people who
were losing their livelihoods exposed the disparities in wealth and
social inequalities which should have served as an early warning for
a potential conflict. When analysis of the unfolding situation even136

tually did occur, food security was a missing link. More specifically,
food security was not factored as a key element driving displacement,
urbanization, refugee outflow, economic and or social collapse. Yet,
WFP in Syria was responding to people’s immediate need to be fed;
it was not WFP’s role to question whether the lack of food or collapse
of food systems was one of the origins of the tensions.
The Analysis
The case of Syria, and this understanding of the dynamic, interdependent relationship of hunger and conflict, has significant implications, not only for our understanding of the genesis of conflict, but
also for the ways humanitarians and practitioners should respond.
A metaphor helps to illustrate. Like focusing only on the second and
third acts of a three-act play, most conflict research focuses on conflict
dynamics already evolving in an ongoing conflict. Studying the first
act—meaning understanding the setting, acquiring an understanding of who the actors are, what their everyday life is like, and what is
important to them—rarely happens. Typically, the international aid
community does not answer these questions. It skips that step and
rushes into a response on the basis of urgent, existing and identifiable
needs. Answering some of these questions through collective research
would provide practical insights into Act II, which is typically the
Confrontation, Rising Action, and Act III, the Resolution. Extending the metaphor, a focus on Act I could help inform responses and
possibly help reduce the scale of conflict, through harnessing collective knowledge and using it to design creative “out-of-the box” projects and programmes. Identifying the reasons for inequality is a first
step but then, we as a community should not just state them, but use
them to design more creative ways of responding.
Deeper research and analysis would bring to light the fact that hunger is one of the factors that leads to civil unrest or conflict. While
not the only factor, it is a key constituent in socio-political stability.
This has been unmistakable in the last decade, in 2008, when food
prices spiked, followed by a surge in civil unrest across a swathe of
lower and middle-income countries. “Angry consumers took to the
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streets in at least 48 nations across Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.”
Finally, some contend that the Arab Spring was linked to an increase
in food prices. When people took to the streets in Egypt in 2011,
they shouted: “ ةيعامتجا ةلادع ةيرح شيعBread, Freedom and
Social Justice.”
The existing tools that the humanitarian community uses to determine humanitarian needs do not support analysis to inform decision-making. The resources given by the donor community and the
measurement of the success of allocations are linked to quantities of
food or medicines delivered and to the number of people who have
received them over a short time period. Time to understand what has
happened is not afforded to the humanitarian on the ground, and
most of the time, it is not seen as his or her job. Additional expertise
and data have not been brought to bear to examine and respond appropriately; accordingly, there is a need for suitably interdisciplinary,
inter-agency research to help join the dots followed by new programmatic models and designs. Accurate treatment follows from accurate
diagnosis, and so too the reverse: in Syria, both the international
response and programmes have been accordingly mismatched and
ill-equipped to meet the nature of the challenge of Syria’s breakdown
and collapse.
The Practice
Drawing from these and other examples from the field, we offer a
few suggestions as to how WFP might tailor a more effective and appropriate response. The use of hunger as a weapon of war is probably
as old as war itself. Examples abound today, such as besiegement of
key logistics hubs (like ports) and communities themselves—cutting
people off from access to food and markets. The shattering of livelihoods through scorched-earth tactics, inhibiting communities’ ability to cope and frequently causing destitution and displacement, is
commonplace. The tactic of starving people is brutal and yet horribly
effective, causing lasting and devastating impact. A week of war—or
even just the perceived risk of danger—during the planting or harvesting season can bring a year or longer of hunger to a community.
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Such tactics frequently pass unnoticed due to the swiftness of their
execution. This type of tactic is cheaper, but just as viciously effective
as fighting a war with bombs and bullets.
To induce hunger in large civilian populations in sieges was a common tactic in Syria. The siege and starvation of Madaya received
extensive media coverage. In February 2020, the assault on Idlib has
featured restrictions on food assistance, burning crops and farmable
land described as literally “burning all aspects of life.” Through the
course of the Syrian conflict many other locations have been subjected to the same destructive tactics. The main purpose is to exert pressure on an opposition group to force them to surrender, for example,
by besieging locations. The parties to the conflict are dissimulated
among civilians who are “just” civilian casualties. In Syria’s Eastern
Ghouta, the Government cut off water supplies, targeted communal
kitchens and bakeries, and either restricted or even blocked food assistance. All these measures had had the sole purpose of inflicting
incremental, and often, eventually complete deprivation.
In South Sudan, by the end of 2015, nearly 1.5 million people and
a further 730,000 had been forcibly displaced or fled across South
Sudan’s borders. Approximately ten percent of those seeking protection sought refuge in UN Protection of Civilians sites, with much
larger numbers displacing. In Unity State, “many hid in the swamps
and cases of drowning were reported as people sought to collect water lilies for food or to hide from soldiers.” Although there was disagreement over how such deaths should be recorded, it was decided
that they could not be attributed to famine, as neither hunger nor
hunger-related illness was their direct cause.
In Syria, WFP’s approach was to “stay and deliver”—an approach
which was criticized, as it was seen as only serving people in government-controlled areas where it had physical access. WFP was thus
perceived as siding with one of the parties to the conflict. From the
inside, the reality was much different. For one, the people, mainly civilians residing in government-held areas, were not necessarily affiliated with the government. From the outside, the humanitarian community was not seen as neutral. Nuances of what responders were
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dealing with were, however, not understood or perhaps poorly documented and communicated. In a theatre of operation, deliberate and
conscious trade-offs are made. Syria, prior to the war, was well on
its way to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The
need for humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
was not existent, which means that aside from the Red Crescent,
there were close to no partners on the ground who could effectively
deliver humanitarian assistance. That was the reason WFP decided
to “stay and deliver.” As a protection-mandated agency, it was also
trying to support the delivery of medical supplies. The World Health
Organisation (WHO) was allowed to distribute medicine, but was
prevented from delivering much-needed surgical materials which the
authorities considered would be used for supporting combatants and
thus politically motivated. There is no perfect answer, but these are
the issues and tensions that a representative on the ground has to deal
with and balance to make the best decision possible without always
receiving the required support from Headquarters, often due to a
misreading or lack of understanding of the nuances on the ground.
In another example, Sudan, in the months that led to the overthrow
of President Bashir, the first riots in the streets of Khartoum were
triggered by the lifting of the wheat subsidy, which resulted in a stark
increase in the price of bread. People tend to assume that the poor,
the hungry and the most vulnerable will riot. In the case of Sudan,
the middle class commonly consumes bread and lives in urban settings where it is easier to congregate. The poor live off sorghum. The
riots took place in urban Khartoum or Nyala (the second largest city
in Sudan), where the standard of living is higher than in the rest of
the country. This shows that unrest and riots can be linked sometimes mainly to what people feel entitled to rather than to a loss of
material security. Earlier on in Sudan’s history in Darfur, Khartoum
did not anticipate the uprising of Darfurians, contending that they
were “too hungry to stage an armed revolution.” The traders (the
Zaghawa) across the Chad-Darfur border had built a considerable
amount of wealth which had gone unnoticed by the Government in
Khartoum.
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There is no mechanistic or inevitable relationship between conflict
and hunger. Spikes in food prices frequently, but not inevitably, lead
to unrest. The immediate response of a government can be to draw
from its National Grain Reserve or call on WFP to strengthen its
food assistance programme. This approach is only a redistribution
and does nothing to solve the underlying issue of supply and eventual equitable distribution. In the case of Sudan, the government
turned to its neighbour the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia to provide financial support—again a temporary fix. Worse, these temporary solutions can sometimes detract from addressing the root causes of the
problem. They were, as the media terminology puts it, “band-aids,”
not solutions. In Sudan, WFP’s approach at the time was to try and
address both the immediate needs of those who were hungry and advocate for heightened attention to the country, which is a forgotten
crisis in comparison with Syria, Yemen or South Sudan. In Sudan,
the international community’s role was to advocate for international
support. Concessional finance was unavailable from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as Sudan was in arrears
on account of bearing the debt of South Sudan. Sudan’s continued
presence on the United States State Sponsors of Terrorism list made
it difficult to achieve debt relief and restart International Financial
Institution grants and loans. Many traditional donors limited their
assistance to humanitarian support, while others used partners to
deliver aid outside of government systems. Consequently, there were
few incentives, or conditions, to encourage or help the government
to engage in sufficient macro-economic reform.
The United Nations Country Team in Sudan with donors had offered an interim arrangement to support the economy and prevent
more people from falling into poverty as well as potential civil war.
While economic reforms were, and remain, necessary irrespective
of the availability of external financing, the United Nations, World
Bank, European Union, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the United Kingdom Department for
International Development (DFID) in Khartoum worked on a proposal for a facility to help Sudan deliver a managed programme of
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reforms and address their social and economic impact. This facility would have been governed by an agreement between the international community and the Government of Sudan. The proposal
asserted a number of pre-conditions that stipulated the necessary
macro-economic reforms and the political reforms agreed between
the international community and the Government of Sudan accompanied by continued and re-focused support from traditional partners with increased humanitarian assistance and social safety nets to
provide immediate respite to the poorest during the reform period.
This initiative never materialised despite being creative and forward
thinking. The lack of willingness to expose difficult choices, the need
to be creative, coupled with the effort and energy to achieve results,
can often slow down a practitioner in the field. A country representative will no doubt suffer from advocacy fatigue, meaning that despite
efforts to deliberately weigh decisions and consider the best options,
practitioners inside a theatre of operations are possibly heard but not
listened to.
Leveraging the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus
The first part of this paper has considered some of the complexities practitioners face at the field level. These challenges range from
understanding a context to being equipped by the international
community with the necessary financing and measurement tools
to address the problems even when they have been identified and
understood.
This section of the paper examines the humanitarian-developmentpeace nexus and how it can be leveraged to respond effectively to
some of these complexities. “The nexus focuses on the work needed
to coherently address people’s vulnerability before, during and after
crises.” It is supposed to provide the link between development projects and humanitarian activities. To date, humanitarian funds typically have been stretched to cover development projects, particularly
in protracted crises, inadequately assisting the people in the most
vulnerable situations.
Both WFP’s mandate and the definition of the right to food sup142

port the development of a richer and more effective understanding
of the relationship between conflict and food. The Paris Declaration
on aid effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, followed and
reinforced by the Busan partnership for effective development cooperation require that donor countries ensure that their investments
are focused on results—that they have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality, on sustainable development,
and on enhancing developing countries’ capacities, aligned with the
priorities and policies set out by developing countries themselves.
These agreements also call for inclusive development partnerships
and the recognition of the different and complementary roles of all
actors. The content of these declarations and action plans show that
the international community understands the multi-faceted issues
a practitioner deals with and their localisation or contextualisation.
Yet, bridging the humanitarian-development-peace nexus remains
an elusive goal due to the current aid architecture, because, without
achieving a transition from humanitarian action to development, including peace building assistance, fragile situations do not improve.
It is time for the international community to adapt to maintain its
relevance. The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) created nearly ten years ago is a good example of attempting
to bring about change. One of INCAF’s welcome efforts has been
to work hand-in-hand with partners through the g7+ and in the International Dialogue. Political leadership and advocacy through INCAF and the g7+ helped ensure that conflict and fragility concerns
were integrated into the SDGs, as manifested in Goal 16. WFP has
recognised that it can contribute to this discussion by bringing to
the table ways to integrate operational reality into policy. In this way,
WFP can support donors to change behaviour, particularly in having
a coherent approach to humanitarian-development-peace and security outcomes.
The 2030 Agenda, grounded in the principle of leaving no one behind, and the Grand Bargain Commitments are further manifestations of the international community’s understanding of the fact that
issues cannot be dealt with in isolation. The nexus merely reaffirms
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what has been known for years, that there is a continuum—international assistance is dynamic. The purpose of these commitments
is mainly to confine humanitarian funding to finance humanitarian action. As illustrated by the Sudan example, development is an
area that practitioners—particularly in conflict settings—tend to shy
away from, for the simple reason that development must be aligned
to national priorities and initiatives. Often development actors
are working with a government that is a party to a conflict, which
in a nexus setting, will compromise the humanitarian principle
of neutrality.
These challenges are serious, but not—certainly not always—insurmountable. There is momentum thanks to the humanitariandevelopment-peace nexus, but the thinking behind the nexus has
not sufficiently matured. The triple nexus is a way to recall the three
pillars the UN is built on: human rights, peace and security, and development. Attention and investment should be given to each component, yet today, only three percent of the UN’s budget is devoted
to human rights. Similarly, investment is made in humanitarian assistance, which by nature is punctual and supposed to be short-term.
Different mechanisms should be designed to support longer-term
objectives. If flexible financing mechanisms were in place with realistic time frames to show progress built in, some of the difficulties laid
out above could be overcome.
With adequate resourcing and time, WFP could conduct more comprehensive analysis on food insecurity, detailing the threats faced by
populations to physical, material and legal safety beyond vulnerability to food insecurity. Robust context analysis that is regularly updated will enable protection and people-centred responses to evolve as
situations change. As a result, through its programmes, WFP could
contribute to reduce, and where possible, prevent people’s vulnerability to food insecurity, inequality and exclusion. This approach would
also allow WFP to integrate mechanisms that ensure the long-term
sustainability of its programming. Such analysis would also determine when WFP’s role should be advocacy, rather than direct operational engagement—i.e. when WFP should and can leverage its size
144

and scope to support and partner with other actors that have other
specializations to ensure a coordinated and complementary approach.
Opportunities for Accountability
May 2020 will mark the two-year anniversary of the adoption of
Security Council Resolution 2417. This protective resolution was
the result of years of lobbying, coupled with the concern about
the increase in duration and number of conflicts. It offers the
practitioners on the ground an opportunity to hold the international
community accountable for taking action, when deprivation of
access to food is occurring. Under the umbrella of the protection of
civilians, according to the guidance on the resolution, the Secretary
General must report to the Security Council on the risk of famine
and food insecurity in countries with armed conflict, as part of his
regular reporting on country specific situations.
The guidance on the implementation of the resolution requires
reporting on incidences of destruction of objects necessary for life—
food production, processing or distribution, as well as incidences of
humanitarian agencies being denied access to populations that are in
need of life-saving assistance by warring parties, either directly (e.g.
roadblocks) or indirectly (e.g. through bureaucratic impediments).
This new obligation to report requires WFP to understand food
insecurity in a broad sense and to be able to determine from patterns
and trends when there is an intent to deprive populations from access
to food. The reporting guidance provides an avenue that did not
exist at the start of the Syrian war to support the protection-mandate
agencies such as WFP to take a decision to stay and deliver.
Currently, WFP is using the Integrated Food Security Phase
Classification (IPC) as the tool to determine levels of food
insecurity. It examines three different scales: acute food insecurity,
which threatens lives or livelihoods; chronic food insecurity, which
focuses on quality and quantity of food consumption for an active
and healthy life; and acute malnutrition. The IPC was developed
to provide an understanding of the severity of food security
against which funding would be sought. The IPC has five phases:
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Phase One: Normal; Phase Two: Stressed; Phase Three: Crisis; Phase
Four: Emergency; and Phase Five: Famine. To reach the stage of
Famine within the IPC, at least twenty percent of the population
have no access to food; at least thirty percent of children under
five years are moderately or severely wasted; and two or more
people/10,000 are dying per day due to famine related causes. Or
more colloquially put, famine is distinct from the other phases by
conditions of destitution—a collapse in coping mechanisms and a
large increase in mortality. As such, famine, or Phase Five, is equated
with starvation, when in fact, people may die of hunger or related
causes in other phases, particularly phases Three and Four. This
means “starvation” related deaths are not clear.
A recent analysis of the IPC explains that while the IPC is a good
tool, it is restrictive, because it focuses mainly on severity and is
heavily quantitative. In South Sudan, when famine was declared in
February 2017 in two counties, and subsequently declared ended
in those counties three months later, the IPC Phase Three had risen
from 4 million to 5.5 million people across the country. This shows
that severity is important, but duration, magnitude and geographic
locations are also qualitative dimensions that need to be considered
at granular levels to paint a more accurate picture. The argument
here is also that WFP and the wider community’s analysis requires
sharpening, with an “early warning” lens in mind at all times, to both
prevent and better respond.
WFP and FAO have published two reports based on the IPC to inform the update of the Secretary General to the Security Council on
the 2417 Resolution. However, these reports offer an opportunity
to bring in deeper analysis. For example, there may be food, but no
money to buy food; there is a breakdown of the banking system/nonpayment of salaries (e.g. Yemen, where the Central Bank was closed,
resulting in civil servants and others who received government payments, such as pensioners, not being paid. There is danger in taking
refuge in the “shelter of numbers.” It can only paint a partial picture.
There are other key shortcomings with the IPC. For one, the IPC is
negotiated with, and at times chaired by, the government, which can
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often be a party to the conflict, thus potentially compromising the
principle of neutrality. IPC assumes access—yet, the reality on the
ground is that denial-of-humanitarian-access incidents are not overlaid on IPC maps which can distort the picture. IPC is a snapshot
that is not a substitute for a qualitative narrative that reflects trends
and patterns. It is the latter that is also required, using the 2417
reporting guidance, to support the element of intentionality necessary for prosecution under the Rome Statute. The intention and/or
knowledge of wrongdoing, i.e. the mens rea, is for a litigator to establish. By documenting and reporting to the Security Council, WFP
is providing the information necessary for the membership to decide
whether it should unilaterally refer a case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). It provides a mechanism to inform member states
who can then engage and are obliged to address a situation. The
amendment of the Rome Statute was a significant achievement in
recognising the destruction of the means for survival as a war crime.
Yet it can only be used if a country has ratified the amendment.
WFP can and should support a collective analysis of a situation in
line with the Human Rights Up Front initiatives and the Secretary
General’s Prevention strategy. In addition to the 2417 Resolution,
WFP can contribute to the protection of civilians by investing time
in the reporting to the Security Council. This can be done through
the reports of the Secretary General in integrated mission settings.
Conclusion
The issues at play are complicated and dynamic, and the tools and
structures available are not fully utilised. We recommend better analysis, with both qualitative information and quantitative data, of the
settings we work in. The relationship between hunger and conflict
is complex and dynamic. There are no simple mechanisms or rules.
However, one constant lesson from conflicts and countries as diverse
as Syria and Sudan is that we need to avoid thinking in terms of
a simple binary, a simple cause and effect of hunger following on
conflict. Food security is a vital constituent of socio-political security. We ignore this fact to everyone’s peril, and the effectiveness of
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humanitarian response will suffer as a result.
There is a mismatch between the nature and architecture of existing
delivery systems and the underlying nature of the need. We recommend that the aid industry rethink its financing, and enable work
within a more multilateral framework. To an extent, the tools already
exist, e.g. multi-partner trust funds.
Existing and evolving juridical frameworks provide means to eliminate the use of hunger as a weapon of war. Accountability mechanisms should be invested in and used, while new accountability
frameworks should be seen as opportunities to advocate for support,
to better understand the role of food insecurity in the context of the
conflict and society concerned, and commit member states to address the use of hunger as a weapon of war.
To end on a positive note, we can do better; many of the challenges
outlined above, however diabolical, can only be addressed through a
multilateral approach. In the wake of the Rome Statute amendment,
there are new accountabilities; just as the means and opportunities
exist to take more effective action. This is an urgent task for all concerned by the issue—donors, academics, and practitioners alike.
—Juba, March 2020
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Concluding Lecture
H.E. Mr. Simon Coveney, TD
Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade
Friends,
We are living through an extraordinarily difficult period in global
history.
The arrival of COVID-19 has brought suffering, loss, and hardship
to every country, but particularly to those most vulnerable—a stark
reminder of our common humanity.
As the World Health Organisation’s Dr. Mike Ryan has said, “no
one is safe until everyone is safe,” a reminder that we are all interdependent. Global safety in the face of the pandemic requires global
institutions and a global response. This in turn requires investment
in effective multilateralism—the very heart of Irish foreign policy
over decades.
At times like these, people need hope. That puts what I call a duty
of hope on leaders, though we too need our wellspring from which
to take inspiration. The Irish Nobel laureate, Seamus Heaney, once
told us:
“If we winter this one out, we can summer anywhere.”
Although the calendar tells us it is June and summertime, the virus
has plunged the world into winter. But with a collective, coordinated, coherent global response, we will ensure that summer returns.
I do not underestimate the challenge—this is not simply a health crisis but an economic and social one also. It is a test of each of us, our
commitment to multilateralism, and of the UN Secretary-General’s
reform agenda: it is also an opportunity to drive change, to bridge
across the humanitarian, development and peace pillars of our work
in innovative ways, and to put in place the foundations required for
a better future.
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We must put in place the foundations for a better future which protects the most vulnerable, those furthest behind.
I am conscious that, while the world is focused on the COVID crisis,
we should not forget those already on the margins, living with the
stress and strain of conflict, hunger and displacement. The people
whom the humanitarian system strives to assist. Those most at risk
in a distracted world, a world where resources are scarce and where
people are fearful.
That is why Ireland is stepping up.
We are playing our part to help ensure we indeed have that collective,
coordinated and coherent global response to COVID-19, with the
United Nations at its centre delivering as one.
We are a leading humanitarian donor: the OECD Development Assistance Committee recently observed that Ireland is “an excellent humanitarian partner” and that our approaches—informed by Ireland’s
history of famine and of conflict—could provide a useful inspiration
to other donors.
We do as we say—indeed, in that same report, the OECD complimented Ireland for “walking the talk” in our focus, making a visible
difference and providing leadership, including as a leading advocate
for multilateralism.
We draw upon not just our history but also our values, on principles
of justice, human rights, the rule of law, and support for peace and
friendly cooperation between nations.
That commitment to values, to peace, to the furthest behind—and
to doing as we say—is one of the key reasons why Ireland is seeking
a seat on the Security Council for 2021-22.
If elected—when elected—Ireland will make a difference.
Mary Robinson said at the launch of Ireland’s campaign in July
2018, that to seek a seat in the Council is “the difficult thing.” It
would be easier to stand back, to avoid the difficult discussions and
hard choices faced by members of the Security Council.
But stepping back and taking the easy option is not the Irish way.
In difficult times, countries like Ireland, which I describe as “A small
country, that thinks big, a country that listens, and a strong independent
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voice,” are needed more than ever. On the Security Council, Ireland
will be guided by three essential values, those of empathy, independence and partnership, as we play our part in the discharge of the
Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security.
As the Secretary-General’s recent call for a global ceasefire reminds
us, there is a direct connection between peace, security, and reducing humanitarian need. He said, “There should only be one fight in
our world today, our shared battle against COVID-19.” Yet, even before this crisis, the world faced unprecedented levels of humanitarian
need. Today that challenge is even greater—180 million people—
and growing, and with it the seeds of potential future conflict and
further humanitarian need crises.
The best way to meet humanitarian need is through prevention. Prevention requires us all to step up, to have difficult discussions and to
make hard choices. Such discussions are best informed by empathy,
independence and partnership. Those Irish values frame this Fordham lecture today, as they have this important series of lectures.
Empathy: Ireland as a Humanitarian Actor
A commitment to helping those in need runs deep in Ireland’s culture.
Our empathy is born of pain. The pain of discrimination, oppression, and poverty. Of emigration and forced displacement. Of conflict and division. Above all, the huge trauma of our famine, which
saw our population reduce by half in only four years.
Our empathy is born from hope—the knowledge that change does
come. The Ireland of today is transformed from that of a century
ago. I am fortunate to come from a country which is among the best
performers on the human development index. I have lived through
much of that change.
Ireland’s experience has bred in us a fierce desire to help others.
From our experience of conflict and reconciliation grew the desire to
help others along the path to peace.
From our experience of injustice and discrimination grew a commitment to shape a multilateral order governed by the rule of law and
human rights.
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From our experience of hunger grew the impulse to help those furthest behind, first.
These experiences, these impulses helped frame the newly independent Ireland. They inspired a tradition of Irish missionaries, educators and healers. They lay behind the establishment of Irish humanitarian and development NGOs in the 1960s, many of which are now
among the most effective worldwide, and Irish Aid, Ireland’s official
international development programme, now nearly fifty years old.
Irish men and women today express these values daily across the
global humanitarian system, here in New York, in Geneva, and in
difficult circumstances around the world, working for a better world.
They draw from living tradition.
We remember the Choctaw people. In 1847, from their meagre
means, they sent financial assistance to our famine stricken country
an ocean away. This was barely sixteen years after the Choctaw faced
their own darkest hour on the Trail of Tears.
Their empathy, their solidarity, resonates today.
Seamus Heaney talked of the rhyme of hope and history: they rhymed
when an appeal by the Navajo and Hopi nations for support as they
coped with the impact of COVID caught the imagination of Irish
people who, remembering the historic kindness of the Choctaw, responded to that call spontaneously, in solidarity and with generosity.
That was the spirit which gave birth to Fordham University: founded
by an immigrant son of Ireland, John Hughes, to help the poor break
the cycle of poverty through education. Hughes bought the original
site without having funds to pay for it, relying on the kindness of
strangers. Through education, Fordham has helped prepare humanitarians. That is why it has been appropriate that this lecture series has
allowed a rich exploration of some of the challenges facing today’s
humanitarians.
We heard President Higgins and former President Mary Robinson
on the challenges of responding to humanitarian needs in the context of human migration and a changing climate.
Practitioners and experts have shared their insights and wisdom.
Dr. Jemilah Mahmood of the International Federation of Red Cross
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and Red Crescent Societies spoke of the importance of trust in humanitarian action, and the critical role of national and local organisations in building that trust.
Jamie McGoldrick, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, shared the challenges of negotiating humanitarian access, particularly in places where non-state actors control territory—and where the act of negotiating such access
can potentially criminalise humanitarians.
Dr. Caitriona Dowd of Dublin City University and Matthew Hollingworth of the World Food Programme explored the links between
conflict and hunger, and called on us to do more when hunger is
used as a weapon of war.
The Chief of Staff of the Irish Defence Forces, Vice Admiral
Mark Mellett, discussed the changing nature of peacekeeping and its
role in protecting civilians.
A theme across this lecture series has been the need for decision makers to act with empathy. They need to consider how their decisions
will resonate across the multilateral system, humanitarian actors,
military, governments and other authorities and, above all, those furthest behind, whose voices are the least heard. This is a lesson that
Ireland will take with us while serving on the Security Council.
Independence: Ireland as a Champion of Peace, Human Rights,
and the Most Vulnerable
The humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, impartiality and humanity are embedded within Irish foreign policy.
Conflict is the single greatest driver of humanitarian need. In recent
years, we have seen conflicts becoming more protracted, more fragmented, and more urbanised. In Syria, Yemen, across the Sahel, and
elsewhere, conflicts are dragging on for years, leaving death, misery
and the seeds of future mistrust behind.
Such is the scale of misery, of humanitarian need, the world literally
cannot afford business as usual.
It is time to muster the global political will to address the root causes
of these conflicts. As the Secretary-General said, “We need robust dip155

lomatic efforts to meet these challenges.” A start would be to implement
his appeal for a global ceasefire.
The island of Ireland has known conflict in my lifetime. This has
taught us the importance of robust diplomacy to achieving peace.
We understand the need for support from friends to enable peace,
but also the need to push, to cajole, to encourage and to admonish if
peace is to be achieved.
We know too how precious a flame is peace, and the need to nurture
and protect it once it has been achieved. Peace can too easily be derailed by continuing misery and need, by the absence of hope.
On the Security Council, Ireland will be a tireless champion of the
robust diplomacy of peace.
We bring no selfish interest, no partisan agenda.
We bring neutrality and impartiality.
We bring independence but not indifference.
We bring our informed advocacy.
We bring our experience.
We bring our focus on putting the furthest behind first.
We bring an understanding of the complexities, the geopolitics and
the challenges—and the implications of actions, things which cannot
simply be wished away. Hard work, informed diplomacy, listening,
proposing, and reworking, all in a spirit of collegiality, is required
if the minds of the Council are to be focused on moving forward,
especially on difficult dossiers.
The work of peace is slow and painstaking. It requires bravery. It
come with risk. To be steadfast for peace requires leadership optimistic for the future.
The alternative to working for peace, which I have seen first-hand,
is that the jagged splinters of division and violence continue to ruin
lives, poison societies, and spread misery.
The Security Council has a duty to create frameworks which facilitate leaders to be steadfast in their pursuit of peace. They can create
conditions of hope which allow people to be brave, to take the risks
required to build and secure peace.
Of course, delivering on this is not the responsibility solely of Secu156

rity Council members. Each one of us is called through our global
citizenship to help build peace and reduce humanitarian need. That
is why Ireland will continue to use our own experiences of conflict
and of peacebuilding—our hard won successes, and failures—to
support others in their own efforts, just as we were supported during our peace process. This informs Ireland’s quiet work, helping to
build peace in many places across the world, as well as supporting
the efforts of the United Nations including through the Peacebuilding Fund.
Achieving peace also requires stability. That is why Ireland continues
to provide strong, practical support to peace keeping and enforcement, holding the proud distinction of being the only nation to
have over sixty years continuous deployment on UN, and UN mandated, peace support operations, going back to 1958. Today, Irish
peacekeepers are on the ground in Africa, in the Middle East, and in
the Balkans.
Ireland also engages constructively across the multilateral system, using our voice and our influence to provide leadership and make a
difference. This is particularly important where peace building and
humanitarian action meet.
We were proud, with Kenya, to have played an instrumental role in the
agreement of the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030.
With Jordan, and drawing on our own experience of emigration,
Ireland co-facilitated the New York Declaration on Refugees and
Migrants.
Over the last eighteen months, Ireland has chaired the OCHA and
ICRC Donor Support Groups, and the CERF advisory board. Ireland complements its engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission with membership of the advisory board of the Peacebuilding
Fund. These leadership roles have given us particular insight into
the impact of the virus on conflict-affected countries—something
which no doubt will impact on the work of the Security Council in
the period ahead.
In all of these roles, we have been privileged to work in partnership with others. They will have got to know Ireland’s independence,
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focus and hard work, but particularly the commitment to getting the
best result for all.
Partnership—A Belief in the Multilateral System
Effective partnership is the root of Irish foreign policy. Being an island does not make us insular. Quite the opposite—it reminds us of
the importance of connections, of working with others to achieve
common goals, and of our interdependence with others.
Partnership does not mean homogeneity. It does not mean settling
for the lowest common denominator. It requires work. It requires
understanding. It requires challenge. It requires a commitment to
working towards the highest common factor.
A high functioning multilateral system is the best guarantee of effective partnerships. It is in the multilateral space that the countries of
the world come together to work on building those understandings
and providing that challenge.
However, any honest reflection on multilateralism today would recognize that we do not always achieve the highest common factor.
Each member state has to reflect on why that is.
Effective multilateralism requires wise investments of money, effort
and imagination.
It requires patience too—it takes time to deliver change, to build
peace, to move up the human development index.
We must also remember that progress is not linear. UNDP say that,
as a result of COVID-19, global human development will decline
this year for the first time in three decades. The poorest countries, the
poorest people, are the most affected.
Addressing this complex knot of crises—health, economic and social—is a test of the multilateral system and of the Secretary-General’s reform agenda. It is also a test of the Member States. We must
all step up, in partnership. If we do not, unfortunately the risk of
destabilisation and conflict increases.
There is good news. The UN global response to COVID-19 has seen
the humanitarian and development agencies work effectively together.
The new Resident Coordinator system is stepping up.
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Ireland has been a strong supporter of that coherent, coordinated
UN response—bilaterally, as a committed member of Team Europe
and through our leadership within the humanitarian architecture.
We have complemented that with Irish support to the Global Fund
and GAVI, and our engagement with the International Financial
Institutions on such important issues as debt relief. And with this
crisis likely to continue, Ireland will stay steadfast in our efforts, our
responses and our contributions.
The impact of COVID-19 has been a reminder of the deep interconnection between everybody, every society on Earth. Collective action
is helping us tackle the virus and the associated economic and social
crises. It is important that we learn lessons from our response, which
we can then apply to other challenges such as tackling poverty, inequality or the root causes of extremism.
Those lessons can inform a more effective response to climate change,
the great challenge of our age notwithstanding the immediacy of
COVID-19. Indeed, climate change is already amplifying the economic and social crises accompanying the virus, at a time when the
humanitarian system is stretched to respond to the impacts of conflict, food insecurity and displacement.
Greater consideration needs to be given also to the interplay between
climate change and conflict, something with President Robinson has
highlighted in this lecture series. She said:
“While no armed conflict has one single driver, there is an increasingly
strong body of evidence that suggests that climate change, interacting
with other factors, such as political, economic and social conditions, is a
major contributing factor.”
No country on its own can stop climate change. However, acting
together, we can ensure that our children and grandchildren inherit
a better world—and we know what we need to do. We have map.
We have a process. We have targets. Working in partnership, we can
achieve those targets.
Failure to do so is frightening.
There is, as I said, the risk of increased conflict.
There are island states facing existential threats, which might literally
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be under water in our lifetimes.
Food systems will need to change, fast.
There will be increased demand on the humanitarian system.
In addition to our efforts to do better at home, climate action is a
cornerstone of Ireland’s international development policy. I see delivery on climate action not just as enlightened humanitarianism but,
fundamentally, as part of our future national security.
And expanding Ireland’s international engagement on climate has
deepened our networks, our friendships, including with many other
small island states.
We are all aware of the challenges ahead. Addressing climate issues is
not easy. It requires difficult trade-offs between today and tomorrow.
It requires agile politics. It requires countries to lean in, to trust that
others too will make the effort to change, to work in partnership listening to all voices, big and small. This will enable the achievement
of optimal solutions to shared problems.
That is why Ireland is a member of the Alliance for Multilateralism,
an important investment in the framework enabling and underpinning international trust and partnership. As Helen Keller, a woman
who knew so much about triumph through adversity, said, “Alone we
can do so little, together we can do so much.”
Priorities for the Security Council: IHL, Protection of Civilians,
Addressing the Roots of Conflict
Membership of the Security Council brings with it great responsibility. It also provides opportunities to help frame circumstances where
humanitarian need can be reduced—or prevented.
Our values of empathy, independence and partnership will inform
Ireland’s contribution to those elements of the Security Council’s
work which reduce and prevent humanitarian need, including: ensuring respect for international humanitarian law, and accountability
for violations; strengthening the Security Council’s work on the protection of civilians; and, addressing the root causes of conflict, and
sustaining peace.
For as long as humans have made war, we have made rules to govern
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combat, drawing on religion and culture. This was the inspiration for
the codification of international humanitarian law in the nineteenth
century. These rules are intended to mitigate the effects of conflict
on civilians or those who have stopped fighting. They provide the
umbrella under which civilians as well as humanitarians can shelter.
Today that shelter is often inadequate—with tragic consequences.
Respect for international humanitarian law is being eroded. When
that respect is given, lives are saved. When international humanitarian law is ignored, lives are shattered. Too often we see indiscriminate
attacks on civilians, on hospitals, on health workers. We see humanitarians denied lifesaving access. Cruel political games are played with
vital permissions repeatedly delayed or refused. And humanitarian
aid workers are often deliberately targeted for kidnap or murder.
This is inexcusable.
Peter Maurer, President of the ICRC, spoke at the Security Council
on the 70th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions. He said “continued violations of the law do not mean the law is inadequate, but
rather that efforts to ensure respect are inadequate.”
President Maurer urged the Council to do more. I agree.
A key building block in the peace we have achieved on the island
of Ireland was building trust in institutions and in the rule of law.
Arrangements were put in place to uphold rights and to instil confidence in justice systems.
International humanitarian law needs an investment of analogous
confidence building measures. It is essential that members of the Security Council take the lead, calling out breaches of international
humanitarian law no matter how uncomfortable the politics. Silence
facilitates wrongdoing. By speaking up, by taking action in the face
of breaches of international humanitarian law, the Council will save
lives not just today but into the future.
We cannot allow a culture of impunity to emerge.
Where international humanitarian law is violated, the Security
Council needs to be proactive. It has an important role in ensuring
accountability and effective remedy, and in referring certain violations to the International Criminal Court. When countries fail to
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give effect to the Court’s decision, the Council must be seen to act.
Arrest warrants must be executed. And this support must be backed
up by a renewed commitment to the adequate financing of the Court.
On the Security Council, we will work in partnership to maximise
humanitarian space.
There should be no toleration for those who deliberately target humanitarian workers.
While international travel remains complicated by public health
restrictions, we need to be vigilant in protecting humanitarian access. We need to watch that it is not deliberately restricted for other
motives—indeed, in the face of increasing humanitarian need because of the interlocking health, economic and social crisis, there is
a strong argument for prioritising humanitarian access at this time.
We also need to be particularly mindful of the impact of other Security Council decisions on humanitarian space. Our own actions
should not undermine humanitarian action.
Sanctions regimes or counter-terrorism measures are essential tools
in the Council’s armoury. However, when their design does do not
take sufficient account of the complexity of humanitarian action
during modern conflict it can close the space for principled humanitarian action. And even when that space is kept open, the overhead
navigating them imposes on humanitarian organisations—or even
the United Nations itself—is too high and itself compromises their
ability to respond to need.
Some actors deliberately misinterpret sanctions measures in order to
limit or shrink humanitarian space. Humanitarians can be subject
to mischievous legal action by elements sympathetic to one or other
party to a conflict.
Principled humanitarian action, and brave humanitarians who risk
their lives for others, should never be instrumentalised—humanitarians should not have to run the gauntlet of civil or criminal jeopardy.
That is why I believe that in designing sanctions regimes greater consideration must be given to safeguards for humanitarian action.
One way in which we can do this in by keeping our focus firmly on
the protection of civilians, a theme which Vice Admiral Mark Mellett
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explored in his contribution to this lecture series.
Over the last 20 years, the Security Council has worked to develop
a ‘culture of protection.’ Peacekeeping mandates have evolved: the
protection of civilians, the intelligent use of sanctions regimes and
development of the children and armed conflict agenda have been
important, building on the landmark adoption twenty years ago of
Resolution 1325, on Women, Peace and Security.
However, there is no room for complacency. As conflict evolves and
new conflicts emerge, frequently not involving state actors, fresh
protection challenges arise. The Security Council must continue to
enhance its work on the protection of civilians, including looking at
how its work engages with, and is complementary to, work in other
parts of the UN system. For example, can greater complementarity
be built between the Council’s work on women, peace and security
on one hand and that of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on the other?
We can do more to bridge the gap between the Security Council’s
stated desire to protect civilians and the translation of that into concrete actions on the ground.
To do this will require difficult discussions. Negotiations for which
Ireland is ready, bringing to the table the experience of an island
which has only recently emerged from conflict. A conflict in which
civilians bore the brunt. And a peace where the role of women negotiators was fundamental to achieving agreement.
We also bring to the Security Council the practical learning from
sixty unbroken years of peacekeeping. Our soldiers know the importance of designing peacekeeping mandates which are fit for purpose.
Mandates which do not adequately match the realities of conflict on
the ground put not just civilians but peacekeepers themselves at risk.
Training and resources in turn must match mandates.
Irish peacekeepers have learned how to fully integrate the protection
of civilians into policy and practice. Ireland’s Defence Forces, through
the United Nations Training School Ireland, are at the forefront of
ensuring UN peacekeepers are fully trained in the protection of civilians, bringing together troops from across the globe in the Curragh.
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These are resources on which we can draw in our contribution to the
work of the Security Council.
That practical experience also gives Ireland an insight into the evolving nature of armed conflict, which the Security Council must take
into account in its work.
Over the past decade or so, we have seen the terrible humanitarian consequences of urban conflict and, in particular, the effects of
explosive weapons in populated areas. New technologies, such as
drones or artificial intelligence, mean that human control of weapons is changing. International humanitarian law is trying to keep up.
Among the challenges is the toll which explosive weapons have not
just on people but also on critical infrastructure.
The destruction of schools means that a generation of children may
miss the opportunity for education—and we risk the creation of a
new generation of radicals.
The destruction of hospitals means needless deaths, not just from
conflict but from otherwise treatable conditions. Conflict related
damage to public health systems is affecting the response to COVID-19 in many countries—a danger to their people today but
to all of us tomorrow. We have a shared interest in minimising
such damage.
The destruction of sanitation systems heightens the incidence of
cholera and other diseases.
And the eventual cost of reconstruction is higher, whether the
restoration of infrastructure or the rebuilding of lives fractured
by conflict.
Every day that systems are under strain is another day when more
people somewhere else for safety, whether displaced within their own
country or as refugees in another.
It is clear that we cannot be complacent. That is why Ireland is
among those leading international efforts in Geneva to address the
humanitarian consequences of the use of explosive weapons with
wide area effects in populated areas. Consultations began last November on a political declaration which I hope will be concluded in
the coming months and which will encourage behavioural change in
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those who use such explosives. Through enhanced compliance with
international humanitarian law adequate to the realities of modern
warfare, we will strengthen the protection of civilians.
Of course, the best way to protect civilians from the effects of armed
conflict is to avoid conflict in the first place. The Secretary-General’s
vision on prevention is also Ireland’s vision. He said we must “do
everything we can to help countries to avert the outbreak of crises which
take a high toll on humanity, undermining institutions and capacities to
achieve peace and development.”
Signs of a looming conflict are apparent in advance. Yet, too often
it is only when the first shots are fired, the first wave of people are
displaced, or the first massacre occurs that the world starts to take
notice. At that stage we find ourselves challenged to respond to humanitarian emergencies, to stabilisation—using funds that would be
better invested in development.
That is why I agree with the Secretary-General when he says that
“Prevention must permeate everything we do.”
This is the philosophy at the heart of Ireland’s policy on international
development, A Better World.
This is the philosophy behind Ireland’s contribution to disarmament
over many decades.
This is the philosophy which will inform Ireland’s contribution to
the work of the Security Council.
This understanding is at the heart of Ireland’s development policy
and the priority we attach to reducing humanitarian need.
While the politics of every conflict are different, many of the warning signs are similar. We need to be attentive to increases in human
rights violations and hate speech. Inter-communal violence is a sign
that fragility is growing. Conflict in neighbouring states is a danger
sign, as is persistent gender inequality and the treatment of women.
We are beginning to see climate change impact on security, magnifying the discord which a lack of access to food or wealth can generate. Climate change is creating competition for scarce resources. It is
already causing displacement—imagine the displacement should an
island have to be evacuated before it disappears.
165

COVID-19, and the economic consequences of the global shutdown, is placing additional pressures in countries already battling
many of these challenges.
I am conscious that there are many places where government structures are very weak. The virus is placing additional pressures on those
who wish to stabilise and develop such places. We know also that
state absence or weakness is often exploited by armed groups—indeed, we have seen criminal groups in some countries try to use COVID-19 responses to carve out safe areas. In many contexts, armed
groups try to become de facto authorities, usurping the role of the
state as a means to deliver on political objectives. More needs to be
done to prevent the hollowing-out of state structures, to prevent the
conflicts that inevitably flow from such challenges to state authority.
If we are to deliver on the Charter’s ambition to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” we must act earlier and with more
determination. Preventing conflict, building and sustaining peace
must be a priority for the whole UN system. This means that development, humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding efforts
must work together better.
This is the right thing.
This is also the smart thing.
Peacekeeping and humanitarian action costs US$40 billion annually.
Imagine what we could achieve if that US$40 billion was invested
sustainably and productively?
On the Security Council, Ireland will argue for early, full and effective use of the tools at the Council’s disposal, to enable a more
comprehensive approach to the prevention of conflict.
This would include deepening the relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission, convening Arria formula meetings, and strategic
use of informal meetings so that Security Council debates are seen to
be as informed as possible.
We would work to deepen the dialogue and cooperation with regional organisations, to better understand regional dynamics and
to improve early warning systems. We are backing this up with a
sustained investment in Ireland’s bilateral relationships, through my
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Government’s Global Ireland strategy and in Ireland’s contribution to
effective multilateralism.
Words matter. We would work on the Council to use lines to the
press and statements to send the right and timely signals to parties
to potential conflict.
I have highlighted the importance of Women, Peace and Security—
twenty years on, we have not harnessed the potential of this agenda
to prevent conflict. We need more women at the table and in the
Security Council chamber. We must work to ensure that women at
the table are representative.
On the Security Council, we will listen to women’s voices, learn from
women’s insight, take women’s guidance.
We will work to ensure that women must be part of every mandate
renewal, of every geographic and thematic discussion, of every local
consultation, of every analysis completed in the field. This will make
the work of the United Nations even stronger and, importantly, help
ensure that where we have achieved peace we help avoid recurrence.
I know from my own involvement in talks in Northern Ireland
how difficult, but essential, is the task of sustaining peace. It takes
engagement over the long term, patience, ingenuity, imagination
and generosity.
Since the adoption of the sustaining peace resolutions in 2016, the
Security Council has engaged more deeply in this agenda, whether through discussions on conflict prevention and mediation, or
through difficult issues of legacy such as reconciliation, accountability and transitional justice. This is important work, to which Ireland
can bring the perspectives and value of lived experience.
Conclusion
Franklin Roosevelt spoke of his hope for “a better life, a better world,
beyond the horizon.”
It was Roosevelt who first used the phrase ‘United Nations.’ I like to
think that the UN is the vehicle for us to reach that better world, to
bring that horizon closer.
The United Nations is us, its member states. We determine how ef167

fective it can be. When we step up, the UN steps up. When we act in
solidarity, the UN can act in solidarity.
At this moment when the world is facing the triple crisis of COVID
-19—health, economic and social—we need our United Nations to
be at its most effective. That will enable the best possible response to
the humanitarian consequences of this crisis. To get there, each of
must contribute to a renewed global solidarity.
Ireland will play our part in building that solidarity, bringing our
values of empathy, partnership and independence, our history and
our hard work. We will do so in the plenary halls of New York and
Geneva, on the boards and in the backrooms, in capitals and, we
hope, on the Security Council.
With a clear, strong and independent voice, we will keep people at
the centre of all our efforts and seek to leave no one behind.
—Dublin, May 2020
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